KANSAS OFFICE of
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44-556. Judicial review of actions of the board; procedure; payment of compensation pending administrative and judicial review; application of 1993 amendments; reimbursement or credit for amounts paid under certain circumstances. (a) Any action of the board pursuant to the workers compensation act, other than the disposition of appeals of preliminary orders or awards under K.S.A. 44-534a, and amendments thereto, shall be subject to review in accordance with the Kansas judicial review act by appeal directly to the court of appeals. Any party may appeal from a final order of the board by filing an appeal with the court of appeals within 30 days of the date of the final order. When an appeal has been filed pursuant to this section, an appellee may file a cross appeal within 20 days after the date upon which the appellee was served with notice of the appeal. Such review shall be upon questions of law.

(b) Commencement of an action for review by the court of appeals shall not stay the payment of compensation due for the ten-week period next preceding the board's decision and for the period of time after the board's decision and prior to the decision of the court of appeals on review.

(c) If review is sought on any order entered under the workers compensation act prior to October 1, 1993, such review shall be in accordance with the provisions of K.S.A. 44-551 and this section, and any other applicable procedural provisions of the workers compensation act, as all such provisions existed prior to amendment by this act on July 1, 1993.

(d) (1) If compensation, including medical benefits, temporary total disability benefits or vocational rehabilitation benefits, has been paid to the worker by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier during the pendency of review under this section and the amount of compensation awarded by the board is reduced or totally disallowed by the decision on the appeal or review, the employer and the employer's insurance carrier, except as otherwise provided in this section, shall be reimbursed from the workers compensation fund established in K.S.A. 44-566a, and amendments thereto, for all amounts of compensation so paid which are in excess of the amount of compensation that the worker is entitled to as determined by the final decision on review. The director shall determine the amount of compensation paid by the employer or insurance carrier which is to be reimbursed under this subsection (d)(1), and the director shall certify to the commissioner of insurance the amount so determined. Upon receipt of such certification, the commissioner of insurance shall cause payment to be made to the employer or the employer's insurance carrier in accordance therewith.

(2) If any temporary or permanent partial disability or temporary or permanent total disability benefits have been paid to the worker by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier during the pendency of review under this section and the amount of compensation awarded for such benefits by the board is reduced by the decision on the appeal or review and the balance of compensation due the worker exceeds the amount of such reduction, the employer and the employer's insurance carrier shall receive a credit which shall be applied as provided in this subsection (d)(2) for all amounts of such benefits which are in excess of the amount of such benefits that the worker is entitled to as determined by the final decision on review or appeal. If a lump-sum amount of compensation is due and owing as a result of the decision of the court of appeals, the credit under this subsection (d)(2) shall be applied first against such lump-sum amount. If there is no such lump-sum amount or if there is any remaining credit after a credit has been applied to a lump-sum amount due and owing, such credit shall be applied against the last compensation payments which are payable for a period of time after the final decision on review or appeal so that the worker continues to receive compensation payments after such final decision until no further compensation is payable after the credit has been satisfied. The credit allowed under this subsection (d)(2) shall not be applied so as to stop or reduce benefit payments after such final decision, but shall be used to reduce the period of time over which benefit payments are payable after such final decision. The provisions of this subsection (d)(2) shall be applicable in all cases under the workers compensation act in which a final award is issued by an administrative law judge on or after July 1, 1990.

(e) If compensation, including medical benefits, temporary total disability benefits or vocational rehabilitation benefits, has been paid to the worker by the employer, the employer's insurance carrier or the workers compensation fund during the pendency of review under this section, and pursuant to K.S.A. 44-534a or K.S.A. 44-551, and amendments thereto, and the employer, the employer's insurance carrier or the workers compensation fund, which was held liable for and ordered to pay all or part of the amount of compensation awarded by the administrative law judge or board, is held not liable by the final decision on review by either the board or an appellate court for the compensation paid or is held liable on such appeal or review to pay an amount of compensation which is less than the amount paid pursuant to the award, then the employer, employer's insurance carrier or workers compensation fund shall be reimbursed by the party or parties which were held liable on such review to pay the amount of compensation to the worker that was erroneously ordered paid. The director shall determine the amount of compensation which is to be reimbursed to each party under this subsection, if any, in accordance with the final decision on the appeal or review and shall certify each such amount to be reimbursed to the party required to pay the amount or amounts of such reimbursement. Upon receipt of such certification, the party required to make the reimbursement shall pay the amount or amounts required to be paid in accordance with such certification. No worker shall be required to make reimbursement under this subsection or subsection (d).

(f) As used in subsections (d) and (e), "employers' insurance carrier" includes any qualified group-funded workers compensation pool under K.S.A. 44-581 through 44-591, and amendments thereto, or a group-funded pool under the Kansas municipal group-funded pool act which includes workers compensation and employers' liability under the workers compensation act.

(g) In any case in which any review is sought under this section and in which the compensability is not an issue to be decided on review, medical compensation shall be payable and shall not be stayed pending such review. The worker may proceed under K.S.A. 44-510k, and amendments thereto, and may have a hearing in accordance with that statute to enforce the provisions of this subsection.

History: L. 1927, ch. 232, § 42; L. 1929, ch. 206, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 250, § 10; L. 1961, ch. 243, § 5; L. 1967, ch. 281, § 1; L. 1970, ch. 190, § 9; L. 1974, ch. 203, § 42; L. 1976, ch. 145, § 197; L. 1977, ch. 109, § 29; L. 1979, ch. 158, § 1; L. 1982, ch. 213, § 4; L. 1986, ch. 318, § 57; L. 1987, ch. 187, § 14; L. 1989, ch. 149, § 5; L. 1990, ch. 183, § 9; Revived and amended, L. 1995, ch. 1, § 3; L. 1998, ch. 114, § 4; L. 2000, ch. 160, § 15; L. 2001, ch. 121, § 5; L. 2010, ch. 17, § 72; July 1.

Revisor's Note:

1993 amendments to statute declared unconstitutional in Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 887 P.2d 1119 (1995.)

Cross References to Related Sections:

Payment of medical compensation when compensability is not an issue on review, see 44-551.

Law Review and Bar Journal References:

Survey of law of workmen's compensation, William A. Kelly, 10 K.L.R. 347 (1961).

Defenses hereunder available to certain employer, Thomas M. Van Cleave, Jr., 14 K.L.R. 393, 402 (1965).

Judicial review of administrative decisions, Kenton C. Granger, 33 J.B.A.K. 291, 335, 336 (1964).

Second injury fund (K.S.A. 44-566 et seq.), Alvin D. Herrington, 35 J.B.A.K. 167, 197 (1966).

"The Unusual-Exertion Requirement and Employment-Connected Heart Attacks," William A. Kelly, 16 K.L.R. 411, 415 (1968).

Compensation due to plaintiff-employee during appeal, Sheila R. Miller, 18 K.L.R. 940, 942, 943, 944, 945 (1970).

"Procedures for Reviewing Workmen's Compensation Awards," 13 W.L.J. 197, 200, 203, 206, 208 (1974).

"Potential Federalization of State Workmen's Compensation Law—The Kansas Response," James C. Wright and James P. Rankin, 15 W.L.J. 244, 258 (1976).

Survey of workmen's compensation, Ann Hoover, 15 W.L.J. 409 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—An Introduction to Changes in the Kansas Statute," Bryce B. Moore, 24 K.L.R. 603, 608, 609 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—Major Changes in Employments Covered, Benefits, Defenses, Offsets, and Other Changes," Alvin D. Herrington, 24 K.L.R. 611, 616 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—The Preliminary Hearing, the Workmen's Compensation Fund, and Civil Penalties for Failure to Pay Compensation When Due," Albert M. Ross, 24 K.L.R. 623, 625 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—The Workmen's Compensation Fund," Charles J. Woodin, 24 K.L.R. 641, 642 (1976).

"Practicing Law in a Unified Kansas Court System," Linda Diane Henry Elrod, 16 W.L.J. 260, 272 (1977).

Judicial review of administrative decisions, 17 W.L.J. 312, 330 (1978).

"Judicial Review of Administrative Action—Kansas Perspectives," David L. Ryan, 19 W.L.J. 423, 426 (1980).

"Rethinking Kansas Administrative Procedure," Marilyn V. Ainsworth and Sidney A. Shapiro, 28 K.L.R. 419, 435 (1980).

"Major Legislative Changes in Workers' Compensation Law," Gary L. Jordan, 3 J.K.T.L.A. No. 1, 14, 16 (1979).

"Preparation and Presentation of the Claimant's Case," Gary L. Jordan, 3 J.K.T.L.A. No. 6, 17, 19 (1980).

"A Quantitative and Descriptive Survey of Evidence Law in the Kansas Appellate Courts," Stanley D. Davis, 37 K.L.R. 715, 718 (1989).

"Workers Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVI, No. 1, Special section, 3 (1992).

"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVI, No. 3, Special Section 1, 3 (1993).

"Challenging and Defending Agency Actions in Kansas," Steve Leben, 64 J.K.B.A. No. 5, 22, 35 (1995).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 2, Review Section, 27 (1996).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 4, Review Section, 24 (1998).

"Reaffirming the Finality of Awards: Acosta v. National Beef," Diane F. Barger and Randall E. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 1, 6 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 2, 22 (2004).

CASE ANNOTATIONS

Explanation, see Revisor's Note under article title, chapter 44, article 5.

Cases through 1973

APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

—Scope of review (1-7)

1. The supreme court is limited on appellate review to "questions of law," which in final analysis, simply means that its duty is to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by any substantial competent evidence.

(a) Drake v. State Department of Social Welfare, 210 Kan. 197, 198, 499 P.2d 532 (1972);

(b) Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 Kan. 613, 615, 412 P.2d 986 (1966);

(c) Ratzlaff v. Friedeman Service Store, 195 Kan. 548, 550, 407 P.2d 513 (1965);

(d) Callahan v. Eby Construction Co., 192 Kan. 814, 815, 391 P.2d 315 (1964);

(e) Morgan v. Auto Transports, Inc., 192 Kan. 139, 141, 386 P.2d 230 (1963);

(f) Thompson v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co., 189 Kan. 77, 78, 367 P.2d 72 (1961);

(g) Rowton v. Rainbo Baking Co., 189 Kan. 74, 76, 366 P.2d 796 (1961);

(h) Cody v. Lewis & West Transit Mix, 186 Kan. 437, 443, 351 P.2d 4 (1960);

(i) Smith v. Jones, 185 Kan. 505, 507, 509, 345 P.2d 640 (1959);

(j) Grow v. Musgrove Petroleum Corp., 184 Kan. 800, 802, 339 P.2d 75 (1959);

(k) Weimer v. Sauder Tank Co., 184 Kan. 422, 425, 337 P.2d 672 (1959);

(l) LaRue v. Sierra Petroleum Co., 183 Kan. 153, 156, 325 P.2d 59 (1958);

(m) Rutledge v. Sandlin, 181 Kan. 369, 370, 310 P.2d 950 (1957);

(n) Fitzwater v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 158, 165, 309 P.2d 681 (1957);

(o) Aguilera v. C. & S. Well Service, 178 Kan. 545, 547, 289 P.2d 1062 (1955);

(p) Evans v. Board of Education of Hays, 178 Kan. 275, 276, 284 P.2d 1068 (1955);

(q) Neff v. Henry Wagner Transport Co., 177 Kan. 738, 743, 281 P.2d 1109 (1955);

(r) McDonald v. Rader, 177 Kan. 249, 250, 251, 277 P.2d 652 (1954);

(s) Angleton v. Foster Wheeler Construction Co., 177 Kan. 134, 135, 276 P.2d 325 (1954);

(t) Kober v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 177 Kan. 53, 55, 276 P.2d 335 (1954);

(u) Silvers v. Wakefield, 176 Kan. 259, 270 P.2d 259 (1954);

(v) Andrews v. Bechtel Construction Co., 175 Kan. 885, 886, 267 P.2d 469 (1954);

(w) Gangel v. Cook Saw Mill, 175 Kan. 673, 674, 675, 265 P.2d 853 (1954);

(x) Justice v. Continental Can Co., 174 Kan. 539, 540, 551, 556, 257 P.2d 564 (1953);

(y) Burton v. Western Iron and Foundry Co., 173 Kan. 506, 507, 249 P.2d 688 (1952);

(z) Shue v. LaGesse, 173 Kan. 309, 310, 245 P.2d 966 (1952);

(aa) Keltner v. Swisher, 168 Kan. 184, 187, 211 P.2d 75 (1949);

(bb) Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 207 P.2d 1179 (1949);

(cc) Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 181, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949);

(dd) Conner v. M & M Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 101, 199 P.2d 458 (1948);

(ee) Richards v. J-M Service Corp., 164 Kan. 316, 318, 188 P.2d 939 (1948);

(ff) Walker v. Arrow Well Servicing Co., 163 Kan. 776, 186 P.2d 104 (1947);

(gg) Long v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 158 Kan. 400, 402, 147 P.2d 705 (1944);

(hh) Thompson v. Swenson Construction Co., 158 Kan. 49, 55, 57, 58, 145 P.2d 166 (1944);

(ii) Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 139 P.2d 846 (1943);

(jj) Proffitt v. Aldredge, 154 Kan. 468, 469, 119 P.2d 523 (1941);

(kk) Williams v. Cities Service Gas Co., 151 Kan. 497, 503, 99 P.2d 822 (1940);

(ll) Earhart v. Wible Ice & Cold Storage Co., 150 Kan. 695, 698, 95 P.2d 366 (1939);

(mm) Whitaker v. Panhandle Eastern P. L. Co., 142 Kan. 314, 318, 46 P.2d 862 (1935);

(nn) Meredith v. Seymour Packing Co., 141 Kan. 244, 245, 40 P.2d 325 (1935);

(oo) Jones v. Flexible Forms Co., 140 Kan. 416, 36 P.2d 1027 (1934);

(pp) Kearns v. Reed, 136 Kan. 36, 39, 12 P.2d 820 (1932);

(qq) Fray v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 854, 856, 297 P. 668 (1931); overruled 135 Kan. 216, 9 P.2d 652 (1932);

(rr) Harrigan v. Western Coal & Min. Co., 133 Kan. 573, 578, 300 P. 1115 (1931);

(ss) Coe v. Koontz, 129 Kan. 581, 283 P. 487 (1930).

2. Supreme court has jurisdiction to pass upon application of law to an undisputed set of facts; question of law.

(a) Roth v. Hudson Oil Co., 185 Kan. 576, 345 P.2d 627 (1959);

(b) Landes v. Smith, 189 Kan. 229, 233, 368 P.2d 302 (1962);

(c) Dorst v. City of Chanute, 185 Kan. 593, 598, 345 P.2d 698 (1959);

(d) Bowler v. Elmdale Developing Co., 185 Kan. 785, 786, 347 P.2d 391 (1959).

3. Whether judgment is supported by substantial evidence is question of law.

(a) Gray v. Beller, 199 Kan. 284, 285, 428 P.2d 833 (1967);

(b) McIver v. State Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 678, 680, 426 P.2d 118 (1967);

(c) Beaver v. Tammany Industries, 180 Kan. 440, 443, 304 P.2d 501 (1956);

(d) Coble v. Williams, 177 Kan. 743, 747, 282 P.2d 425 (1955);

(e) Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 364, 139 P.2d 846 (1943);

(f) Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 145 Kan. 36, 64 P.2d 582 (1937);

(g) Hill v. Etchen Motor Co., 143 Kan. 655, 56 P.2d 103 (1936);

(h) Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624, 7 P.2d 70 (1932).

4. The term "substantial evidence" as used on appellate review defined. Barr v. Builders, Inc., 179 Kan. 617, 619, 296 P.2d 1106 (1956).

5. The question of law presented on appellate review (in this case) is whether the basic premise on which the trial court founded the findings was erroneous or proper as a matter of law. Smith v. Jones, 185 Kan. 505, 508, 345 P.2d 640 (1959).

6. Comprehensiveness and completeness of the act ceases on appeal to supreme court. Neufeld v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 193 Kan. 131, 134, 391 P.2d 1009 (1964).

7. In workmen's compensation review, supreme court determines questions of law only; substantial competent evidence defined. Jones v. City of Dodge City, 194 Kan. 777, 778, 402 P.2d 108 (1965).

—Review of evidence (12-14)

12. Supreme court determines whether any substantial evidence supports the trial court's judgment; all testimony is reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.

(a) Peschka v. Wilkinson Drilling Co., 192 Kan. 126, 131, 386 P.2d 509 (1963);

(b) Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 190 Kan. 448, 451, 375 P.2d 771 (1962);

(c) Whitely v. King Radio Corporation, Inc., 190 Kan. 439, 441, 375 P.2d 593 (1962);

(d) Phillips v. Skelly Oil Co., 189 Kan. 491, 370 P.2d 65 (1962);

(e) Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 Kan. 699, 701, 352 P.2d 48 (1960);

(f) Place v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 186 Kan. 523, 350 P.2d 788 (1960);

(g) Heer v. Hankamer Excavating Co., 184 Kan. 186, 334 P.2d 372 (1959);

(h) Reed v. Clay Center Concrete & Sand Co., 184 Kan. 374, 336 P.2d 405 (1959);

(i) Allen v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 184 Kan. 184, 334 P.2d 370 (1959);

(j) LaRue v. Sierra Petroleum Co., 183 Kan. 153, 325 P.2d 59 (1958);

(k) Murphy v. I.C.U. Const. Co., 158 Kan. 541, 543, 148 P.2d 771 (1944);

(l) Waltrip v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 147 Kan. 781, 783, 78 P.2d 898 (1938).

13. Supreme court may determine whether trial court's finding supported by evidence.

(a) Davis v. Braun, 170 Kan. 177, 180, 223 P.2d 958 (1950);

(b) Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 235, 200 P.2d 271 (1948);

(c) Abbott v. Southwest Grain Co., 162 Kan. 315, 176 P.2d 839 (1947);

(d) Scott v. Kansas Western Pipe Line Co., 158 Kan. 160, 163, 146 P.2d 366 (1944);

(e) Brandon v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 506, 507, 163 P.2d 384 (1945).

14. District court finding supported by some evidence is conclusive on appeal.

(a) Cook v. Dobson Sheet Metal Works, 157 Kan. 576, 579, 580, 142 P.2d 709 (1943);

(b) Taylor v. Armour & Co., 186 Kan. 51, 348 P.2d 632 (1960);

(c) Rakes v. Wright Cooperative Exchange, 185 Kan. 794, 347 P.2d 389 (1959);

(d) Davis v. Haren & Laughlin Construction Co., 184 Kan. 820, 339 P.2d 41 (1959);

(e) Kafka v. Edwards, 182 Kan. 568, 322 P.2d 785 (1958);

(f) Cooper v. Helmerich & Payne, 162 Kan. 547, 551, 178 P.2d 242 (1947);

(g) Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499, 503, 163 P.2d 364 (1945);

(h) Johnson v. Voss, 152 Kan. 586, 589, 106 P.2d 648 (1940);

(i) Yehle v. Stamey-Tidd Const. Co., 150 Kan. 440, 447, 94 P.2d 328 (1939);

(k) Johnson v. Arma Elevator Co., 146 Kan. 965, 968, 73 P.2d 1018 (1937);

(l) Hale v. Derry, 144 Kan. 555, 557, 61 P.2d 895 (1936);

(m) Butler v. White Eagle Oil Ref. Co., 140 Kan. 202, 34 P.2d 120 (1934);

(n) Suttle v. Marble Produce Co., 140 Kan. 13, 15, 34 P.2d 116 (1934);

(o) Dinoni v. Vulcan Coal Co., 132 Kan. 810, 811, 297 P. 721 (1931).

—Credence and weight of evidence (19-21)

19. Supreme court will not say what testimony should be given credence; it has neither the duty nor the authority to weigh for evidence.

(a) Allen v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 184 Kan. 184, 186, 334 P.2d 370 (1959);

(b) Lutz v. Gehring Contractor-Builder, Inc., 188 Kan. 690, 692, 366 P.2d 281 (1961);

(c) Heer v. Hankamer Excavating Co., 184 Kan. 186, 187, 334 P.2d 372 (1959);

(d) Rothman v. Globe Construction Co., 171 Kan. 572, 235 P.2d 981 (1951).

20. Supreme court will not weigh evidence on appeal.

(a) Wilbeck v. Grain Belt Transportation Co., 181 Kan. 512, 514, 313 P.2d 725 (1957);

(b) Conner v. M & M Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 102, 199 P.2d 458 (1948);

(c) McMillin v. City of Salina, 163 Kan. 575, 576, 184 P.2d 201 (1947);

(d) Walker v. Arrow Well Servicing Co., 163 Kan. 776, 778, 186 P.2d 104 (1947);

(e) Abbott v. Southwest Grain Co., 162 Kan. 315, 176 P.2d 839 (1947);

(f) Neal v. Boeing Airplane Co., 161 Kan. 322, 323, 167 P.2d 643 (1946);

(g) Burk v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 160 Kan. 519, 522, 526, 163 P.2d 402 (1945);

(h) Goss v. McJunkin Flying Service, 157 Kan. 684, 143 P.2d 659 (1943);

(i) Carrington v. British American Oil Producing Co., 157 Kan. 101, 105, 138 P.2d 463 (1943);

(j) Brown v. Olson Drilling Co., 155 Kan. 230, 231, 124 P.2d 451 (1942);

(k) DeVaul v. Southern Kansas Stage Lines, 151 Kan. 697, 100 P.2d 627 (1940).

21. Finding supported by substantial competent evidence approved notwithstanding evidence which would support contrary finding if believed. Mannell v. Jerome & Associates, 194 Kan. 789, 790, 401 P.2d 1009 (1965).

APPEALS, IN GENERAL

—Right of appeal (26-34)

26. No right to appeal before 1929 amendment. Ferguson v. Palmolive-Peet Co., 129 Kan. 516, 283 P. 508 (1930).

27. Right of appeal applies to pending litigation. Corpora v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 129 Kan. 690, 284 P. 818 (1930).

28. No appeal may be made to supreme court without statutory authority. Williams v. Seymour Packing Co., 174 Kan. 168, 172, 254 P.2d 248 (1953).

29. Oral refusal of modification of award is in effect no award; not appealable. Davis v. Haren & Laughlin Construction Co., 184 Kan. 820, 822, 339 P.2d 41 (1959).

30. Necessary to have adjudication on issues in order to appeal. Brown v. Shellabarger Mill & Elev. Co., 142 Kan. 476, 489, 50 P.2d 919 (1935).

31. This section contemplates appeal to the district court from a "final award" of the director; term "final award" construed; appeal may not be made from the award of the examiner. Harper v. Coffey Grain Co., 192 Kan. 462, 466-470, 388 P.2d 607 (1964).

32. Appeal to district court from examiner's award when review pending before director ineffectual. Harper v. Coffey Grain Co., 192 Kan. 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 470, 388 P.2d 607 (1964).

33. Appellant not divested of right by transmitting appeal to wrong court. Russell v. Lamoreaux Homes, Inc., 198 Kan. 447, 448, 450, 424 P.2d 561 (1967).

34. Payment of compensation required herein pending appeal not a jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining such appeal; no provision for dismissing appeal upon failure to make specified payments. Kissick v. Salina Manufacturing Co., Inc., 204 Kan. 849, 851, 852, 854, 855, 466 P.2d 344 (1970).

—Time for appeal (39-43)

39. Time for appeal runs from date judgment rendered. Brower v. Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 142 Kan. 7, 8, 45 P.2d 864 (1935).

40. Time for filing appeal to supreme court not extended by filing post-judgment motions. Souden v. Rine Drilling Co., 150 Kan. 239, 240, 92 P.2d 74 (1939).

41. Under facts failure to file notice in time not prejudicial; not reversible error. Peters v. Peters, 177 Kan. 100, 103, 104, 105, 276 P.2d 302 (1954).

42. Cross-appeal one year after final order is too late. Davis v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 137 Kan. 30, 34, 19 P.2d 733 (1933).

43. Filing of post-judgment motion fails to enlarge or extend the time for appeal. Dunn v. Kuhlman Diecasting Co., 203 Kan. 670, 671, 455 P.2d 536 (1969).

—Formal requirements (48-57)

48. Effect of incomplete abstract on appeal to supreme court. Addington v. Hall, 160 Kan. 268, 160 P.2d 649 (1945); Watson v. International Milling Co., 190 Kan. 98, 372 P.2d 287 (1962).

49. Contention rule of supreme court requiring printed abstract inapplicable rejected; when appeal reaches supreme court it shall be prosecuted in like manner as other appeals in civil cases. Ford v. Morrison, 182 Kan. 787, 790, 324 P.2d 140 (1958).

50. Filing of supersedeas bond did not stay payment of compensation pending appeal or prosecution of action under K.S.A. 44-512a. Teague v. George, 188 Kan. 809, 810, 815, 365 P.2d 1087 (1961).

51. An appeal will lie only from review and approval of director, not from findings and award of examiner. Bammes v. Viking Manufacturing Co., 192 Kan. 616, 618, 389 P.2d 828 (1964).

52. Appeal is "taken and perfected" upon filing written notice of appeal with district court clerk. Magers v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 193 Kan. 137, 138, 392 P.2d 148 (1964).

53. Appeal to district court perfected by filing written notice with director in time. Scammahorn v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Assn., 197 Kan. 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416 P.2d 771 (1966).

54. Notice of appeal not timely; appeal dismissed. Shinkle v. Kansas State Highway Commission, 200 Kan. 191, 197, 434 P.2d 836 (1967).

55. Appeal made from examiner's award which was approved by director absent application for review by claimant; error in wording disregarded and notice of appeal held sufficient. Elwood v. General Motors Corporation, 200 Kan. 686, 687, 688, 689, 438 P.2d 44 (1968).

56. Section provides complete and exclusive appeal procedure; requirement that compensation payable be not stayed is prerequisite of right to appeal, but on the filing of decision of supreme court setting aside an award, said requirement no longer obtains. Krueger v. Hoch, 202 Kan. 319, 320, 321, 447 P.2d 823. Modified: Kissick v. Salina Manufacturing Co., Inc., 204 Kan. 849, 466 P.2d 344 (1970).

57. Cited in denying recovery under workmen's compensation act because five workmen not employed at time of accident; appeal to proper court. Otta v. Johnson, 204 Kan. 366, 368, 461 P.2d 758 (1969).

—Miscellaneous (62-74)

62. Appeal perfected from modified award does not reinstate original award. Brewington v. Western Union, 163 Kan. 534, 538, 183 P.2d 872 (1947).

63. Appeal taken and dismissed does not affect award. Hurst v. Independent Construction Co., 136 Kan. 583, 586, 16 P.2d 540 (1932).

64. Provisions of K.S.A. 44-512a are not construed as a limitation upon appeal right granted hereunder.

(a) Mitchener v. Daniels, 187 Kan. 765, 766, 359 P.2d 872 (1961);

(b) Redenbaugh v. State Department of Social Welfare, 187 Kan. 320, 356 P.2d 794 (1960);

(c) Bentley v. State Department of Social Welfare, 187 Kan. 340, 356 P.2d 791 (1960).

65. When a second appeal is brought to supreme court in the same case, the first decision is the settled law of the case on all questions involved in the first appeal and reconsideration will not be given such questions. Owen v. Ready Made Buildings, Inc., 181 Kan. 659, 665, 313 P.2d 267 (1957).

66. Supreme court has authority to remand a cause to the district court to make specific findings or to correct an award in a compensation case.

(a) Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 190 Kan. 448, 451, 375 P.2d 771 (1962);

(b) Peterson v. Fairmont Food Co., 179 Kan. 799, 298 P.2d 223 (1956);

(c) Justice v. Continental Can Co., 174 Kan. 539, 257 P.2d 564 (1953);

(d) Thorp v. Victory Cab Co., 172 Kan. 384, 240 P.2d 128 (1952); second appeal 173 Kan. 383, 246 P.2d 273 (1952).

67. Same rules applied in appeals from occupational disease cases under K.S.A. 44-5a01 et seq. as other compensation cases. Sirico v. Burch, 190 Kan. 474, 476, 478, 375 P.2d 596 (1962).

68. Claimant in compensation appeal should not be required to stand by while the employer and the insurance carrier settle their personal disputes; such questions are to be resolved in an independent action. Hobelman v. Krebs Construction Co., 188 Kan. 825, Syl. 5, 366 P.2d 270 (1961).

69. On compensation appeal supreme court will not determine which of two insurers liable. Justice v. Continental Can Co., 174 Kan. 539, 540, 551, 556, 257 P.2d 564 (1953).

70. Jurisdiction of supreme court on appeal considered. Elliott v. Ralph Construction Co., 195 Kan. 723, 726, 408 P.2d 584 (1965).

71. Purpose of section; no provision for restitution or "recover back" of payments made pending appeal in event of reversal. Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 196 Kan. 244, 247, 248, 250, 409 P.2d 1001 (1966).

72. Respondents may not raise questions on appeal when raised for the first time in district court. Davis v. Joe Ward Construction Co., 197 Kan. 589, 593, 419 P.2d 918 (1966).

73. Failure to comply with section; action under K.S.A. 44-512a; remedies available to workman not stayed pending appeal. Casebeer v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 203 Kan. 425, 426, 427, 429, 430, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 438, 454 P.2d 511. Modified: Kissick v. Salina Manufacturing Co., Inc., 204 Kan. 849, 466 P.2d 344 (1970).

74. Appeal without merit; no error in examiner's findings which were approved by director and adopted by trial court. Davis v. Winchester Packing Co., 204 Kan. 215, 217, 460 P.2d 617 (1969).

PARTICULAR QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT

—Common questions (79-84)

79. The question of whether the disability of a workman is due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment is a question of fact.

(a) Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 194 Kan. 278, 285, 398 P.2d 578 (1965);

(b) Phillips v. Skelly Oil Co., 189 Kan. 491, 492, 370 P.2d 65 (1962);

(c) Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 Kan. 699, 701, 352 P.2d 48 (1960);

(d) Allen v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 184 Kan. 184, 185, 334 P.2d 370 (1959);

(e) Heer v. Hankamer Excavating Co., 184 Kan. 186, 187, 334 P.2d 372 (1959);

(f) Grow v. Musgrove Petroleum Corp., 184 Kan. 800, 802, 803, 339 P.2d 75 (1959);

(g) LaRue v. Sierra Petroleum Co., 183 Kan. 153, 155, 325 P.2d 59 (1958);

(h) Kafka v. Edwards, 182 Kan. 568, 570, 322 P.2d 785 (1958);

(i) Miller v. Kan. S. Flint Rig Co., 155 Kan. 66, 122 P.2d 734 (1942);

(j) Gregg v. American Walnut Lbr. Co., 137 Kan. 201, Syl. 2, 19 P.2d 463 (1933).

80. The existence, extent and duration of an injured workman's incapacity is a question of fact for the trial court to determine.

(a) Cody v. Lewis & West Transit Mix, 186 Kan. 437, 443, 351 P.2d 4 (1960);

(b) Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449, 451, 381 P.2d 365 (1963);

(c) Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 Kan. 699, 352 P.2d 48 (1960);

(d) Smith v. Jones, 185 Kan. 505, 507, 508, 345 P.2d 640 (1959);

(e) Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 204, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957);

(f) Alexander v. Crysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 714, 207 P.2d 1179 (1949);

(g) Mihoover v. Winter Livestock Commission Co., 155 Kan. 432, 125 P.2d 363 (1942);

(h) Cowan v. Kerford Quarry Co., 146 Kan. 682, 685, 72 P.2d 999 (1937);

(i) Voiles v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 141 Kan. 451, 41 P.2d 723 (1935);

(j) Conner v. Base Line Coal Co., 130 Kan. 504, 508, 287 P. 585 (1930);

(k) Brewer v. Vinegar Hill Zinc Co., 119 Kan. 355, 239 P. 762 (1925).

81. The question "May a workman draw full compensation benefits and still stay on the job at full pay?" is a question of law upon which the supreme court ruled in affirmative.

(a) Hallett v. McDowell & Sons, 186 Kan. 813, 819, 352 P.2d 946 (1960);

(b) Smith v. Jones, 185 Kan. 505, 345 P.2d 640 (1959);

(c) Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957);

(d) Davis v. Braun, 170 Kan. 177, 183, 223 P.2d 958 (1950);

(e) Rupp v. Jacobs, 149 Kan. 712, 717, 88 P.2d 1102 (1939);

(f) McGhee v. Sinclair Refining Co., 146 Kan. 653, 658, 659, 73 P.2d 39 (1937);

(g) Beal v. El Dorado Refining Co., 132 Kan. 666, 672, 296 P. 723 (1931).

82. Payments hereunder not acquiescence in award. Scammahorn v. Gibraltar Savings and Loan Assn., 195 Kan. 273, 277, 404 P.2d 170 (1965).

83. Cited in considering effect of an award on earlier one it modifies. Ratzlaff v. Friedeman Service Store, 200 Kan. 430, 432, 435, 436 P.2d 389 (1968).

84. Payment not stayed pending appeal. Jackson v. Stevens Well Service, 208 Kan. 637, 643, 493 P.2d 264 (1972).

—Unusual questions (89-99)

89. Leg injury with sympathectomy operation to back to relieve pain; question whether this was scheduled injury or general bodily disability treated as question of fact. Reed v. Clay Center Concrete & Sand Co., 184 Kan. 374, 376, 336 P.2d 405 (1959).

90. Whether employer was prejudiced by want of notice of accidental injury presents a question of fact. Cooper v. Morris, 186 Kan. 703, 705, 352 P.2d 35 (1960).

91. Voluntary informal payments findings based on conflicting evidence binding on supreme court. House v. Greer, 183 Kan. 691, 693, 331 P.2d 289 (1958).

92. No merit in contention on appeal that demand for compensation under K.S.A. 44-512a was made before compensation was due. Shinkle v. State Highway Commission, 202 Kan. 311, 317, 448 P.2d 12 (1968).

93. Where employer, during pendency of appeal, fails to pay director's award, he is subject to demand and lump sum payment in accordance with K.S.A. 44-512a. Griffith v. State Highway Commission of Kansas, 203 Kan. 672, 674, 680, 456 P.2d 21. Modified: Kissick v. Salina Manufacturing Co., Inc., 204 Kan. 849, 466 P.2d 344 (1970).

94. Claimant should elect remedy he seeks to pursue (dissent). Griffith v. State Highway Commission of Kansas, 203 Kan. 672, 682, 456 P.2d 21 (1969).

95. Demand for lump sum payment held premature. Hallmark v. Dalton Construction Co., 206 Kan. 159, 160, 476 P.2d 221 (1970).

96. Auto accident while on job did not aggravate a pre-existing coronary condition which caused death a month later. Embry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 451 F.2d 472, 475 (1971).

97. Applied in computing benefits of part-time pilot; award of maximum benefits. Zeitner v. Floair, Inc., 211 Kan. 19, 21, 505 P.2d 661 (1973).

98. New and noncompensable accidental injury after primary compensable injury; recovery denied. Stockman v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 211 Kan. 260, 262, 505 P.2d 697 (1973).

99. Provisions of K.S.A. 44-512a may be invoked where payments of compensation required herein are not paid. Kissick v. Salina Manufacturing Co., Inc., 204 Kan. 849, 851, 852, 854, 855, 466 P.2d 344 (1970).

—Apportionment and dependency (104-108)

104. Employer cannot appeal from an apportionment among dependents wholly dependent, because it is a matter which does not concern him. Mc Cormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 692, 232 P. 1071 (1925).

105. District court finding as to dependency conclusive on appeal, when. Briney v. Hopper Construction Co., 146 Kan. 927, 929, 73 P.2d 1110 (1937).

106. Finding against dependency of mother conclusive on appeal. Baldwin v. Manhattan Oil Co., 136 Kan. 238, 239, 14 P.2d 655 (1932).

107. Finding that parents not dependent is conclusive on appeal. Junkin v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 145 Kan. 234, 65 P.2d 263 (1937).

108. Degree of dependency in workman's compensation case is question of fact and findings with respect thereto will not be disturbed on appellate review when there is any evidence to support them.

(a) Lines v. Hudson Oil Co., 146 Kan. 143, 68 P.2d 1096 (1937);

(b) Shobe v. Tobin Construction Co., 179 Kan. 43, 49, 292 P. 729 (1956);

(c) Peters v. Peters, 177 Kan. 100, 276 P.2d 302 (1954);

(d) Carrington v. British American Oil Producing Co., 157 Kan. 101, 138 P.2d 463 (1943).

—Self-insurer (113-114)

113. "Self-insurer" construed term not limited to those qualified "self-insurers" in K.S.A. 44-532; dissent. Scammahorn v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Assn., 195 Kan. 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 404 P.2d 165 (1965).

114. Self-insurer required to comply with provisions of statute, including the filing of a bond. Griffith v. State Highway Commission of Kansas, 203 Kan. 672, 674, 677, 678, 680, 681, 456 P.2d 21 (1969).

APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT

—Scope and nature of review (119-128)

119. The jurisdiction of the district court is simply its power to grant or refuse compensation, or to increase or diminish any award as justice may require.

(a) Place v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 186 Kan. 523, 527, 350 P.2d 788 (1960);

(b) Landes v. Smith, 189 Kan. 229, 368 P.2d 302 (1962);

(c) Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 188 Kan. 792, 793, 365 P.2d 1101 (1961);

(d) Coble v. Williams, 177 Kan. 743, 282 P.2d 425 (1955).

120. District court may weigh conflicting evidence.

(a) Burk v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 160 Kan. 519, 522, 526, 163 P.2d 402 (1945);

(b) Harris v. Bechtel-Dempsey-Price, 160 Kan. 560, 565, 164 P.2d 89 (1945);

(c) Leamos v. Wilson & Co., 136 Kan. 613, 616, 16 P.2d 490 (1932);

(d) Orendoc v. Kaw Steel Construction Co., 131 Kan. 366, 368, 291 P. 952 (1930).

121. The district court may not grant a trial de novo nor hear new evidence, but takes the case on the transcript of the proceedings had before the director.

(a) Place v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 186 Kan. 523, 524, 350 P.2d 788 (1960);

(b) Landes v. Smith, 189 Kan. 229, 232, 368 P.2d 302 (1962);

(c) Fleming v. National Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 574, 363 P.2d 432 (1961);

(d) Grow v. Musgrove Petroleum Corp., 184 Kan. 800, 802, 339 P.2d 75 (1959);

(e) Attebery v. Griffin Construction Co., 181 Kan. 450, 461, 312 P.2d 598 (1957);

(f) Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Matlock, 151 Kan. 293, 298, 98 P.2d 456 (1940);

(g) Fougnie v. Wilbert & Schreeb Coal Co., 130 Kan. 410, 286 P. 396 (1930).

122. Case is tried de novo in district court on the transcript.

(a) Rorabaugh v. General Mills, 187 Kan. 363, 366, 356 P.2d 796 (1960);

(b) Landes v. Smith, 189 Kan. 229, 232, 368 P.2d 302 (1962);

(c) Davis v. Haren & Laughlin Construction Co., 184 Kan. 820, 339 P.2d 41 (1959);

(d) Wilson v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 185 Kan. 725, 347 P.2d 235 (1959);

(e) Burns v. Topeka Fence Erectors, 174 Kan. 136, 254 P.2d 285 (1953).

123. Affidavits filed with commissioner after hearing closed are not part of record. Eagle-Picher M. & S. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Comm., 147 Kan. 456, 458, 76 P.2d 808 (1938).

124. Claimant had made compensation claims on three previous occasions; trial judge is obligated to weigh possible exaggeration of testimony in such cases; not passion or prejudice for trial judge to comment thereon. Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 190 Kan. 448, 552, 375 P.2d 771 (1962).

125. When award formally made and entered by district court, it may not thereafter be modified by such court; when nunc pro tunc order may be made by district court discussed. Norcross v. Pickrell Drilling Co., 202 Kan. 524, 526, 449 P.2d 569 (1969).

126. All decisions of director of workmen's compensation concerning administration of second injury fund are subject to review by district court. Leiker v. Manor House, Inc., 203 Kan. 906, 907, 915, 916, 457 P.2d 107 (1969).

127. Provision for review de novo by district court not unconstitutional where director performs quasi-judicial function. Gawith v. Gage's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 206 Kan. 169, 181, 476 P.2d 966 (1970).

128. On appeal from order of director, court is authorized to hear case de novo on record below and substitute its judgment for that of director. Muntzert v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 206 Kan. 331, 333, 478 P.2d 198 (1970).

—Findings (133-136)

133. Within the scope of the record made before the director the district court is authorized to make its own findings of fact and is not bound by findings of the director; district court has right to weigh evidence.

(a) Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 188 Kan. 792, 793, 794, 365 P.2d 1101 (1961);

(b) Burk v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 160 Kan. 519, 526, 163 P.2d 402 (1945);

(c) Vigola v. Labor Exchange Coal Co., 145 Kan. 889, 67 P.2d 421 (1937);

(d) Resnar v. Wilbert & Schreeb Coal Co., 132 Kan. 806, Syl. 2, 297 P. 429 (1931).

134. After independent determination district court may adopt director's findings and award.

(a) Sirico v. Burch, 190 Kan. 474, 476, 375 P.2d 596 (1962);

(b) Wilson v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 185 Kan. 725, 727, 347 P.2d 235 (1959);

(c) Davis v. Haren & Laughlin Construction Co., 184 Kan. 820, 822, 823, 339 P.2d 41 (1959).

135. District court, in compensation case, is not compelled to make detailed findings of fact which resolve disputed testimony of witnesses.

(a) Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 188 Kan. 792, 794, 365 P.2d 1101 (1961);

(b) Thompson v. Swenson Construction Co., 158 Kan. 49, 56, 145 P.2d 166 (1944).

136. District court has authority hereunder to determine application for lump sum award pursuant to K.S.A. 44-531. Johnson v. General Motors Corporation, 199 Kan. 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 727, 433 P.2d 585 (1967).

—Miscellaneous (141-146)

141. District court's appellate jurisdiction may not be limited by appellant. Taylor v. Taylor, 156 Kan. 763, 766, 137 P.2d 147 (1943).

142. Insurance carrier could not for the first time inject the question of the validity of insurance policy before the district court on appeal. Landes v. Smith, 189 Kan. 229, 236, 368 P.2d 302 (1962).

143. On compensation appeal district court cannot determine which of two insurers liable. Standard Surety & Cas. Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 104 F.2d 492, 493, 496 (1939).

144. Trial court's finding workman refused medical treatment held not supported by evidence; cancellation of award reversed. Evans v. Cook & Galloway Drilling Co., 191 Kan. 439, 444, 445, 381 P.2d 341 (1963).

145. Demand for payment under K.S.A. 44-512a premature when made during time appeal may be taken hereunder. Hunter v. General Motors Corporation, 202 Kan. 166, 169, 170, 446 P.2d 838 (1968).

146. District court erred in failing to allow counsel an opportunity to argue the claimant's case. Collins v. Kansas Milling Co., 207 Kan. 617, 618, 485 P.2d 1343 (1971).

—Remand and new trial (151-160)

151. Case remanded to district court with directions to make findings; district court may reconsider its findings and award as authorized by order of remand. Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 190 Kan. 448, 450, 451, 375 P.2d 771 (1962).

152. An award which has been formally made and entered by district court may not thereafter be modified by that court, such judgment being final.

(a) Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 190 Kan. 448, 450, 375 P.2d 771 (1962);

(b) Fleming v. National Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 576, 363 P.2d 432 (1961);

(c) Clark v. Winfield Hospital & Training Center, 186 Kan. 705, 707, 708, 352 P.2d 442 (1960);

(d) Gray v. Hercules Powder Co., 160 Kan. 767, 165 P.2d 447 (1946).

153. District court cannot vacate or modify its award; available remedies. Gray v. Hercules Powder Co., 160 Kan. 767, 772, 776, 778, 165 P.2d 447 (1946).

154. District court without jurisdiction to grant new trial in workmen's compensation case.

(a) Clark v. Winfield Hospital & Training Center, 186 Kan. 705, 707, 352 P.2d 442 (1960);

(b) Fleming v. National Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 575, 363 P.2d 432 (1961);

(c) Terrell v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 174 Kan. 633, 637, 638, 258 P.2d 275 (1953);

(d) Gray v. Hercules Powder Co., 160 Kan. 767, 769, 770, 771, 165 P.2d 447 (1946).

155. District court has no authority to remand a case to the director for further proceedings.

(a) Landes v. Smith, 189 Kan. 229, 232, 368 P.2d 302 (1962);

(b) Fleming v. National Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 574, 575, 363 P.2d 432 (1961);

(c) Attebery v. Griffin Construction Co., 181 Kan. 450, 461, 312 P.2d 598 (1957);

(d) Willis v. Skelly Oil Co., 135 Kan. 543, 545, 546, 11 P.2d 980 (1932);

(e) Fougnie v. Wilbert & Schreeb Coal Co., 130 Kan. 410, 412, 286 P. 396 (1930).

156. After award is made director does not have authority to grant a rehearing; request for a more complete hearing does not enlarge director's authority.

(a) Fleming v. National Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 575, 363 P.2d 432 (1961);

(b) Gray v. Hercules Powder Co., 160 Kan. 767, 165 P.2d 447 (1946);

(c) Walz v. Missouri Pac. Rld. Co., 142 Kan. 164, 45 P.2d 861 (1935);

(d) Walz v. Missouri Pac. Rld. Co., 130 Kan. 203, 285 P. 595 (1930).

157. Director required to receive all evidence on all points and branches of case, so that district court and supreme court may review the transcript.

(a) Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Matlock, 151 Kan. 293, 299, 98 P.2d 456 (1940);

(b) Parker v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Kan. 832, 837, 840, 73 P.2d 1032 (1937);

(c) Walz v. Missouri Pac. Rld. Co., 142 Kan. 164, 166, 45 P.2d 861 (1935);

(d) Brown v. Shellabarger Mill & Elev. Co., 142 Kan. 476, 478, 50 P.2d 919 (1935);

(e) Willis v. Skelly Oil Co., 135 Kan. 543, 11 P.2d 980 (1932);

(f) Fougnie v. Wilbert & Schreeb Coal Co., 130 Kan. 410, 413, 286 P. 396 (1930).

158. Award by director final unless appealed within the prescribed time.

(a) Fleming v. National Cash Register Co., 188 Kan. 571, 363 P.2d 432 (1961);

(b) Hurst v. Independent Construction Co., 136 Kan. 583, 16 P.2d 540 (1932).

159. Appeal from award of examiner is ineffectual to confer jurisdiction on district court, because it is not an appeal from a final award of the director; motion to quash such an appeal is properly sustained and as a matter of course the case is thereby sent back to director. Harper v. Coffey Grain Co., 192 Kan. 462, Syl. 1, 468, 388 P.2d 607 (1964).

160. District court is without authority to remand proceedings to director or examiner for hearing of further evidence or taking additional action. Kuhn v. Grant County, 201 Kan. 163, 439 P.2d 155 (1968).

Cases after 1973

161. Cited; district court not bound by director's findings, may weigh evidence in record, and make own findings of fact. Stanley v. A & A Iron Works, 211 Kan. 510, 513, 506 P.2d 1120.

162. Cited; district court properly sustained hearing examiner's motion to dismiss in mandamus action. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Reid, 211 Kan. 613, 614, 507 P.2d 339.

163. Whether district court's judgment that employer-employee relationship existed is supported by substantial competent evidence is question of law. Knoble v. National Carriers, Inc., 212 Kan. 331, 332, 510 P.2d 1274.

164. Cited in holding K.S.A. 60-2101 (a) does not permit trial de novo in district court from order of administrative agency. Copeland v. Kansas State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 213 Kan. 741, 742, 518 P.2d 377.

165. Finding synovitis occupational disease and award of compensation sustained. Hill v. General Motors Corporation, 214 Kan. 279, 281, 519 P.2d 608.

166. Failure to file bond within time not jurisdictional prerequisite to perfection of appeal. Boyd v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 214 Kan. 797, 799, 801, 804, 522 P.2d 395.

167. Applied; claim for traumatic neurosis disallowed; not causally connected with employment. Buck v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 215 Kan. 157, 160, 523 P.2d 697.

168. Findings of trial court supported by substantial evidence; causal connection between trauma and malignant melanoma. Cox v. Ulysses Cooperative Oil & Supply Co., 218 Kan. 428, 432, 544 P.2d 363.

169. Award under K.S.A. 44-510d remanded to award of total permanent disability; evidence. Reichuber v. Cook Well Servicing, 220 Kan. 93, 95, 551 P.2d 810.

170. Referred to in determining 1974 amendment of K.S.A. 44-528 could not be applied retroactively. Eakes v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 220 Kan. 565, 566, 552 P.2d 998.

171. District court had authority to hear appeal de novo; findings supported by evidence. Woods v. Peerless Plastics, Inc., 220 Kan. 786, 790, 556 P.2d 455.

172. Relied on; failure to file supersedeas bond authorized claimant to serve written demand under K.S.A. 44-512a. Kelly v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 347, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 566 P.2d 10.

173. Section cited; claim under K.S.A. 44-501 proper. Makalous v. Kansas State Highway Commission, 222 Kan. 477, 486, 565 P.2d 254.

174. Jurisdiction on appeal; limited to consideration of questions of law. Chapman v. Wilkenson Co., 222 Kan. 722, 724, 567 P.2d 888.

175. Applied; provisions of subsection (d) inapplicable to accidents which took place before July 1, 1974. Ferrell v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 223 Kan. 421, 422, 423, 573 P.2d 1065.

176. Referred to in determining scope of review on appeal from school board decision limited by K.S.A. 60-2101. Brinson v. School District, 223 Kan. 465, 468, 470, 576 P.2d 602.

177. Statute runs from date judgment rendered; notice of appeal not filed within time; dismissal ordered. Hensley v. Carl Graham Glass, 3 Kan. App. 2d 57, 589 P.2d 124.

178. Final order of district court required before there is appellate jurisdiction (dissenting opinion). Childress v. Childress Painting Co., 3 Kan. App. 2d 135, 141, 590 P.2d 1093.

179. Notice of appeal was timely filed and the court had jurisdiction. Carlman v. Shields Drilling Co., 3 Kan. App. 2d 282, 593 P.2d 1013.

180. 1979 amendment of this section made appeal timely. Hensley v. Carl Graham Glass, 226 Kan. 256, 257, 597 P.2d 641.

181. Mentioned in holding timeliness of claim is issue of fact and should not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Morgan v. Inter-Collegiate Press, 4 Kan. App. 2d 319, 321, 606 P.2d 479.

182. Mentioned in setting out test for determining permanent total and permanent partial disability. Grounds v. Triple J Constr. Co., 4 Kan. App. 2d 325, 328, 606 P.2d 484.

183. Whether substantial competent evidence exists is a question of law. Rose v. Thornton & Florence Electric Co., 4 Kan. App. 2d 669, 672, 609 P.2d 1180.

184. Under paragraph (c), scope of review is limited to questions of law. Crabtree v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 5 Kan. App. 2d 440, 442, 618 P.2d 849. Reversed: 229 Kan. 440, 625 P.2d 453.

185. In determining whether "handicapped" employee "knowingly" misrepresented the condition, employee's state of mind when misrepresentation made controls. Collins v. Cherry Manor Convalescent Center, 7 Kan. App. 2d 270, 274, 640 P.2d 875 (1982).

186. Subsection (d) not limited in application to reimbursement of overpayment which exceeds balance due claimant after award judicially reduced. Johnston v. Tony's Pizza Service, 232 Kan. 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 658 P.2d 1047 (1983).

187. Award for medicine expenses prior to the ten-week period provided in subsection (b) is stayed by respondent's appeal; nonpayment is not basis for lump-sum redemption under K.S.A. 44-512a. Page v. General Motors Corporation, 210 Kan. 699, 700, 504 P.2d 153 (1972).

188. District court lacks authority to award attorney fees under K.S.A. 44-536(g) on appeal. Lackey v. D & M Trucking, 9 Kan. App. 2d 679, 686, 687 P.2d 23 (1984).

189. Director required to enter order even when review not requested, and appeal may be taken therefrom; effect of clerical error considered. Osmundson v. Sedan Floral, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 261, 697 P.2d 85 (1985).

190. 1979 amendment to (c) made procedural provisions of Chapter 60 relative to judgment, postjudgment motions and appeals applicable. Dieter v. Lawrence Paper Co., 237 Kan. 139, 143, 697P.2d 1300 (1985).

191. Cited; act gives exclusive jurisdiction to director to authorize a change of treating physicians (K.S.A. 44-510) where judgment final. Dinkel v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 604, 605, 706 P.2d 470 (1985).

192. Review by court of appeals limited to questions of law. Wade v. Union Nat'l Bank, 10 Kan. App. 2d 645, 646, 707 P.2d 1087 (1985).

193. Cited; hospitalization and treatment for overdose of medication prescribed for covered injury not ordinary and necessary result of injury. Carr v. Unit No. 8169, 237 Kan. 660, 666, 703 P.2d 751 (1985).

194. No jurisdiction to consider denial of Fund's motion to dismiss where order appealed from not final order. McArthur v. Glass King Mfg., Inc., 11 Kan. App. 2d 35, 37, 711 P.2d 774 (1986).

195. Restitution doctrine not in act; no recovery back of monies paid during appeal after appeal determines nonliability. Clouston v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 11 Kan. App. 2d 112, 113, 715 P.2d 29 (1986).

196. An appeal of vocational rehabilitation award under K.S.A. 44-510g may be made hereunder during first 26 weeks. Clintsman v. St. Joseph Hosp. of Concordia, 11 Kan. App. 2d 199, 202, 717 P.2d 1074 (1986).

197. Willfulness of employee's act under K.S.A. 44-501 is question for factfinder; district court's finding affirmed. Carter v. Koch Engineering, 12 Kan. App. 2d 74, 86, 735 P.2d 247 (1987).

198. Cited; proof required of employer to be relieved of liability for hiring or retaining handicapped employee (K.S.A. 44-1567) examined. Denton v. Sunflower Electric Co-op, 12 Kan. App. 2d 262, 264, 269, 740 P.2d 98 (1987).

199. Cited; "wage" as including allowances to the extent economic gain resulted to employee (K.S.A. 44-511) examined. Ridgway v. Board of Ford County Comm'rs, 12 Kan. App. 2d 441, 442, 748 P.2d 891 (1987).

200. Cited; de novo review provided for in K.S.A. 8-259(a) as predominantly appellate in nature examined. Angle v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 12 Kan. App. 2d 756, 764, 758 P.2d 226 (1988).

201. District court empowered to increase claimant's award even though claimant did not appeal from director's award. Boeing Military Airplane Co. v. Enloe, 13 Kan. App. 2d 128, 132, 764 P.2d 462 (1988).

202. Compensation limitations to scheduled injury (K.S.A. 44-510d) absent resulting injury to unscheduled area reviewed. Duncan v. City of Osage City, 13 Kan. App. 2d 364, 366, 770 P.2d 843 (1989).

203. Standard of review to be applied by district courts in workers' compensation cases determined. Monroe v. General Motors Corp., 13 Kan. App. 2d 460, 773 P.2d 683 (1989).

204. Scope of review not altered by act for judicial review of agency actions (K.S.A. 77-601 et seq.). Reeves v. Equipment Service Industries, Inc., 245 Kan. 165, 176, 777 P.2d 765 (1989).

205. Director's action on claim for penalties and additional benefits, after trial court's affirmance of award, subject to review. Sawyer v. Oldham's Farm Sausage Co., 246 Kan. 327, 333, 787 P.2d 697 (1990).

206. Rights and liabilities between those held jointly liable to claimant as beyond jurisdiction of workers compensation proceeding examined. American States Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 14 Kan. App. 2d 492, 499, 794 P.2d 662 (1990).

207. Medical testimony not essential to establish existence, nature, and extent of disability; question one of fact for trial court. Tovar v. IBP, Inc., 15 Kan. App. 2d 782, 784, 817 P.2d 212 (1991).

208. Insolvent employer's obligation under Kansas workers compensation act was nontax in nature; not entitled to tax priority in bankruptcy. In Re Payne, 27 B.R. 809, 810, 811 (1983).

209. Since temporary award arising from preliminary hearing under K.S.A. 44-534a not appealable to district court, stay provisions herein not applicable. Stout v. Stixon Petroleum, 17 Kan. App. 2d 195, 202, 836 P.2d 1185 (1992).

210. Whether appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review ALJ's order when no written request for review by appeals board filed; retroactive application of amendments discussed. Rios v. Board of Public Utilities of Kansas City, 256 Kan. 184, 185, 883 P.2d 1177 (1994).

211. Whether appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review ALJ's order when claimant failed to request review by appeals board examined. Hall v. Roadway Express, Inc., 19 Kan. App. 2d 935, 937, 941, 878 P.2d 846 (1994).

212. Whether ALJ order filed prior to October 1, 1993, should be reviewed in accordance with pre-1993 amendment procedures examined. McClure v. Rodricks, 20 Kan. App. 2d 102, 104, 883 P.2d 1228 (1994).

213. Cited; whether date of accident occurred in workers compensation case involving carpal tunnel syndrome examined. Berry v. Boeing Military Airplanes, 20 Kan. App. 2d 220, 222, 885 P.2d 1261 (1994).

214. Whether workers compensation board selected by private organizations is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power examined. Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 780, 792, 887 P.2d 1119 (1995).

215. Whether appellate review of "order" means order of administrative law judge examined. University of Kansas v. Department of Human Resources, 20 Kan. App. 2d 354, 358, 887 P.2d 1147 (1995).

216. Whether workers compensation board has authority to substitute its judgment for ALJ's decision in reviewing administrative decisions examined. Helms v. Tollie Freightways, Inc. 20 Kan. App. 2d 548, 550, 889 P.2d 1151 (1995).

217. Date of accident for micro-trauma injury was earlier than last day worked; disability computed under pre-1993 amendments. Condon v. Boeing Co., 21 Kan. App. 2d 580, 582, 903 P.2d 775 (1995).

218. Workers compensation board did not err in the method used to award employee work disability. Guerrero v. Dold Foods, Inc., 22 Kan. App. 2d 53, 55, 913 P.2d 612 (1995).

219. Appeal of workers compensation order must be filed within 30 days of order date; three additional mailing days not allowed. Jones v. Continental Can Co., 260 Kan. 547, 550, 920 P.2d 939 (1996).

220. Amendment authorizing workers compensation board to replace district court in reviewing ALJ decisions is constitutional. Gleason v. Samaritan Home, 260 Kan. 970, 976, 986, 926 P.2d 1349 (1996).

221. Appropriateness of including wages paid by contractors to satisfy employer's payroll requirement of K.S.A. 44-505 (a)(2) is question of statutory interpretation; unlimited review. Myers v. Indian Creek Woods Townhomes Ass'n, 22 Kan. App. 2d 627, 629, 920 P.2d 472 (1996).

222. No substantial competent evidence for work disability finding where employee returned to job earning comparable wage. Watkins v. Food Barn Stores, Inc., 23 Kan. App. 2d 837, 936 P.2d 294 (1997).

223. Board's findings reviewed for substantial competent evidence; uncontradicted evidence should generally be regarded as conclusive. Nance v. Harvey County, 23 Kan. App. 2d 899, 901, 931 P.2d 1245 (1997).

224. Order requiring subsequent employer to reimburse prior employer for injury occurring during employment with subsequent employer reversed. Kimber v. U.S.D. No. 418, 24 Kan. App. 2d 280, 283, 944 P.2d 169 (1997).

225. Under K.S.A. 44-510e(a) finding whether good faith effort made to find appropriate employment required to determine appropriate procedure for wage calculation. Copeland v. Johnson Group, Inc., 24 Kan. App. 2d 306, 311, 944 P.2d 179 (1997).

226. Employee injured while returning to car after educational seminar constituted compensable injury. Brobst v. Brighton Place North, 24 Kan. App. 2d 766, 770, 955 P.2d 1315 (1997).

227. Equitable doctrine of laches is not statutorily authorized to bar claimant's application for workers compensation benefits. Burnside v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 24 Kan. App. 2d 684, 687, 951 P.2d 1315 (1998).

228. Workers compensation board dismissal of case for lack of jurisdiction is a final appealable order. Rivera v. Cimarron Dairy, 267 Kan. 875, 878, 988 P.2d 235 (1999).

229. Employer liable to compensate employee for injury where claimant was totally unable to return to work for one week. Overstreet v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., Inc., 26 Kan. App. 2d 586, 587, 985 P.2d 142 (1999).

230. Remand from board to ALJ is not a final order subject to appellate review. Williams v. General Electric Company, 27 Kan. App. 2d 792, 9 P.3d 1267 (2000).

231. Substantial competent evidence of record to support findings of Workers Compensation Board. Webber v. Automotive Controls Corp., 272 Kan. 700, 35 P.3d 788 (2001).

232. In workers compensation cases, section limits appellate courts to review of decisions of Workers Compensation Board and does not authorize review of district court decisions. Sander v. State, 278 Kan. 487, 102 P.3d 1136 (2004).

233. Bright-line last-day-worked rule discussed and applied. Fletcher v. U.S.D. No. 229, 38 Kan. App. 2d 388, 165 P.3d 1071 (2007).

234. Cited in workers compensation opinion discussing the "going and coming rule" and exceptions thereto. Halford v. Nowak Construction Co., 39 Kan. App. 2d 935, 937, 186 P.3d 206 (2008).

235. No separation of powers violation in court conducting an appeal de novo on the record. Frick v. City of Salina, 289 Kan. 1, 208 P.3d 739 (2009).

236. Review of workers compensation board is limited to questions of law. Mitchell v. Petsmart, Inc., 41 Kan. App. 2d 523, 203 P.3d 76 (2009).

237. Workers' compensation modification proceeding does not offer a second opportunity to determine original award issues. Scheidt v. Teakwood Cabinet & Fixture, Inc., 42 Kan. App. 2d 259, 211 P.3d 175 (2009).

238. Decisions of workers compensation board are reviewed under the Kansas judicial review act. Herrera-Gallegos v. H & H Delivery Service, Inc., 42 Kan. App. 2d 360, 212 P.3d 239 (2009).

239. Workers compensation board award upheld in case involving recreational and social events. Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 42 Kan. App. 2d 441, 213 P.3d 764 (2009).

240. Section does not grant an automatic stay of an award by the workers compensation appeals board during pending judicial review of the award. Nuessen v. Sutherlands, 51 Kan. App. 2d 616, 620, 352 P.3d 587 (2015).


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