KANSAS OFFICE of
  REVISOR of STATUTES

  

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22-3402. Discharge of persons not brought promptly to trial; discharge deadlines; delays, requests and charging of time; suspension of deadlines until March 1, 2024; guidelines for prioritizing trials; office of judicial administration report to legislature; retroactive application of certain amendments. (a) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within 150 days after such person's arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (e).

(b) If any person charged with a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond shall not be brought to trial within 180 days after arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant, or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (e).

(c) If any trial scheduled within the time limitation prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) is delayed by the application of or at the request of the defendant, the trial shall be rescheduled within 90 days of the original trial deadline.

(d) After any trial date has been set within the time limitation prescribed by subsection (a), (b) or (c), if the defendant fails to appear for the trial or any pretrial hearing, and a bench warrant is ordered, the trial shall be rescheduled within 90 days after the defendant has appeared in court after apprehension or surrender on such warrant. However, if the defendant was subject to the 180-day deadline prescribed by subsection (b) and more than 90 days of the original time limitation remain, then the original time limitation remains in effect.

(e) For those situations not otherwise covered by subsection (a), (b) or (c), the time for trial may be extended for any of the following reasons:

(1) The defendant is incompetent to stand trial. If the defendant is subsequently found to be competent to stand trial, the trial shall be scheduled as soon as practicable and in any event within 90 days of such finding;

(2) a proceeding to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial is pending. If the defendant is subsequently found to be competent to stand trial, the trial shall be scheduled as soon as practicable and in any event within 90 days of such finding. However, if the defendant was subject to the 180-day deadline prescribed by subsection (b) and more than 90 days of the original time limitation remain, then the original time limitation remains in effect. The time that a decision is pending on competency shall never be counted against the state;

(3) there is material evidence that is unavailable, reasonable efforts have been made to procure such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence can be obtained and trial commenced within the next succeeding 90 days. Not more than one continuance may be granted to the state on this ground, unless for good cause shown, where the original continuance was for less than 90 days, and the trial is commenced within 120 days from the original trial date; or

(4) because of other cases pending for trial, the court does not have sufficient time to commence the trial of the case within the time fixed for trial by this section. Not more than one continuance of not more than 30 days may be ordered upon this ground.

(f) In the event a mistrial is declared, a motion for new trial is granted or a conviction is reversed on appeal to the supreme court or court of appeals, the time limitations provided for in this section shall commence to run from the date the mistrial is declared, the date a new trial is ordered or the date the mandate of the supreme court or court of appeals is filed in the district court.

(g) If a defendant, or defendant's attorney in consultation with the defendant, requests a delay and such delay is granted, the delay shall be charged to the defendant regardless of the reasons for making the request, unless there is prosecutorial misconduct related to such delay. If a delay is initially attributed to the defendant, but is subsequently charged to the state for any reason, such delay shall not be considered against the state under subsection (a), (b) or (c) and shall not be used as a ground for dismissing a case or for reversing a conviction unless not considering such delay would result in a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial or there is prosecutorial misconduct related to such delay.

(h) When a scheduled trial is scheduled within the period allowed by subsection (a), (b) or (c) and is delayed because a party has made or filed a motion, or because the court raises a concern on its own, the time elapsing from the date of the making or filing of the motion, or the court's raising a concern, until the matter is resolved by court order shall not be considered when determining if a violation under subsection (a), (b) or (c) has occurred. If the resolution of such motion or concern by court order occurs at a time when less than 30 days remains under the provisions of subsection (a), (b) or (c), the time in which the defendant shall be brought to trial is extended 30 days from the date of the court order.

(i) If the state requests and is granted a delay for any reason provided in this section, the time elapsing because of the order granting the delay shall not be subsequently counted against the state if an appellate court later determines that the district court erred by granting the state's request unless not considering such delay would result in a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial or there is prosecutorial misconduct related to such delay.

(j) The provisions of this section shall be suspended until March 1, 2024, in all criminal cases.

(k) When prioritizing cases for trial, trial courts shall consider relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the:

(1) Trial court's calendar;

(2) relative prejudice to the defendant;

(3) defendant's assertion of the right to speedy trial;

(4) calendar of trial counsel;

(5) availability of witnesses; and

(6) relative safety of the proceedings to participants as a result of the response to the COVID-19 public health emergency in the judicial district.

(l) The office of judicial administration shall prepare and submit a report to the senate standing committee on judiciary and the house of representatives standing committee on judiciary on or before January 17, 2022, and January 16, 2023, containing the following information disaggregated by judicial district:

(1) The number of pending criminal cases on January 1, 2022, and January 1, 2023, respectively;

(2) the number of criminal cases resolved during fiscal years 2021 and 2022, respectively, and the method of disposition in each case;

(3) the number of jury trials conducted in criminal cases during fiscal years 2021 and 2022, respectively; and

(4) the number of new criminal cases filed in fiscal years 2021 and 2022, respectively.

(m) No time between March 19, 2020, and March 1, 2024, shall be assessed against the state for any reason. Any person arraigned before March 1, 2024, shall be deemed to have been arraigned on March 1, 2024, for the application of the time limitations provided in subsection (a), (b) or (c).

(n) The amendments made to this section by section 1 of chapter 12 of the 2021 Session Laws of Kansas are procedural in nature and shall be construed and applied retroactively.

History: L. 1970, ch. 129, § 22-3402; L. 1976, ch. 163, § 18; L. 2004, ch. 47, § 1; L. 2012, ch. 157, § 4; L. 2014, ch. 139, § 5; L. 2020, ch. 4, § 2; L. 2021, ch. 12, § 1; L. 2023, ch. 15, § 1; April 20.

Source or Prior Law:

62-1301, 62-1431, 62-1432, 62-1433.

Law Review and Bar Journal References:

The time during which appeal is pending not counted in determining whether defendant is entitled to discharge under this section, Richard H. Seaton and Paul E. Wilson, 39 J.B.A.K. 97, 170 (1970).

Delay in the courts, George S. Reynolds, 12 W.L.J. 12, 21 (1972).

"Kansas Diversion: Defendant's Remedies and Prosecutorial Opportunities," Joseph Brian Cox, 20 W.L.J. 344, 372 (1981).

"Survey of Kansas Law: Juvenile Law," Sheila Reynolds, 32 K.L.R. 371, 390 (1984).

"Recent Developments Concerning Speedy Trial Rights," Keith Henry, Vol. VII, No. 2, J.K.T.L.A. 19 (1983).

"Pretrial Proceedings," K.L.R., Criminal Procedure Edition, 9, 14, 19 (1989).

Survey of Recent Cases, 43 K.L.R. 985 (1995).

"Criminal Procedure Review: Survey of Recent Cases," 44 K.L.R. 895 (1996).

Survey of Recent Cases, 45 K.L.R. 1366, 1368 (1997).

Survey of Recent Cases, 46 K.L.R. 889, 929 (1998).

Criminal Procedure Edition, 47 K.L.R. 937 (1999).

"Criminal Procedure Survey of Cases," 48 K.L.R. 895 (2000).

"Criminal Procedure Survey of Recent Cases," 50 K.L.R. 901 (2002).

"Criminal Procedure Survey of Recent Cases, Kansas Issue," 52 K.L.R. 771 (2004).

"Criminal Procedure Survey of Recent Cases," 54 K.L.R. 895 (2006).

Criminal Procedure Survey, 55 K.L.R. 797 (2007).

Criminal Procedure Survey, 56 K.L.R. 808 (2008).

"2009 Legislative Update," Joseph N. Molina, 78 J.K.B.A. No. 7, 29 (2009).

CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Cited in holding accused not denied right to speedy trial. State v. Davis, 209 Kan. 225 to 230, inclusive, 495 P.2d 965.

2. Cited; defendant not brought to trial within 90 days as provided; conviction reversed. State v. Sanders, 209 Kan. 231, 232, 234, 235, 495 P.2d 1023.

3. State's duty to bring defendant to trial within time provided hereunder; affirmative action not required of defendant. State v. Higby, 210 Kan. 554, 556, 557, 559, 502 P.2d 740.

4. Right to speedy trial not violated; state requested continuance because of crowded docket and circumstances indicate trial set by agreement. State v. McCollum, 211 Kan. 631, 633, 634, 636, 507 P.2d 196.

5. Construed and applied; defendant spent part of time in jail and part on bond; unexcused delay of 180 days sets outside limit. State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180, 509 P.2d 1125.

6. No abuse of discretion to order continuance of two weeks instead of one week requested even though date fixed beyond 90 day limit. State v. Petrin, 213 Kan. 258, 260, 515 P.2d 748.

7. Right to speedy trial not denied where trial commenced in eighty-eight days from arraignment. State v. Osbey, 213 Kan. 564, 567, 568, 517 P.2d 141.

8. Cited; section does not apply to detention of probationer pending hearing for probation revocation. Toman v. State, 213 Kan. 857, 860, 518 P.2d 502.

9. Factors considered in determining that constitutional speedy trial was not denied. State v. Smith, 215 Kan. 34, 38, 39, 523 P.2d 691.

10. Allegation of violation of section in second motion under K.S.A. 60-1507; record examined; no error. Brizendine v. State, 215 Kan. 433, 434, 524 P.2d 718.

11. Limitation of section noted in determining that K.S.A. 22-2717 does not restrict successive continuances. Odom v. State, 215 Kan. 456, 458, 524 P.2d 217.

12. Former K.S.A. 62-1431 and 62-1432 referred to in determining inmate not denied speedy trial. Townsend v. State, 215 Kan. 485, 487, 488, 524 P.2d 758.

13. Delays granted at defendant's request not counted in computing statutory period. State v. Powell, 215 Kan. 624, 527 P.2d 1063.

14. Defendants denied speedy trial within 180 days after arraignment; ordered discharged. State v. Cox, 215 Kan. 803, 804, 805, 528 P.2d 1226.

15. Period of delay resulting from continuance granted at defendant's request excluded in computing time for trial. State v. Pendergrass, 215 Kan. 806, 807, 809, 528 P.2d 1190.

16. Section implements and defines constitutional guarantee of speedy trial. State v. Pendergrass, 215 Kan. 806, 807, 809, 528 P.2d 1190.

17. Defendant erroneously discharged for failure to meet requirements of section; time delay fault of defendant. State v. Sherman, 217 Kan. 326, 328, 329, 536 P.2d 1373.

18. Where delay caused by application of defendant, he is not entitled to discharge under section. State v. Brown, 217 Kan. 595, 598, 538 P.2d 631.

19. Applied; discharge of defendant due to delay held error under facts. State v. Fink, 217 Kan. 671, 674, 677, 538 P.2d 1390.

20. Subsection (d) cited in holding proper exercise of discretion thereunder. State v. Steward, 219 Kan. 256, 261, 547 P.2d 773.

21. Contention statute unconstitutional as denial of speedy trial held without merit. State v. Henry, 219 Kan. 310, 311, 548 P.2d 808.

22. Failure to sustain motions for mistrial and discharge not error; sua sponte continuance. State v. Jones, 220 Kan. 136, 139, 551 P.2d 801.

23. Phrase "not more than thirty days" in subsection (3) construed; refusing to discharge defendant within time not error. State v. Coburn, 220 Kan. 750, 751, 753, 556 P.2d 382.

24. Computation of time chargeable to the state disclosed defendant brought to trial within time required by sections; delays. State v. Lewis, 220 Kan. 791, 795, 796, 556 P.2d 888.

25. Applied; severance of defendants did not prejudice rights of remaining defendant. State v. Rueckert, 221 Kan. 727, 731, 561 P.2d 850.

26. Delay in trial fault of defendant; speedy trial had within time limit of section. State v. Pierson, 222 Kan. 498, 502, 565 P.2d 270.

27. Section inapplicable to a defendant who is in custody serving other sentences. State v. Sanders, 224 Kan. 138, 139, 140, 578 P.2d 702.

28. Section construed; delays caused by defendant are not to be included in the 90-day limit provided hereunder; defendant discharged. State v. Warren, 224 Kan. 454, 580 P.2d 1336.

29. In case of mistrial, computation of 90-day period begins from date mistrial declared. State v. McClain, 224 Kan. 464, 580 P.2d 1334.

30. Defendants charged with false writing and conspiracy denied speedy trial. State v. Cuezze, Houston & Faltico, 225 Kan. 274, 276, 277, 278, 283, 589 P.2d 626.

31. Trial date postponed five times because of applications and motions by defendant; less than 90 days chargeable to state; no merit to speedy trial question. State v. McCambry, 225 Kan. 803, 804, 594 P.2d 222.

32. Discharges hereunder and right to speedy trial discussed; date of arraignment controls application of section. State v. Taylor, 3 Kan. App. 2d 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 594 P.2d 262.

33. Judgment affirmed; the right to speedy trial is applicable to criminal cases appealed to district courts from municipal court convictions. City of Overland Park v. Fricke, 226 Kan. 496, 497, 498, 500, 501, 502, 601 P.2d 1130.

34. Section inapplicable to a defendant who is in custody serving prior sentences. State v. McCowan, 226 Kan. 752, 758, 602 P.2d 1363.

35. Delay requested by defendant chargeable to defendant; no denial of speedy trial found. State v. Rice, 227 Kan. 416, 423, 607 P.2d 489.

36. Delays due to withdrawal of defendant's counsel and continuances requested by defendant's counsel not included in 90-day limit, even though defendant objected to withdrawal and continuances. State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663, 665, 608 P.2d 1351.

37. Delay resulting from continuance granted at request of defendant is excluded in computing time for trial. State v. Porter, Green & Smith, 228 Kan. 345, 353, 615 P.2d 146.

38. Time that unauthorized interlocutory appeal by the state is pending and time secured by defendant to respond not charged against accused in computing time limit for speedy trial; judgment affirmed. State v. Grimes, 229 Kan. 143, 144, 145, 148, 149, 622 P.2d 143.

39. Conviction affirmed; defendant received a speedy trial and must be charged with the time he had escaped from jail and remained at large. State v. Mick, 229 Kan. 157, 159, 621 P.2d 1006.

40. Provisions of statute directory rather than mandatory; delay cannot infringe on right to speedy trial. City of Garnett v. Zweiner, 229 Kan. 507, 510, 625 P.2d 491.

41. The right to a speedy trial attaches when an individual becomes an accused. State v. Schlicher, 230 Kan. 482, 487, 639 P.2d 467 (1982).

42. Trial not commenced within 90-day period because of pending competency evaluation of defendant; court should order extension of time but failure does not mandate dismissal of action. State v. Anderson, 230 Kan. 681, 682, 641 P.2d 353 (1982).

43. Filing notice of intent to rely on insanity defense held waiver of requirements of speedy trial hereunder. State v. Topham, 231 Kan. 167, 170, 642 P.2d 986 (1982).

44. Dismissal of first information and refiling same charges even though additional charges added will not delay time limits on original charges; four factor test applied. State v. Hunt, 8 Kan. App. 2d, 162, 164, 166, 167, 651 P.2d 967 (1982).

45. Court properly combined post-arraignment time of first prosecution and post-arraignment time of second prosecution. State v. Ransom, 233 Kan. 185, 661 P.2d 392 (1983).

46. Where defendant not incarcerated solely by reason of charges involved in appeal, statute not applicable. State v. Strong, 8 Kan. App. 2d 589, 591, 593, 596, 663 P.2d 668 (1983).

47. Although trial court erred in determining the date of arraignment, under facts of case defendant's right to speedy trial not violated. State v. Rosine, 233 Kan. 663, 664 P.2d 852 (1983).

48. Where state dismisses without showing necessity and refiles, time between first arraignment and dismissal plus second arraignment and trial period used in computing hereunder. State v. Ransom, 234 Kan. 322, 325, 673 P.2d 1101 (1983).

49. Where state shows necessity for dismissal and refiling, only period from second arraignment to trial used in computing hereunder. State v. Haislip, 234 Kan. 329, 336, 673 P.2d 1094 (1983).

50. Cited in holding state has no right to appeal partial dismissal of complaint while remainder pending. State v. Bickford, 234 Kan. 507, 508, 672 P.2d 607 (1983).

51. Order of continuance must have statutory grounds and be rendered within 180-day statutory period. State v. George, 9 Kan. App. 2d 479, 481, 681 P.2d 30 (1984).

52. Permissive extension provisions do not apply to continuances fixing trial date within 180-day period; original trial date considered. State v. Corrigan, 10 Kan. App. 2d 55, 57, 58, 691 P.2d 1311 (1984).

53. Delay in trial caused by defendant's psychiatrist's inability to complete evaluation not charged to state. State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 689 P.2d 822 (1984).

54. No requirement that sentencing be within 180 days after plea or finding of guilty. State v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 274, 279, 689 P.2d 885 (1984).

55. Accused may waive rights by conduct, such as requesting or even acquiescing in, grant of continuance. State v. Bean, 236 Kan. 389, 392, 691 P.2d 30 (1984).

56. Time limit for new trial runs from date new trial granted, same as mistrial under (4). State v. Hanks, 236 Kan. 524, 536, 694 P.2d 407 (1985).

57. Continuance proper; requested with understanding of incarcerated defendant that rights hereunder waived. State v. Garner, 237 Kan. 227, 233, 236, 699 P.2d 468 (1985).

58. Waiver of felony jury (K.S.A. 22-3403(1)) determined; defendant, prosecution and court must agree; two of three insufficient. State v. Siver, 237 Kan. 569, 701 P.2d 699 (1985).

59. Arraignment starts statute running regardless of crime charged; arraignment effectively waived where trial held without objection and question of guilt submitted. State v. Huber, 10 Kan. App. 2d 560, 561, 562, 704 P.2d 1004 (1985).

60. Cited; delay from authorized interlocutory appeal (K.S.A. 22-3603) should not count in determining defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial. State v. Galloway, 238 Kan. 100, 104, 106, 708 P.2d 508 (1985).

61. Trial within 30 days after expiration of 180-day period because of scheduling conflicts within statutory intent. State v. Kee, 238 Kan. 342, 354, 355, 711 P.2d 746 (1985).

62. Unreasonable to charge defendant with 65 days remaining in 180-day period where request for jury necessitated continuance. State v. Dreher, 239 Kan. 259, 260, 261, 717 P.2d 1053 (1986).

63. Cited; convictions under K.S.A. 21-3414, 21-3421, 21-3502, 21-3701; speedy trial; justices qualified on rehearing examined. State v. Ransom, 239 Kan. 594, 722 P.2d 540 (1986).

64. Court of appeals has no jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus for violation of state law. Cain v. Petrovsky, 798 F.2d 1194, 1195 (1986).

65. Period of 179 days accused's motion to suppress evidence kept under advisement not a delay caused by accused. State v. Roman, 240 Kan. 611, 731 P.2d 1281 (1987).

66. Insanity defense (K.S.A. 22-3219) as speedy trial delay examined. State v. Maas, 242 Kan. 44, 744 P.2d 1222 (1987).

67. Right to speedy trial in criminal cases extends to appeals from municipal court to district court. City of Elkhart v. Bollacker, 243 Kan. 543, 546, 757 P.2d 311 (1988)

68. When misdemeanor charges dismissed then refiled, time between dismissal and subsequent first appearance (K.S.A. 22-3205) disregarded in computing speedy trial. City of Derby v. Lackey, 243 Kan. 744, 763 P.2d 614 (1988).

69. Cited; person released from custody as not subject to speedy trial provisions of K.S.A. 22-4303 examined. State v. Julian, 244 Kan. 101, 103, 765 P.2d 1104 (1988).

70. Trial within original statutory limitation plus court-allowed 30-day continuance does not violate statutory right to speedy trial. State v. Clements, 244 Kan. 411, 415, 770 P.2d 447 (1989).

71. Admissibility of evidence stored in court computer (particularly continuances granted), regardless of compliance with K.S.A. 60-2601a, determined. State v. Chapman, 244 Kan. 471, 769 P.2d 660 (1989).

72. Applicability examined where confinement on unrelated charges alleged as subterfuge to avoid effect of statute. State v. Goss, 245 Kan. 189, 191, 777 P.2d 781 (1989).

73. Delays caused by defendant's filing motion for competency hearing chargeable to defendant. State v. Prewett, 246 Kan. 39, 41, 785 P.2d 956 (1990).

74. Obligation on prosecution to provide speedy trial, applicability of statute to municipal court, when statute commences to run determined. City of Dodge City v. Rabe, 14 Kan. App. 2d 468, 471, 472, 794 P.2d 301 (1990).

75. Delays in obtaining and communicating with counsel chargeable to defendant in determining speedy trial. State v. Matson, 14 Kan. App. 2d 632, 637, 798 P.2d 488 (1990).

76. Statutory right to speedy trial compared to right protected by U.S. and Kansas Constitutions. State v. Smith, 247 Kan. 455, 457, 799 P.2d 497 (1990).

77. Time period to satisfy speedy trial requirement examined; "brought to trial" defined. State v. Bierman, 248 Kan. 80, 88, 805 P.2d 25 (1991).

78. Four-factor test to determine whether defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial violated examined. Smith v. Deppish, 248 Kan. 217, 218, 221, 807 P.2d 144 (1991).

79. Absent a showing of necessity, state cannot avoid time limitations by dismissing action and then refiling. State v. Jamison, 248 Kan. 302, 806 P.2d 972 (1991).

80. Factors to consider when determining whether constitutional right rather than statutory right to speedy trial violated examined. State v. Fitch, 249 Kan. 562, 819 P.2d 1225 (1991).

81. Defendant's acts constituted waiver of right to speedy trial; formal hearing not required before granting continuance. State v. Brown, 249 Kan. 698, 703, 704, 823 P.2d 190 (1991).

82. Second trial commenced within 180 days of mistrial; no denial of right to speedy trial. State v. Smith, 16 Kan. App. 2d 478, 482, 825 P.2d 541 (1992).

83. Extension of statutory time limit during defendant's period of incompetency and assertion of insanity defense examined. State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3, 27, 832 P.2d 1176 (1992).

84. Speedy trial analogy noted as not persuasive regarding circumstances surrounding notice of intent to seek hard 40. State v. Bailey, 251 Kan. 156, 168, 834 P.2d 342 (1992).

85. Speedy trial question examined where defendant failed in providing sufficient record. State v. Humphrey, 252 Kan. 6, 27, 845 P.2d 592 (1992).

86. Speedy trial limitations tolled while defendant facing trial in another jurisdiction; uniform agreement on detainers act (K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq.) examined. State v. Maggard, 16 Kan. App. 2d 743, 750, 829 P.2d 591 (1992).

87. State's rights to continuance of trial dates limited; no denial to speedy trial. State v. Green, 252 Kan. 548, 550, 551, 847 P.2d 1208 (1993).

88. Statute not violated when state made adequate showing of necessity for dismissing and refiling charges. State v. Clovis, 254 Kan. 168, 864 P.2d 687 (1993).

89. Whether defendant's trial was commenced within the period allowed examined. State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994).

90. Whether continuance granted when defendant is appointed new attorney is chargeable to defendant examined. State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 290, 294, 875 P.2d 242 (1994).

91. Whether continuance filed without defendant's permission is chargeable to defendant for speedy trial purposes examined. State v. Bafford, 255 Kan. 888, 891, 879 P.2d 613 (1994).

92. How much of delay caused by defendant's motion to suppress evidence should be charged to defendant for speedy trial purposes examined. City of Dodge City v. Downing, 257 Kan. 561, 563, 894 P.2d 206 (1995).

93. Whether defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial was violated examined. State v. Martinez, 20 Kan. App. 2d 824, 827, 893 P.2d 267 (1995).

94. Section inapplicable to defendant being held in jail on charges not involved in appeal. State v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774, 777, 895 P.2d 1238 (1995).

95. Trial judge's assessment of delays attributable to defendant reasonable; no statutory violation of speedy trial. State v. Colbert, 257 Kan. 896, 899, 896 P.2d 1089 (1995).

96. Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on denial of speedy trial. State v. Crane, 260 Kan. 208, 211, 216, 918 P.2d 1256 (1996).

97. When length of delay is not presumptively prejudicial, other factors of speedy trial test need not be considered. State v. Green, 260 Kan. 471, 473, 920 P.2d 414 (1996).

98. Speedy trial right specified by section applies only to commencement of trial. State v. Brown, 22 Kan. App. 2d 560, 561, 920 P.2d 460 (1996).

99. Defendant held in jail not solely for crime charged is entitled to a trial within 180 days after arraignment. State v. Abel, 261 Kan. 331, 333, 932 P.2d 952 (1997).

100. Defendant held in jail not solely for crime charged was brought to trial in timely manner. State v. Noriega, 261 Kan. 440, 457, 932 P.2d 940 (1997).

101. A defendant may waive right to speedy trial by his conduct such as requesting or acquiescing in the grant of a continuance. State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744, 746, 749, 933 P.2d 730 (1997).

102. Issue of when defendant placed in jeopardy considered when case tried to court with no jury. State v. Beerbower, 262 Kan. 248, 257, 936 P.2d 248 (1997).

103. Time delay caused by state's unauthorized interlocutory appeal charged to the state for speedy trial purposes. State v. Unruh, 263 Kan. 185, 186, 946 P.2d 1369 (1997).

104. Waiver by defendant of right to speedy trial precluded appellate review. State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69, 74, 955 P.2d 1209 (1998).

105. Continuance requested by defendant attributable to defendant in computing speedy trial violation; speedy trial violation denied. State v. Hemby, 264 Kan. 542, 543, 957 P.2d 428 (1998).

106. Statutory speedy right to trial not applicable where defendant in custody for reason other than subject charge. State v. Ruff, 266 Kan. 27, 30, 967 P.2d 742 (1998).

107. District magistrate must convict and impose sentence before defendant can appeal to district court for de novo review. State v. Remlinger, 266 Kan. 103, 104, 968 P.2d 671 (1998).

108. Defense attorney may not waive right to a 12-person jury without voluntary written waiver or oral waiver in court; trial court reversed. State v. Morfitt, 25 Kan. App. 2d 8, 11, 956 P.2d 719 (1998).

109. Right to speedy trial not violated by extension under (3)(c) notwithstanding admissible evidence not obtained. State v. Brown, 266 Kan. 563, 571, 973 P.2d 773 (1999).

110. Criminal defendant is entitled to jury trial in appeal to district court after jury trial before magistrate. State v. Wright, 26 Kan. App. 2d 879, 881, 995 P.2d 416 (2000).

111. All charges dismissed for failure to try defendant within 90 days after arraignment. State v. Hines, 269 Kan. 698, 7 P.3d 1237 (2000).

112. No violation of 90-day trial rule as court set trial date within 30-day extension authorized by subsection (3)(d). State v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 27 Kan. App. 2d 439, 8 P.3d 3 (2000).

113. Agreed request for continuance to obtain diversion should be charged to defendant for purposes of computing speedy trial compliance. State v. Biarda, 27 Kan. App. 2d 570, 7 P.3d 317 (2000).

114. Juvenile has no constitutional right to speedy trial under Kansas Juvenile Justice Code; case was tried "without unnecessary delay" requirement of section. In re S. A. J., 29 Kan. App. 2d 789, 31 P.3d 320 (2001).

115. Defendant is bound by counsel's suggestion of trial date beyond 90-day speedy trial limit absent personal objection thereto. State v. Arrocha, 30 Kan. App. 2d 120, 39 P.3d 101 (2002).

116. Time period for speedy trial requirements begins on date mistrial is declared regardless of cause. State v. White, 275 Kan. 580, 67 P.3d 138 (2003).

117. Prosecutor's statements that two necessary witnesses would not be available on trial date, without further explanation insufficient to warrant continuance beyond statutory time limit. State v. George, 31 Kan. App. 2d 430, 65 P.3d 1060 (2003).

118. Period allowed for continuance counted from date of trial setting, not from date on which motion to continue was granted. State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 231, 83 P.3d 182 (2004).

119. Time limit for prosecution in municipal court is more stringent than in district court. City of Shawnee v. Patch, 33 Kan. App. 2d 560, 105 P.3d 727 (2005).

120. Delays caused by defendant's motion for competency evaluation are charged to defendant for speedy trial consideration. State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 126 P.3d 1110 (2006).

121. Time during interlocutory appeal by state does not count against 180-day speedy trial requirement, but time after receipt of appellate court's decision counts against 180-day requirement. State v. Haney, 34 Kan. App. 2d 840, 125 P.3d 587 (2006).

122. Defendant's right to speedy trial not violated because it was possible could have been obtained within 90 day time limit. State v. Garcia, 282 Kan. 252, 262, 144 P.3d 684 (2006).

123. When district court finds no necessity for dismissal of first case and refiling of an identical case against the same defendant, elapsed time over both cases must be aggregated. State v. Clemence, 36 Kan. App. 2d 791, 797, 145 P.3d 931 (2006).

124. Statute does not require defendant to be prejudiced by the delay; convictions reversed, sentences vacated, charges dismissed. State v. Adams, 283 Kan. 365, 370, 371, 153 P.3d 512 (2007).

125. Time between granting of defendant's motion for continuance and original trial date properly charged to defendant. State v. Brown, 283 Kan. 658, 667, 157 P.3d 624 (2007).

126. The 90-day period for rescheduling trial on defense continuance not added on to time limit under K.S.A. 22-3402. State v. Lawrence, 38 Kan. App. 2d 473, 167 P.3d 794 (2007).

127. Mentioned; inmate seeking certificate of appealability of federal district court's denial of habeas petition; COA denied. Davis v. McKune, 241 Fed. Appx. 507, 509 (2007).

128. When state files interlocutory appeal not authorized by K.S.A. 22-3603, time for appeal charged to state under K.S.A. 22-3402. State v. Mitchell, 285 Kan. 1070, 1080, 1083, 179 P.3d 394 (2008).

129. Cited; right to speedy trial of inmate confined in correctional institution governed by K.S.A. 22-4301 and 22-4401, not 22-3402. State v. Angelo, 287 Kan. 262, 268, 271, 197 P.3d 337 (2008).

130. Defendant not brought to trial within 180 days of arraignment, defendant discharged from liability. State v. Gore, 39 Kan. App. 2d 779, 783, 184 P.3d 972 (2008).

131. Cited; trial continuance extends the 180-day deadline for commencing a trial under UMDDA, when. State v. Watson, 39 Kan. App. 2d 923, 928, 186 P.3d 812 (2008).

132. Cited in opinion discussing compatibility of K.S.A. 8-1567(h) and 21-3608a. State v. Cott, 39 Kan. App. 2d 950, 953, 186 P.3d 826 (2008).

133. Cited; when defendant's continuance request granted, time from grant of continuance until rescheduled trial is attributable to defendant. State v. Bryant, 40 Kan. App. 2d 308 to 310, 191 P.3d 350 (2008).

134. Principles relating to speedy trials under K.S.A. 22-3402 discussed, remanded to determine whether defendant acquiesced in continuance. State v. Vaughn, 288 Kan. 140, 200 P.3d 446 (2009).

135. Right to speedy trial does not apply to defendants held in custody for other crimes. State v. Blaurock, 41 Kan. App. 2d 178, 201 P.3d 728 (2009).

136. Charges dismissed for violation of speedy trial rule; ICE detainer did not place hold on defendant. State v. Montes-Mata, 41 Kan. App. 2d 1078, 208 P.3d 770 (2009).

137. Legislature did not intend that "other cases" in K.S.A. 22-3402(5)(d) be limited to only other criminal cases. State v. Dean, 42 Kan. App. 2d 32, 208 P.3d 343 (2009).

138. Principles regarding due process for probation revocation discussed and applied. State v. Curtis, 42 Kan. App. 2d 132, 209 P.3d 753 (2009).

139. When the State appeals the dismissal of complaint, the time during an appeal shall not count against the State for speedy trial purposes. State v. Blizzard, 43 Kan. App. 2d 418, 225 P.3d 773 (2010).

140. No violation of statutory speedy trial rights found where defendant requested a continuance and waived his speedy trial rights. State v. Pennington, 43 Kan. App. 2d 446, 227 P.3d 978 (2010).

141. Continuance properly charged to defendant; no speedy trial violation found. State v. Elnicki, 43 Kan. App. 2d 555, 228 P.3d 1087 (2010).

142. Trial shall be within 90 days of a competency finding, following a court-ordered suspension of proceedings. State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 243 P.3d 683 (2010).

143. Present custodial claim required to effect defendant's speedy trial claim as being held "solely by reason" of pending charges. State v. Montes-Mata, 292 Kan. 367, 253 P.3d 354 (2011).

144. Reasonable period of time to consider and decide the defendant's motion to suppress can be charged to the defendant. State v. Butts, 46 Kan. App. 2d 1074, 269 P.3d 862 (2012).

145. District court may grant trial continuance on basis that material evidence is unavailable but there is reason to believe evidence can be obtained and trial begin in 90 days. State v. Dobbs, 297 Kan. 1225, 308 P.3d 1258 (2013).

146. Right to speedy trial applies to a limited liability company ordered to appear by summons. State v. Spencer Gifts, 51 Kan. App. 2d 437, 444, 348 P.3d 611 (2015).

147. Failure to allow defendant to be present at hearing where defense counsel sought a continuance that defendant did not agree with was error; delay in speedy trial calculation should not have been counted against defendant. State v. Brownlee, 302 Kan. 491, 508, 354 P.3d 525 (2015).

148. Speedy trial statute did not create a vested right that would preclude retroactive application of statute's amended language to the defendant. State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 57, 371 P.3d 862 (2016).

149. Statutory speedy trial right only applies when a person is "charged with a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond" and not when the court has merely issued a notice to appear. State v. Spencer Gifts, 304 Kan. 755, 762, 374 P.3d 680 (2016) (overruling City of Elkhart v. Bollacker, 243 Kan. 542, 757 P.2d 311 (1988)).

150. When record on appeal does not contain sufficient factual findings to permit an appellate court to determine whether a violation of a defendant's right to be present at a continuance hearing was harmless, the appropriate response is to remand to the district court to make the necessary findings. State v. Wright, 305 Kan. 1176, 390 P.3d 899 (2017).

151. A case cannot be dismissed under K.S.A. 22-3402 when the cause for the delay was originally attributed to the defendant, there was no prosecutorial misconduct and there is no violation of the defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights. State v. Hammerschmidt, 57 Kan. App. 2d 449, 458, 453 P.3d 1185 (2019).

152. "Crowded docket" exception in subsection (e)(4) encompasses both the reason the court must change a trial date as well as the reason it cannot be rescheduled within the speedy trial deadline. State v. Foster, 60 Kan. App. 2d 243, 247, 493 P.3d 283 (2021), rev. denied (Sept. 27, 2021).

153. Defendant's waiver of statutory speedy trial rights in conjunction with continuance request is unconditional, unless defendant clarifies a condition on such waiver. State v. Shockley, 314 Kan. 46, 55-56, 494 P.3d 832 (2021).

154. Statute does not create a fundamental right but establishes procedural guardrails to protect the constitutional right to a speedy trial; statutory violation is not necessarily a constitutional violation. State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 288, 497 P.3d 566 (2021).


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