21-4704.
History: L. 1992, ch. 239, § 4; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 254; L. 1994, ch. 341, § 1; L. 1995, ch. 251, § 3; L. 1996, ch. 258, § 10; L. 1999, ch. 164, § 17; L. 2001, ch. 186, § 2; L. 2002, ch. 10, § 1; L. 2004, ch. 175, § 3; L. 2006, ch. 126, § 4; L. 2006, ch. 212, § 16; L. 2007, ch. 169, § 3; L. 2008, ch. 183, § 4; L. 2009, ch. 132, § 10; L. 2010, ch. 147, § 5; L. 2010, ch. 147, § 6; Repealed, L. 2011, ch. 30, § 288; July 1.
Revisor's Note:
Section was amended multiple times in 2001 session, see also 21-4704a.
Section was amended multiple times in 2007 session, see also 21-4704b.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
"Modern Kansas Legislative Strategies: The Blackmail Gambit," Robert Drean, 35 W.L.J. 157, 158 (1995).
"The Kansas Stalking Law: A 'Credible Threat' to Victims. A Critique of the Kansas Stalking Law and Proposed Legislation," Callie Anderson Marks, 36 W.L.J. 468 (1997).
Survey of Recent Cases, 45 K.L.R. 1393 (1997).
"The State's Response to Sexual Offenders," Carla Stovall, 7 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, No. 2, 29, 39 (1998).
"The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act—Post Hendricks," Hon. Tom Malone, 67 J.K.B.A. No. 2, 36 (1998).
"The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act," Robert J. Lewis, Jr., 38 W.L.J. 327 (1999).
"Recent Developments in Kansas Bioethics Law: The Kansas Prevention of Assisted Suicide Act," Kevin J. Breer and Cherie Leigh Durst, 38 W.L.J. 557 (1999).
"Does Public Access to Sex Offender Registration Information Under the Kansas Sex Offender Registration Act Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment? [State v. Scott, 961 P.2d 667 (Kan.1998)]," Marti Paulsen, 38 W.L.J. 727 (1999).
"Apprendi v. New Jersey: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminals in Sentencing," Stephanie B. Stewart, 49 K.L.R. 1193 (2001).
"2001 Legislative Wrap Up," Paul T. Davis, 70 J.K.B.A. No. 7, 14 (2001).
"Criminal Procedure Survey of Recent Cases," 50 K.L.R. 901 (2002).
"Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders," David J. Gottlieb, 50 K.L.R. 1031 (2002).
"Surviving Apprendi: A Procedural Ideal Meets the Real World of Determinate Sentencing," Teresa L. Sittenauer, 72 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 44 (2003).
"Durational and Dispositional Departures Under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act: The Kansas Supreme Court's Uneasy Passage Through Apprendi-land [State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2002)]," Steven J. Crossland, 42 W.L.J. 687 (2003).
"Criminal Procedure Survey of Recent Cases, Kansas Issue," 52 K.L.R. 771 (2004).
"Criminal Procedure Survey of Recent Cases," 53 K.L.R. 983 (2005).
"A Compromised Solution: Balancing the Constitutional Consequences and the Practical Benefits of Using Juvenile Adjudication for Sentence Enhancement Purposes," Nicole M. Romine, 45 W.L.J. 113 (2005).
Attorney General's Opinions:
Driving under the influence; place of incarceration for third or subsequent offense; penalties. 94-43.
DUI; penalties; sentencing guidelines; grid for nondrug crimes; presumptive disposition; term of imprisonment. 94-161.
DUI; eligibility for good time credit on third or subsequent conviction. 95-41.
Upon revocation of postrelease supervision for fourth or subsequent DUI offense, offender is to be confined in Department of Corrections facility. 2003-21.
Ex post facto clause discussed and applied regarding bill concerning post incarceration supervision. 2008-14.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Cited; whether defendant's exclusion from limited retroactivity provision of state sentencing guidelines violates equal protection examined. Chiles v. State, 254 Kan. 888, 891, 869 P.2d 707 (1994).
2. Cited; whether defendants whose sentences are converted to guidelines remain subject to postrelease supervision upon release examined. Phillpot v. Shelton, 19 Kan. App. 2d 654, 663, 875 P.2d 289 (1994).
3. Whether consecutive sentences required when defendant assigned to community corrections commits new felony; whether action departure discussed. State v. Howard, 20 Kan. App. 2d 252, 253, 885 P.2d 1273 (1994).
4. Whether changing a crime's presumptive sentence from nonimprisonment to presumed imprisonment precludes retroactive sentencing guidelines conversion examined. State v. Sidders, 20 Kan. App. 2d 405, 406, 888 P.2d 409 (1995).
5. Whether juvenile adjudication can be used to enhance severity level of theft conviction examined. In re J.E.M., 20 Kan. App. 2d 596, 600, 890 P.2d 364 (1995).
6. Whether court erred in determining firearm was not used in commission of aggravated battery examined. State v. George, 20 Kan. App. 2d 648, 652, 658, 891 P.2d 1118 (1995).
7. Whether imposing imprisonment for presumed nonprison felony defendant committed on probation for felony constitutes departure examined. State v. Dillard, 20 Kan. App. 2d 660, 663, 890 P.2d 1248 (1995).
8. Whether judge erred in imposing sentence and failing to properly make findings for dispositional departure examined. State v. Rhoads, 20 Kan. App. 2d 790, 797, 892 P.2d 918 (1995).
9. Whether judge erred by imposing indeterminate sentence contrary to KSGA (K.S.A. 21-4704 et seq.) examined. State v. Rhoads, 20 Kan. App. 2d 790, 800, 892 P.2d 918 (1995).
10. Whether sentencing judge has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences in multiple conviction cases examined. State v. Peal, 20 Kan. App. 2d 816, 819, 893 P.2d 258 (1995).
11. Whether K.S.A. 8-1567(f) controls over subsection (a) in determining penalties for third or later DUI conviction examined. State v. Webb, 20 Kan. App. 2d 873, 874, 893 P.2d 255 (1995).
12. Whether substantial and compelling reasons existed for departure from presumptive sentence examined. State v. Richardson, 20 Kan. App. 2d 932, 901 P.2d 1 (1995).
13. Whether felony DUI penalty provision is controlled by subsection (f) or KSGA "21-4701 et seq." examined. State v. Binkley, 20 Kan. App. 2d 999, 1000, 894 P.2d 907 (1995).
14. Aggravated indecent liberties with a child is a severity level 3 person felony under 1993 KSGA (K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq.). State v. Shaw, 21 Kan. App. 2d 460, 462, 901 P.2d 49 (1995).
15. Imposition of incarceration or probation in border box case is presumptive sentence for appeal purposes. State v. Bost, 21 Kan. App. 2d 560, 567, 571, 903 P.2d 160 (1995).
16. Convictions of nonprimary crimes must be considered part of criminal history for primary crime under 1993 KSGA. State v. Riley, 259 Kan. 774, 776, 915 P.2d 774 (1996).
17. Firearms provision in subsection (h) and K.S.A. 21-3410 do not preclude conversion. State v. Torrance, 22 Kan. App. 2d 721, 731, 922 P.2d 1109 (1996).
18. Trial court error of deferring imprisonment decision pending alcohol evaluation ruled harmless. State v. Cernech, 22 Kan. App. 2d 900, 902, 924 P.2d 648 (1996).
19. Prior state conviction qualified as punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year for federal statute purposes. U.S. v. Arnold, 113 F.3d 1146, 1147 (1997).
20. Instruction failed to state all elements of level 4 felony offense; court without jurisdiction to impose sentence therefor. State v. Jackson, 262 Kan. 119, 137, 936 P.2d 761 (1997).
21. Retroactivity examined; statute defining length or type of criminal punishment is substantive and applies prospectively unless otherwise expressly provided. State v. Ford, 262 Kan. 206, 208, 936 P.2d 255 (1997).
22. Sentence vacated where defendant sentenced for offense committed before effective date of amendments to section's penalty provisions. State v. Wright, 24 Kan. App. 2d 558, 567, 948 P.2d 667 (1997).
23. Under subsections (f) and (h) trial court is not required to find substantial and compelling reasons to impose nonprison sentence. State v. Colbert, 24 Kan. App. 2d 756, 757, 953 P.2d 1058 (1998).
24. Departure based on evidence which would if proven establish greater offense than in plea agreement reversed. State v. Soler, 25 Kan. App. 2d 1, 2, 957 P.2d 516 (1998).
25. Evidence that defendant was not amenable to probation supervision constituted compelling reason supporting upward departure. State v. Meyer, 25 Kan. App. 2d 195, 198, 960 P.2d 261 (1998).
26. Placement at conservation camp must be considered when sentencing defendant falling within nondrug border box to imprisonment sentence. State v. Schick, 25 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703, 971 P.2d 346 (1998).
27. Prior conviction used to classify defendant as a persistent sex offender may not be used in determining defendant's criminal history category. State v. Taylor, 27 Kan. App. 2d 62, 998 P.2d 123 (2000).
28. Court's upward departure upon conviction of child abuse violates defendant's constitutional rights, following Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 23 P.3d 801 (2001).
29. K.S.A. 21-3516 not unconstitutionally overbroad but trial court erred in using prior conviction to compute criminal history score and to double sentence as persistent sex offender; holding in State v. Taylor, 27 Kan. App. 2d 62 (2000) specifically approved. State v. Zabrinas, 271 Kan. 422, 24 P.3d 77 (2001).
30. Court may classify defendant a persistent sex offender based on one prior sex offense and include other prior sex offenses in defendant's criminal history score. State v. Armstrong, 29 Kan. App. 2d 822, 33 P.3d 246 (2001).
31. No violation of Apprendi when sentence imposed was based in part upon defendant's criminal history score; i.e. sentence was within presumptive range. State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002).
32. Inclusion of prior juvenile adjudication in defendant's criminal history score does not violate Apprendi. State v. Hitt, 273 Kan. 224, 42 P.3d 732 (2002).
33. Prior conviction used to classify defendant as persistent sex offender may not be used in determining defendant's criminal history category. State v. Moore, 274 Kan. 639, 55 P.3d 903 (2002).
34. Enhancement of sentence of persistent sex offender does not violate Apprendi and Gould limitations. State v. Spinden, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1014, 54 P.3d 514 (2002).
35. Court not required to state aggravating or mitigating factors when sentence imposed is within presumptive guidelines grid box. Pieplow v. State, 31 Kan. App. 2d 998, 76 P.3d 1069 (2003).
36. Prior conviction refers to another conviction effected prior to sentencing hearing regardless of when other crime was committed in relation to sentencing crime. State v. Kirby, 32 Kan. App. 2d 811, 89 P.3d 931 (2004).
37. Application of persistent sex offender provisions did not require withdrawal of plea. State v. Chesbro, 35 Kan. App. 2d 662, 673, 134 P.3d 1 (2006).
38. Trial court decision to not impose a nonprison sentence for an offense classified in grid block 5-I was not subject to appeal. State v. Whitlock, 36 Kan. App. 2d 556, 559, 142 P.3d 334 (2006).
39. Imposing double maximum sentence based on trial court finding prior crime sexually motivated unconstitutional. State v. Allen, 283 Kan. 372, 379, 153 P.3d 488 (2007).
40. Cited in discussing sentencing; no credit against postrelease supervision for time served in excess of sentence. State v. Gaudina, 284 Kan. 354, 360, 362, 160 P.3d 854 (2007).
41. Section defines two segments of the bifurcated sentence; period of confinement and period of postrelease supervision. State v. Gaudina, 284 Kan. 354, 358, 160 P.3d 854 (2007).
42. Mentioned; defendant pled to attempted second degree unintentional murder, now a nonexistent crime; test discussed. McPherson v. State, 38 Kan. App. 2d 276, 284, 163 P.3d 1257 (2007).
43. Prior conviction for solicitation of a minor is not enough to establish the defendant as a persistent sex offender. State v. Lowden, 38 Kan. App. 2d 858, 860, 861, 174 P.3d 895 (2008).
44. Mentioned in opinion involving downward departure from sentencing guidelines in second-degree murder conviction. State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan. 719, 732, 176 P.3d 160 (2008).
45. Cited in opinion holding that juveniles have a constitutional right to jury trials. In re L.M., 286 Kan. 460, 468, 186 P.3d 164 (2008).
46. Cited; court upholds consecutive sentences for longest prison term in sentencing presumptive grid block; sentence cannot be appealed. State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 825, 828, 840, 841, 848 to 851, 190 P.3d 207 (2008).
47. Cited; no error found in sentencing by imposing the high numbers in appropriate grid boxes for on-grid convictions. State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 1098, 1113, 191 P.3d 294 (2008).
48. State breached plea agreement; prosecutor provided negative comments and no rationale for accepting the plea agreement. State v. Foster, 39 Kan. App. 2d 380, 381 to 385, 180 P.3d 1074 (2008).
49. Cited; court on appeal is forbidden from reviewing presumptive sentences; K.S.A. 60-1507 motions may raise constitutional claims. State v. Hawkins, 40 Kan. App. 2d 10, 20, 188 P.3d 965 (2008).
50. Cited; K.S.A. 21-4704(j) determines whether a defendant is a persistent sex offender, juvenile adjudications are not referenced. State v. Boyer, 40 Kan. App. 2d 318 to 321, 324, 191 P.3d 357 (2008).
51. Cited; extended jurisdiction juvenile conviction; evidence of probation violation sufficient, incarceration required. State v. J.H., 40 Kan. App. 2d 643, 644, 197 P.3d 467 (2008).
52. Conviction under K.S.A. 21-4704 held not to be a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. U.S. v. Hill, 512 F.3d 1277, 1278 (2008).
53. Cited; section discussed and applied; dissent viewed section differently. State v. Luttig, 40 Kan. App. 2d 1095, 1099, 1100, 1102, 199 P.3d 793 (2009).
54. Alleged illegal sentence upheld; Kansas sentencing guidelines act limits its application to crimes on July 1, 1993, or thereafter. State v. Davis, 288 Kan. 153, 200 P.3d 443 (2009).
55. Conviction under K.S.A. 21-3504; mitigating circumstances permit downward departure from mandatory minimum imprisonment term set out in K.S.A. 21-4643. State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 200 P.3d 1275 (2009).
56. Juvenile adjudications are not to be considered in determination of persistent sex offender status under K.S.A. 21-4704(j). State v. Boyer, 289 Kan. 108, 209 P.3d 705 (2009).
57. No constitutional violation in K.S.A. 21-4704; defendant sentenced under K.S.A. 21-4642. State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 217 P.3d 15 (2009).
58. Ineffective assistance of counsel found; presumptive prison sentence involved. Moll v. State, 41 Kan. App. 2d 677, 204 P.3d 659 (2009).
59. Conviction hereunder upheld; traffic stop and smell of marijuana provided probable cause for search. State v. Preston, 41 Kan. App. 2d 981, 207 P.3d 1081 (2009).
60. Where the imposed sentence is within the presumptive guidelines sentence range, appellate court lacks appellate jurisdiction. State v. Miller, 42 Kan. App. 2d 12, 208 P.3d 774 (2009).
61. K.S.A. 21-4704 gives district court discretion to impose the aggravated sentence without requiring specific factual findings. State v. Hardesty, 42 Kan. App. 2d 431, 213 P.3d 745 (2009).
62. Felony conviction of aggravated battery while on felony probation subjects defendant to a nondeparture sentence of imprisonment. State v. Curreri, 42 Kan. App. 2d 460, 213 P.3d 1084 (2009).
63. Court must pronounce the complete sentence including a postrelease supervision term at the sentencing hearing. State v. Arrocha, 42 Kan. App. 2d 796, 217 P.3d 467 (2009).
64. "Prior conviction" to enhance sentence does not include juvenile adjudication. State v. Dale, 42 Kan. App. 2d 1043, 220 P.3d 1102 (2009).
65. Juvenile adjudications not basis for persistent sex offender status. State v. LaBelle, 290 Kan. 529, 231 P.3d 1065 (2010).
66. No appellate jurisdiction for a sentence within the presumptive grid block. State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011).
67. When a defendant being sentenced for felony theft has 3 or more prior felony theft convictions, only 3 of such prior convictions are required to trigger enhancement of defendant's sentence to presumptive imprisonment. State v. Williams, 47 Kan. App. 2d 102, 272 P.3d 1282 (2012).
68. Sentence imposed under K.S.A. 21-4642 is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing under K.S.A. 21-4704 for a defendant convicted of rape and with one prior rape conviction. State v. Turner 293 Kan. 1085, 272 P.3d 19 (2012).
69. Persistent sex offender statute allowing doubling of a maximum presumptive sentence cannot be applied to an off-grid Jessica's Law offense to double mandatory minimum of 25 years imprisonment. State v. Wilson, 294 Kan. 818, 280 P.3d 784 (2012).
70. When a person is convicted of a sexually violent crime and such person has a prior Kansas conviction for a sexually violent crime or a conviction for a comparable offense in another state, the court is required to double the person's prison sentence. State v. Riolo, 50 Kan. App. 2d 351, 330 P.3d 1120 (2014).
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