21-3204.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3204; L. 1984, ch. 39, § 33; L. 1996, ch. 214, § 25; L. 1999, ch. 164, § 4; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Violation of speeding statute absolute liability offense; defective cruise control not defense. State v. Baker, 1 Kan. App. 2d 568, 569, 570, 571, 571 P.2d 65.
2. Offense charged under city ordinance an absolute liability offense in light hereof. City of Overland Park v. Estell, 8 Kan. App. 2d 182, 187, 653 P.2d 819 (1982).
3. Cited; absolute liability of DUI statute (K.S.A. 8-1567), lack of intent, proof by circumstantial evidence followed. City of Wichita v. Hull, 11 Kan. App. 2d 441, 444, 724 P.2d 699 (1986).
4. Cited; under K.S.A. 21-3610, seller need not have knowledge of minor's age; K.S.A. 21-3610 meets constitutional tests. State v. Robinson, 239 Kan. 269, 272, 274, 718 P.2d 1313 (1986).
5. Compulsion defense determined applicable to absolute liability traffic offenses. State v. Riedl, 15 Kan. App. 2d 326, 329, 807 P.2d 697 (1991).
6. Whether statute clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability examined. State v. JC Sports Bar, Inc., 253 Kan. 815, 822, 823, 861 P.2d 1324 (1993).
7. Whether K.S.A. 65-2803 requires proof of criminal intent to show violation examined on question reserved by prosection. State v. Mountjoy, 257 Kan. 163, 170, 891 P.2d 376 (1995).
8. Statutory requirement that all vehicles be driven on the right half of roadway is an absolute liability offense. State v. Hopper, 260 Kan. 66, 69, 917 P.2d 872 (1996).
9. Accused's knowledge of status as a habitual violator is an essential element of offense under K.S.A. 8-287. State v. Lewis, 263 Kan. 843, 848, 953 P.2d 1016 (1998), rev'g., 23 Kan. App. 2d 758, 767, 768, 935 P.2d 1072 (1997).
10. If law enforcement officer observes person violating K.S.A. 8-1548, officer has probable cause to seize person to investigate violation. State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 138, 142, 183 P.3d 788 (2008).
11. Crime involving intent to expose individuals to a life-threatening communicable disease is a specific intent crime. State v. Richardson, 289 Kan. 118, 209 P.3d 696 (2009).
12. Discussion of crimes designated as strict liability, general intent and specific intent crimes. In re C.P.W., 289 Kan. 448, 213 P.3d 413 (2009).
13. K.S.A. 8-1522 construed; section establishes two rules, one relating to maintaining a single lane and one relating to changing lanes. State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601 (2009).
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