Printable Format60-226. General provisions governing discovery. (a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: Depositions on oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter onto land or other property under K.S.A. 60-234, K.S.A. 60-245(a)(1)(A)(iii) or K.S.A. 60-245a, and amendments thereto; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. (1) Scope in general. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
(2) Limitations on frequency and extent. (A) On motion, or on its own, the court may limit the frequency or extent of discovery methods otherwise allowed by the rules of civil procedure and must do so if it determines that:
(i) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by subsection (b)(1).
(B) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(2)(A). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
(3) Insurance agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insurance is not a part of an insurance agreement.
(4) Trial preparation; materials. (A) Documents and tangible things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative, including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent. But, subject to subsection (b)(5), those materials may be discovered if:
(i) They are otherwise discoverable under paragraph (1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.
(B) Protection against disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.
(C) Previous statement. Any party or other person may, on request and without the required showing, obtain the person's own previous statement about the action or its subject matter. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order, and K.S.A. 60-237, and amendments thereto, applies to the award of expenses. A previous statement is either:
(i) A written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or approved; or
(ii) a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording, or a transcription of it, that recites substantially verbatim the person's oral statement.
(5) Trial preparation; experts.
(A) Deposition of an expert who may testify. A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a disclosure is required under subsection (b)(6), the deposition may be conducted only after the disclosure is provided.
(B) Trial-preparation protection for draft disclosures. Subsections (b)(4)(A) and (b)(4)(B) protect drafts of any disclosure required under subsection (b)(6), and drafts of a disclosure by an expert witness provided in lieu of the disclosure required by subsection (b)(6), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.
(C) Trial-preparation protection for communications between a party's attorney and expert witnesses. Subsections (b)(4)(A) and (b)(4)(B) protect communications between the party's attorney and any witness about whom disclosure is required under subsection (b)(6), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications:
(i) Relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony;
(ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or
(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.
(D) Expert employed only for trial preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. But a party may do so only:
(i) As provided in K.S.A. 60-235(b), and amendments thereto; or
(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(E) Payment. Unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery:
(i) Pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under subsection (b)(5)(A) or (b)(5)(D); and
(ii) for discovery under subsection (b)(5)(D), also pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses it reasonably incurred in obtaining the expert's facts and opinions.
(6) Disclosure of expert testimony. (A) Required disclosures. A party must disclose to other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present expert testimony. The disclosure must state:
(i) The subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; and
(ii) the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify.
(B) Witness who is retained or specially employed. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, if the witness is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case, or is one whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony, the disclosure under subsection (b)(6)(A) must also state a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
(C) Time to disclose expert testimony. A party must make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court orders. Absent a stipulation or court order, the disclosures must be made:
(i) At least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial; or
(ii) if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under subsection (b)(6)(B), within 30 days after the other party's disclosure.
(D) Supplementing the disclosure. The parties must supplement these disclosures when required under subsection (e).
(E) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all disclosures under this subsection must be:
(i) In writing, signed and served; and
(ii) filed with the court in accordance with K.S.A. 60-205(d), and amendments thereto.
(7) Claiming privilege or protecting trial preparation materials. (A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party must:
(i) Expressly make the claim; and
(ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications or things not produced or disclosed, and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.
(B) Information produced. If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
(c) Protective orders. (1) In general. A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending, as an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the district court where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action and must describe the steps taken by all attorneys or unrepresented parties to resolve the issues in dispute. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(A) Forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery;
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters;
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order;
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court orders.
(2) Ordering discovery. If a motion for a protective order is wholly or partly denied the court may, on just terms, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery.
(3) Awarding expenses. The provisions of K.S.A. 60-237, and amendments thereto, apply to the award of expenses.
(d) Sequence of discovery. Unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise for the parties' and witnesses' convenience and in the interests of justice:
(1) Methods of discovery may be used in any sequence; and
(2) discovery by one party does not require any other party to delay its discovery.
(e) Supplementing disclosures and responses. (1) In general. A party who has made a disclosure under subsection (b)(6), or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production or request for admission, must supplement or correct its disclosure or response:
(A) In a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or
(B) as ordered by the court.
(2) Expert witness. For an expert to whom the disclosure requirement in subsection (b)(6) applies, the party's duty to supplement extends both to information included in the disclosure and to information given during the expert's deposition. Any additions or changes to this information must be disclosed at least 30 days before trial, unless the court orders otherwise.
(f) Signing disclosures and discovery requests, responses and objections. (1) Signature required; effect of signature. Every disclosure under subsection (b)(6) and every discovery request, response or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's own name, or by the party personally, if unrepresented, and must state the signor's address, e-mail address and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry:
(A) With respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made;
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response or objection, it is:
(i) Consistent with the rules of civil procedure and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.
(2) Failure to sign. Other parties have no duty to act on an unsigned disclosure, request, response or objection until it is signed, and the court must strike it unless a signature is promptly supplied after the omission is called to the attorney's or party's attention.
(3) Sanction for improper certification. If a certification violates this section without substantial justification, the court, on motion, or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the violation.
History: L. 1963, ch. 303, 60-226; amended by Supreme Court order dated July 20, 1972; L. 1986, ch. 215, § 6; L. 1997, ch. 173, § 11; L. 2008, ch. 21, § 2; L. 2010, ch. 135, § 95; L. 2011, ch. 48, § 8; L. 2012, ch. 35, § 2; L. 2017, ch. 75, § 4; July 1.
Source or prior law:
(a). G.S. 1868, ch. 80, §§ 346, 347; L. 1909, ch. 113, § 1; L. 1909, ch. 182, §§ 337, 338; R.S. 1923, 60-2819 through 60-2821.
(b). G.S 1868, ch. 80, §§ 346, 347; L. 1909, ch. 182, §§ 337, 338; R.S. 1923, 60-2819, 60-2820.
(d). G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 346; L. 1909, ch. 182, § 337; R.S. 1923, 60-2819.
Cross References to Related Sections:
Use of depositions in limited actions, see 61-3105.
Discovery of records at University of Kansas School of medicine and medical center used for instructional purposes, see 76-355 et seq.
Pretrial procedure, see 60-216.
Certification and filing of depositions by officer, see 60-230(f).
Failure as to deposition or interrogatories, consequences, see 60-237(d).
Judgment may be denied or continuance ordered to permit affidavits, depositions or discovery, see 60-256(f).
Depositions of witness upon written questions, see 60-231.
Depositions upon oral examinations, see 60-230, 60-237.
Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions, see 60-232.
Failure to attend or serve subpoena, expenses, see 60-230(g).
Persons before whom depositions may be taken, see 60-228.
Stipulations as to taking depositions, see 60-229.
Subpoena, see 60-245.
Interrogatories of parties, written, see 60-233.
Perpetuation of testimony, see 60-227.
Discovery and production of documents, etc., see 60-234.
Physical and mental examinations of persons, see 60-235.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
Commented upon prior to legislative enactment, Emmet Blaes, 31 J.B.A.K. 174 (1962).
Compared with federal rules; list of states adopting, Lee Silverstein, 11 K.L.R. 213, 214 (1962).
Enlarging Kansas discovery, Ronan E. Degnan, 11 K.L.R. 221, 223 (1962).
"Highlights of the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure (1963)," Spencer A. Gard, 2 W.L.J. 199, 208 (1962).
1961-63 survey of law of evidence, Spencer A. Gard, 12 K.L.R. 239, 249 (1963).
"Divorce Under the New Code," Dan Hopson, Jr., 33 J.B.A.K. 165, 166 (1964).
"Divorce and Alimony Under the New Code," Dan Hopson, Jr., 12 K.L.R. 27 (1963).
Paragraph (b) discussed, Edward M. Boyle, 13 K.L.R. 125, 133, 134 (1964).
Paragraph (b) discussed with respect to insurance policies, Gary Kershner, 5 W.L.J. 270, 279 (1966).
Discussed in reference to use of depositions and interrogatories, David Prager, 33 J.B.A.K. 25, 74, 76, 77 (1964).
"The Continuing Nature of Discovery," Louis E. Striegel, 34 J.B.A.K. 97, 98 (1965).
Paragraph (b); effect upon discovery under civil code, Spencer A. Gard, 33 J.B.A.K. 7, 60, 61 (1964).
Paragraph (b); discussing what constitutes relevant evidence, Louis E. Striegel, 5 W.L.J. 47, 55 (1965).
Discussed in article on discovery and production of documents under civil code, Wayne Coulson, 33 J.B.A.K. 96, 97 (1964).
Paragraph (b); discussion of district court rules relating to interrogatories, D. Keith Anderson, 6 W.L.J. 113, 122, 124 (1966).
"Survey of Kansas Law: Evidence," Spencer A. Gard, 16 K.L.R. 125, 136 (1967).
"Interrogatories Restrained," Roger D. Stanton, 37 J.B.A.K. 7, 8, 58, 59 (1968).
Subsection (b); survey of civil procedure, Spencer A. Gard, 17 K.L.R. 739 (1969).
Comment concerning discovery of insurance policy limits, Randy L. Baird, 11 W.L.J. 237 (1972).
"Discovery Techniques in Workmen's Compensation: Largely Undiscovered?" Robert Fowks, 42 J.B.A.K. 83, 84, 86, 87 (1973).
"Contested Estate Matters After Court Unification," Calvin J. Karlin, 48 J.B.A.K. 97, 101 (1979).
"Kansas Diversion: Defendant's Remedies and Prosecutorial Opportunities," Joseph Brian Cox, 20 W.L.J. 344, 358 (1981).
"Experts & Discovery," Richard Cordry, 3 J.K.T.L.A. No. 4, 14, 15 (1979).
"Limiting Discovery of Non-Testifying Experts," Mark A. Johnson, 4 J.K.T.L.A. No. 1, 5, 6 (1980).
"Comparative Fault: Avoiding the Phantom Trap," Dan Wulz, 6 J.K.T.L.A. No. 4, 8, 9 (1983).
"Changes Made by the New Juvenile Codes," Sheila Reynolds, 51 J.K.B.A. 181, 186 (1982).
"Depositions Upon Oral Exam: Making Changes in a Witness' Testimony," Alan V. Johnson, 51 J.K.B.A. 263, 264 (1982).
"Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—Some New Approaches to Case Management and Limits on Discovery in Federal Courts," G. T. VanBebber, 52 J.K.B.A. 247, 251 (1983).
"Survey of Kansas Law: Juvenile Law," Sheila Reynolds, 32 K.L.R. 371, 379 (1984).
"Recent Development in Kansas Civil Procedure," E. Elinor P. Schroeder, 32 K.L.R. 515, 533 (1984).
"Survey of Kansas Law: Family Law," Nancy G. Maxwell, 32 K.L.R. 543, 577 (1984).
"Comparative Negligence. New Rules of Pleading and Burden of Proof," Vol. IX, Special Issue, J.K.T.L.A. 28 (1985).
"A Fresh Look at an Old Problem," Vol. IX, No. 1, J.K.T.L.A. 23 (1985).
"Trial Tactics and Depositions: A New Series of Relationships," Vol. IX, Special Issue, J.K.T.L.A. 12 (1985).
"The Scope of the Physician/Patient Privilege Under K.S.A. 60-427(d): Must a Litigant Sign an Unlimited Medical Authorization," Dan L. Wulz, Vol. X, No. 2, J.K.T.L.A. 27 (1986).
"Closing Argument: The Final Fatal Flaw," Roger W. Badeker, 59 J.K.B.A. No. 3, 37, 40 (1990).
"Prohibiting Ex Parte Contacts with Treating Physicians in Kansas," Patrick R. Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XV, No. 3, 11 (1992).
"Identifying and Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in Various Business Transactions," David J. Haydon, 61 J.K.B.A. No. 8, 24, 28 (1992).
"Industrial Espionage? Discovery Within the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Battle for Protective Orders Governing Trade Secrets and Confidential Information," James R. Jarrow, 32 W.L.J. 318 (1993).
"Discovery of Insurance Adjustor's Files Under 60-226(b)(3)," L. J. Leatherman, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 18, 19 (1993).
"Challenging and Defending Agency Actions in Kansas," Steve Leben, 64 J.K.B.A. No. 5, 22, 31 (1995).
"Will Contests in Kansas," Dennis M. Feeney & Jeffery L. Carmichael, 64 J.K.B.A. No. 7, 22, 23 (1995).
"How to Prevent the Discovery of Opinions Held by Nontestifying Experts," Bryan W. Smith, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 4, 16 (1996).
"Compliance Through Cooperation," Robert W. Parnacott, 65 J.K.B.A. No. 5, 22 (1996).
"The Fork in the Road: A Practitioner's Guide to the 1997 Changes in the Code of Civil Procedure," J. Nick Badgerow, 66 J.K.B.A. No. 5, 32 (1997).
"On the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Kansas," Mark D. Hinderks and Steve Leben, 66 J.K.B.A. No. 9, 24 (1997).
"Back to the Basics: Procedures for Taking Depositions (Part 1)," Randall E. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 4, 17 (1999).
"The Kansas Joint-Defense Privilege: A Cigarette Smokescreen," Derek S. Casey, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 6, 16 (1999).
"The Lawyer's Inferno: A Guide to Navigating Discovery Disputes," Paul W. Rebein and Matthew C. Miller, 69 J.K.B.A. No. 3, 19 (2000).
"An Analysis of the Admissibility of Expert Opinion Testimony in Kansas State Courts After Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals," James D. Griffin, 71 J.K.B.A. No. 2, 28 (2002).
"Legal Malpractice in Kansas: Principles and Examples," Monte Vines, 72 J.K.B.A. No. 10, 16, 22 (2003).
"Discovery Issues in Sedgwick County," John W. Johnson, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, 11, 12, 13 (2005).
"Motions in Limine: Where Evidence Stands on the Threshold," Derek S. Casey, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 4, 4 (2006).
"Comparison of Federal and State Court Practice," David G. Seely, 75 J.K.B.A. No. 4, 28 (2006).
"Improperly Divorced From Its Roots: The Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs," Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, 55 K.L.R. 463 (2007).
"Cutting the Hedge: Reforming Comparative Fault in Medical Malpractice," John W. Johnson and Edward L. Robinson, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 3, 12 (2007).
"ESI Comes to the K.S.A.: Kansas Adopts Federal Civil Procedure Rules on Electronic Discovery," J. Nick Badgerow, 77 J.K.B.A. No. 7, 30 (2008).
"Videotaping a Defense Medical Examination," Ryan E. Hodge, J.K.A.J. Vol. 31, No. 5, 10 (2008).
"Ethics in Handling Medical Records Pre-Suit and in Civil Discovery," James R. Howell, 32 J.K.A.J., No. 4, 6 (2009).
"Please Leave the Room: Who Can Attend Depositions?" J. Nick Badgerow and Lindsay Noelle, K.D.J. Winter (2006).
"The Pot Calls the Kettle Black: A Rebuttal to 'Cutting the Hedge: Reforming Comparative Fault in Medical Malpractice'," Jerry D. Hawkins, K.D.J. Spring (2007).
"Ex Parte Contacts with Treating Physicians: A Look at the Law and Current Practice," John W. Johnson, 33 J.K.A.J., No. 5, 11 (2010).
"Written Discovery: A Bag of Tools (Part 1)," James R. Howell, 34 J.K.A.J., No. 2, 4 (2010).
"Requests For Admission: Another Tool in the Box? (Part 2)," James R. Howell, 34 J.K.A.J., No. 3, 4 (2011).
"Discovery Tools: Requests For Production of Documents (Part 3)," James R. Howell, 34 J.K.A.J. No. 4, 6 (2011).
"Recent Changes in the Expert Rules: A Resolution or New Battleground?" James R. Howell, 36 J.K.A.J. No. 2, 9 (2012).
"Successful Expert Discovery in Kansas State Court Civil Litigation," Steve R. Fabert, 82 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 36 (2013).
CASE ANNOTATIONS
Prior law cases, see G.S. 1949, 60-2819 to 60-2821 and the 1961 Supp. thereto.
1. Statements taken by insurance claim adjuster not under supervision of attorney in preparation for trial not protected hereunder. Alseike v. Miller, 196 K. 547, 548, 552, 555, 557, 558, 412 P.2d 1007.
2. Use of discovery depositions; not limited by 60-227. Taylor v. Maxwell, 197 K. 509, 512, 513, 419 P.2d 822.
3. Liability insurance policy limits held not subject to disclosure under statute. Muck, Administratrix v. Claflin, 197 K. 594, 598, 600, 601, 419 P.2d 1017.
4. Subsection (e) quoted in construing subsection (c) of 60-232. Trimble, Administrator v. Coleman Co., Inc., 200 K. 350, 355, 356, 437 P.2d 219.
5. Denial of continuance and assigning case for trial did not prejudice defendant as to discovery and pre-trial conference. Scott v. Keyse, 200 K. 625, 629, 630, 438 P.2d 112.
6. Answers to interrogatories must be relevant and material in order to be considered by trier of facts. Allen v. Schauf, 202 K. 348, 365, 449 P.2d 1010.
7. Subsection (e) cited; contemporaneous objection rule applied. Jensen v. Jensen, 205 K. 465, 466, 470 P.2d 829.
8. Cited in case concerning refusal to comply with discovery and consequences therefor. Williams v. Consolidated Investors, Inc., 205 K. 728, 732, 735, 472 P.2d 248.
9. Where testimony at preliminary hearing admitted at trial due to absence of witness, defendant's failure to object at preliminary hearing waived his right to object at trial to leading questions eliciting such testimony. State v. Washington, 206 K. 336, 339, 479 P.2d 833.
10. Claim that missing diagram deprived defendant of right to require introduction of all of deposition as required hereunder, not upheld; admission where deponent died before signing deposition did not constitute prejudicial error. Ballhorst v. Hahner-Foreman-Cale, Inc., 207 K. 89, 92, 95, 484 P.2d 38.
11. Subsection (d) cited; discussion of whether prisoner was unable to attend court relevant. State v. Goodman, 207 K. 155, 160, 161, 483 P.2d 1040.
12. Cited in holding that existence of liability insurance and policy limits thereof are subject to disclosure at pretrial conference. Cropp v. Woleslagel, 207 K. 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 485 P.2d 1271.
13. Refusal to admit into evidence a deposition when no attempt to secure the attendance of defendant was made, held not error. State v. Frideaux, 207 K. 790, 792, 487 P.2d 541.
14. Use of unsigned deposition by adverse party allowed where witness had died. Grubb, Administrator v. Grubb, 208 K. 484, 486, 487, 488, 493 P.2d 189.
15. No error in excluding expert medical testimony; deposition required seasonable amendment under subsection (e). Barnes v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, 211 K. 315, 320, 321, 507 P.2d 288.
16. Subsection (d) (3) cited; opposing party not required to be notified prior to trial of use of deposition. Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 K. 91, 97, 515 P.2d 1062.
17. Where deposition of party not inconsistent with his trial testimony, improper to create impression that there are inconsistencies before the jury. Mesecher v. Cropp, 213 K. 695, 698, 518 P.2d 504.
18. Trial courts refusal to permit deposition of defendant to be read in evidence held error; not prejudicial. Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 214 K. 128, 137, 519 P.2d 1101.
19. Mentioned in holding trial court abused discretion in dismissing damage action under 60-237 (b) (2). Vickers v. City of Kansas City, 216 K. 84, 90, 531 P.2d 113.
20. Trial court ruling did not prejudicially restrict plaintiffs' right of discovery. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 K. 44, 55, 536 P.2d 54.
21. Applied with 60-232; deposition properly introduced for impeachment purposes. Service Oil Co., Inc. v. White, 218 K. 87, 100, 542 P.2d 652.
22. No basis to request admissions where parties had no "pending action" as defined and required by statute. Boyce v. Knudson, 219 K. 357, 360, 548 P.2d 712.
23. Failure of trial court to require answers to interrogatories; no abuse of discretion. Hamilton v. Ling, 1 K.A.2d 22, 28, 561 P.2d 880.
24. Contents of liability insurance policy discoverable under subsection (b)(2). Shriver v. Athletic Council of KSU, 222 K. 216, 219, 564 P.2d 451.
25. Appellant failed to provide court with adequate record; review impossible. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Schropp, 222 K. 612, 625, 567 P.2d 1359.
26. Witnesses' statements taken by insurance company during initial investigation of potential claim discoverable under subsection (b)(1). Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 225 K. 615, 616, 618, 619, 622, 623, 592 P.2d 915.
27. Cited in construing the scope of discovery and relevancy in deposition proceedings under 25-4124. Governmental Ethics Commission v. Cahill, 225 K. 772, 778, 779, 780, 594 P.2d 1103.
28. No abuse of discretion by trial court in dismissing action with prejudice upon plaintiff's failure to answer interrogatories as ordered by court. Fields v. Stauffer Publications, Inc., 2 K.A.2d 323, 325, 326, 578 P.2d 1138.
29. Contents of insurance policy discoverable under subsection (b)(2), but such information is not admissible in evidence. White v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 226 K. 191, 192, 596 P.2d 1229.
30. Quo warranto action for removal from office of public official; inquisitorial procedures after action commenced deemed proper. State ex rel. Miller v. Richardson, 229 K. 234, 236, 237, 623 P.2d 1317.
31. Failure to supplement answer to interrogatory concerning impending sale or lease of party's interest in property deemed knowing concealment. Smith v. Smith, 5 K.A.2d 117, 118, 119, 612 P.2d 1257.
32. A home study investigative report in a child custody dispute is relevant evidence, and the parties must be given access to the report during discovery. Eastman v. Eastman, 6 K.A.2d 137, 139, 626 P.2d 1238.
33. Protection of trade secrets discussed. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 6 K.A.2d 444, 455, 629 P.2d 1174 (1981).
34. Right to discovery subject to discretion of trial court. Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 6 K.A.2d 461, 471, 630 P.2d 167 (1981).
35. Insurance company's initial investigation of potential claim not requested by counsel; not in anticipation of litigation. Independent Mfg. Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 6 K.A.2d 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 637 P.2d 431 (1981).
36. District court denial of protective order under subsection (c) held arbitrary; in camera inspection should have been undertaken; order issued by supreme court. Berst v. Chipman, 231 K. 369, 370, 653 P.2d 106 (1982).
37. Party must show "colorable entitlement" to the defense of discriminatory prosecution before discovery is allowed. State ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 231 K. 524, 529, 646 P.2d 1091 (1982).
38. Motion for protective order hereunder denied; discovery of confidential information allowed when information sought goes to central issue of action. Berst v. Chipman, 232 K. 180, 181, 185, 186, 187, 188, 653 P.2d 107 (1982).
39. Where defense counsel's client could waive attorney-client privilege and testify regarding prior statement regarding consistency with deposition, no grounds for mistrial. Klinzmann v. Beale, 9 K.A.2d 20, 25, 27, 670 P.2d 67 (1983).
40. Trial court has power to limit discovery and issue necessary orders to protect conflicting interests. Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 234 K. 13, 21, 28, 669 P.2d 209 (1983).
41. Cited; mere plotting and planning in anticipation of public improvement not coupled with legal restriction on use not "taking" of property. Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Secretary, Dept. of Transp., 234 K. 121, 131, 671 P.2d 511 (1983).
42. Trial court erred in excluding witness identified as a doctor but not as expert. West v. Martin, 11 K.A.2d 55, 57, 58, 713 P.2d 957 (1986).
43. Error in ordering production of plaintiff's statement to his lawyer and use at trial did not affect substantial rights (60-261). Girrens v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 238 K. 670, 680, 715 P.2d 389 (1986).
44. Expert witness' surprise visit to defendant's hospital injected new material as basis for opinion; testimony limited to prior deposition. Hagedorn v. Stormont-Vail Regional Med. Center, 238 K. 691, 696, 715 P.2d 2 (1986).
45. Manifest injustice does not result simply because plaintiffs may benefit from timing of defendant's depositions of plaintiff's experts. Balagna v. Van Doren-Hazard-Stallings, 11 K.A.2d 357, 360, 720 P.2d 1144 (1986).
46. Cited; use of interrogatories and subpoena duces tecum by director of taxation (79-3233) after commencement of hearing examined. Kansas Dept. of Revenue v. Coca Cola Co., 240 K. 548, 550, 731 P.2d 273 (1987).
47. Cited; use of expert reports in lieu of depositions, payment of fees and expenses examined. Burkhart v. Philsco Products Co., 241 K. 562, 738 P.2d 433 (1987).
48. Statute does not contemplate discovery of medical records of nonparties merely to show bias or prejudice of expert witness. Jones v. Bordman, 243 K. 444, 455, 759 P.2d 953 (1988).
49. Defense attorney fees irrelevant in determining reasonableness of plaintiff's attorney fees; refusal to compel discovery not abuse of discretion. Evans v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 15 K.A.2d 97, 110, 803 P.2d 1033 (1991).
50. Statute does not require deposition testimony to be final and conclusive; appraiser's final determination of property value at trial examined. Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 249 K. 1, 11, 815 P.2d 528 (1991).
51. Discovery exception regarding attorney-client privilege (60-426(b)(1)), sanctions imposed for refusal to comply with discovery order (60-237(b)(2)) examined. Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chtd. v. Louisburg Grain Co., 16 K.A.2d 30, 35, 818 P.2d 805 (1991).
52. Disclosure statements of plaintiff's expert witness examined in claim filed under FELA; relaxed standard of proof of causation noted. Knowles v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 18 K.A.2d 608, 609, 856 P.2d 1352 (1993).
53. Whether court may impose sanctions without allowing litigant opportunity for hearing on opponent's motion to compel discovery examined. Richards v. Bryan, 19 K.A.2d 950, 967, 879 P.2d 638 (1994).
54. Export testimony regarding lost profits excluded as unreliable, untimely hearsay. Olathe Mfg., Inc. v. Browning Mfg., 259 K. 735, 760, 770, 915 P.2d 86 (1996).
55. Harmless error to disallow doctor's testimony because opinion not provided in discovery; same evidence produced by another expert. Bates v. Hogg, 22 K.A.2d 702, 707, 921 P.2d 249 (1996).
56. Medical malpractice action; work product protection of attorney retained by insurance company. Heany v. Nibbelink, 23 K.A.2d 583, 588, 589, 932 P.2d 1046 (1997).
57. Expert witness letters do not satisfy requirements to qualify as answers to written interrogatories. Hare v. Wendler, 263 K. 434, 441, 949 P.2d 1141 (1997).
58. Defendant required to supplement initial report; erroneous admission of testimony is excusable because of testimony of another witness. Frans v. Gausman, 27 K.A.2d 518, 6 P.3d 432 (2000).
59. No provision in Chapter 61 for withdrawal or amendment of admissions as in Chapter 60. Berkshire Aircraft, Inc. v. AEC Leasing Co., 32 K.A.2d 427, 84 P.3d 608 (2002).
60. Pro se litigant must follow same rules as litigant represented by counsel. In re Estate of Broderick, 34 K.A.2d 695, 125 P.3d 564 (2005).
61. No prejudice resulted from failure to disclose witness as an expert before deposition was taken. Warren v. Heartland Automotive Services, Inc., 36 K.A.2d 758, 760, 144 P.3d 73 (2006).
62. Court has discretion in allowing discovery if relevant and not privileged. Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 284 K. 476, 498, 161 P.3d 730 (2007).
63. Supplementing discovery one year after discovery ended is not "seasonable" supplementation. U.S.D. No. 232 v. CWD Investments, 288 K. 536, 205 P.3d 1245 (2009).
64. Discovery rules of K.S.A. 60-226(b)(6) not applicable in context of K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding. Moll v. State, 41 K.A.2d 677, 204 P.3d 659 (2009).
65. Discovery rules of K.S.A. 60-226(b)(6) not applicable to K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings. LaPointe v. State, 42 K.A.2d 522, 214 P.3d 684 (2009).
66. Supplemental disclosures meet the requirements of K.S.A. 60-226(e)(1) because they were disclosed more than 30 days before trial. Foster v. Klaumann, 42 K.A.2d 634, 216 P.3d 671 (2009).
67. Supplementation of disclosure not controlled by 90-day requirement. Walder v. Board of Jackson County Comm'rs, 44 K.A.2d 284, 236 P.3d 525 (2010).
68. Writ of mandamus granted requiring the district court to consider various factors regarding claims of privilege and undue burden. Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 K. 597, 244 P.3d 642 (2010).
69. Civil discovery rules contained in section do not apply in criminal proceedings. State v. Edwards, 299 K. 1008, 1017, 327 P.3d 469 (2014).
70. Section governing discovery in civil cases does not apply in criminal cases. State v. Lewis, 50 K.A.2d 405, 410, 327 P.3d 1042 (2014).
71. Rebuttal evidence is properly admissible when the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut the defense expert's evidence, even if the rebuttal evidence would tend to support the party's case-in-chief. Bereal v. Bajaj, 52 K.A.2d 574, 583-584, 371 P.3d 349 (2016).
72. The non-testifying expert privilege applies to in-house experts who are specifically employed in anticipation of litigation and who are not expected to be called as witnesses at trial. Flaherty v. CNH Indus. America, 56 K.A.2d 1317, 1334, 446 P.3d 1078 (2019).