Law Review and Bar Journal References:

Mentioned in context that intent may be irrelevant in certain fraudulent consumer transactions, William P. Coates, Jr., 44 J.B.A.K. 67, 106, 107 (1975).

"Survey of Kansas Law: Criminal Law and Procedure," Keith G. Meyer, 27 K.L.R. 391, 400 (1979).

"The Kansas Public Employer-Employee Relations Law," Raymond Goetz, 28 K.L.R. 243, 263 (1980).

"Addressing the Consumer's Worst Nightmare: Toward a More Expansive Development of the Law of Tortious Fraud and Deceptive Practices in Kansas," Ellen Byers, 38 W.L.J. 455 (1999).

"Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas," Marc Rosen, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, No. 2, 253 (1999).

Attorney General's Opinions:

Prohibited acts and penalties; consumption on premises to which general public has access. 84-51.

CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Mentioned; willfulness is not legal equivalent of maliciousness as it relates to murder. State v. Roberson, 210 Kan. 209, 214, 499 P.2d 1137.

2. Court instructions defining "feloniously" and "willfully" held proper. State v. Osburn, 211 Kan. 248, 254, 505 P.2d 742.

3. Mentioned in upholding conviction for sale of cocaine; defense of entrapment is exception to rule that proof of willful conduct proves criminal intent. State v. Bagemehl, 213 Kan. 210, 213, 515 P.2d 1104.

4. Mentioned; robbery conviction under prior criminal code reversed for trial court's failure to instruct on essential element of felonious intent. State v. Clingerman, 213 Kan. 525, 530, 516 P.2d 1022.

5. Instructions respecting elements of felony murder proper; "maliciously" imports and includes "willfully." State v. Osbey, 213 Kan. 564, 572, 517 P.2d 141.

6. Applied; conviction of attempted theft of swine reversed; evidence insufficient to infer specific intent to steal. State v. Gobin, 216 Kan. 278, 280, 531 P.2d 16.

7. Conviction hereunder; epileptic not in the throes of an epileptic seizure at time of crime is criminally responsible. State v. Pettay, 216 Kan. 555, 556, 532 P.2d 1289.

8. Applied in determining conspiracy statute (K.S.A. 21-3302) constitutionally valid; indictment stated offense; not impermissibly vague. State v. Campbell, 217 Kan. 756, 770, 539 P.2d 329.

9. Provisions of section as to general criminal intent applicable to prosecution under K.S.A. 21-3411. State v. Farris, 218 Kan. 136, 141, 542 P.2d 725.

10. Paragraph (3) referred to; murder prosecution; instruction on manslaughter proper; erroneously given. State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 184, 542 P.2d 1051.

11. Term "knowingly" included within term "willful"; separate instruction on intent not necessary; conviction upheld. State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 752, 756, 545 P.2d 379.

12. Presumption of intent instruction upheld; instructions, considered as a whole, properly placed burden of proof on state. State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 758, 762, 545 P.2d 383.

13. Conviction of possession of heroin; court did not err in instructing jury on element of intent. State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 540, 552 P.2d 971.

14. Mentioned; intent requirements of K.S.A. 21-3431 declared unconstitutional; impermissibly vague. State v. Kirby, 221 Kan. 1, 5, 563 P.2d 408.

15. Instruction to jury as to presumption that a person intends all the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts upheld. State v. Woods, 222 Kan. 179, 185, 563 P.2d 1061.

16. Defendants' plea of not guilty puts issue of intent or guilty knowledge before the court. State v. Brooks, 222 Kan. 432, 434, 565 P.2d 241.

17. Section cited; conviction under K.S.A. 21-4204 upheld. State v. Hoskins, 222 Kan. 436, 440, 565 P.2d 608.

18. Court's instructions conformed to provisions of section; conviction under K.S.A. 21-3402 upheld. State v. Stafford, 223 Kan. 62, 65, 573 P.2d 970.

19. Applied in determining specific statute (K.S.A. 21-3405) controlled over general statute (K.S.A. 21-3404); involuntary manslaughter prosecution. State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743, 745, 576 P.2d 666.

20. Subsection (3) cited; wanton conduct or gross negligence necessary element of vehicular homicide under State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743. State v. Choens, 224 Kan. 402, 580 P.2d 1298.

21. Instructions on involuntary manslaughter insufficient to present defense theory to jury; conviction reversed. State v. Farley, 225 Kan. 127, 133, 587 P.2d 337.

22. Referred to in holding use of unloaded firearm in violating K.S.A. 21-3411 required mandatory sentence. State v. Deutscher, 225 Kan. 265, 271, 589 P.2d 620.

23. Referred to in reversing conviction under K.S.A. 21-3716 (aggravated burglary); exclusion of evidence prejudicial. In re Nichols, 2 Kan. App. 2d 431, 437, 580 P.2d 1370.

24. Instruction using definition under subsection (3) not erroneous; conviction of involuntary manslaughter upheld. State v. Satterfield, 3 Kan. App. 2d 212, 222, 592 P.2d 135.

25. Statute on compulsion not violative of constitutional rights; defendant had reasonable opportunity to avoid doing act without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm. State v. Rider, Edens & Lemons, 229 Kan. 394, 408, 625 P.2d 425.

26. Information alleging reckless driving sufficiently states crime of manslaughter; "reckless" means "wanton." Henderson v. Schenk, 6 Kan. App. 2d 562, 564, 631 P.2d 246 (1981).

27. Definition of willful conduct discussed; guilty plea to second-degree murder not knowingly made. Clinkingbeard v. State, 6 Kan. App. 2d 716, 717, 718, 634 P.2d 159 (1981).

28. Test of "willful conduct" discussed; civil penalties case does not require more stringent standard than criminal case. State ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 536, 646 P.2d 1091 (1982).

29. Cited in holding rape not "specific intent" crime; K.S.A. 21-3502 not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426, 432, 433, 673 P.2d 1147 (1983).

30. Specific intent may be shown by acts, circumstances and inferences; direct proof not necessary. State v. Dubish, 234 Kan. 708, 716, 675 P.2d 877 (1984).

31. Voluntary intoxication may be defense to specific intent crime; may also be defense in general intent crime where aiding and abetting at issue. State v. Sterling, 235 Kan. 526, 527, 530, 680 P.2d 301 (1984).

32. Word "knowingly" as used in K.S.A. 21-3718 distinguishes intentional from accidental acts. State v. Powell, 9 Kan. App. 2d 748, 751, 687 P.2d 1375 (1984).

33. Rape statute (K.S.A. 21-3502) requires general criminal intent specified herein. State v. Lile, 237 Kan. 210, 213, 699 P.2d 456 (1985).

34. Discussed where conduct shown at preliminary hearing (K.S.A. 22-2902) on involuntary manslaughter charge (K.S.A. 21-3404) raised issue of wantonness. State v. Burrell, 237 Kan. 303, 306, 307, 699 P.2d 499 (1985).

35. Definition of "intentional" herein noted in consumer protection act case. Manley v. Wichita Business College, 237 Kan. 427, 438, 701 P.2d 893 (1985).

36. Cited; "willful" as used in aggravated failure to appear statute (K.S.A. 21-3814) examined. State v. Chappell, 11 Kan. App. 2d 546, 550, 729 P.2d 1241 (1986).

37. Cited; under K.S.A. 21-3610, seller need not have knowledge of minor's age; K.S.A. 21-3610 meets constitutional tests. State v. Robinson, 239 Kan. 269, 271, 272, 718 P.2d 1313 (1986).

38. Cited; second-degree murder (K.S.A. 21-3402) as specific intent crime, instruction on diminished capacity examined. State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 82, 744 P.2d 1228 (1987).

39. Cited; statute on debtor depriving creditor of creditor's own money or not requiring intent to defraud (K.S.A. 21-3734(1)(c)) examined. State v. Jones, 242 Kan. 385, 391, 748 P.2d 839 (1988).

40. Misrepresentations regarding application for welfare benefits as "willfully false" examined. State v. Jones, 13 Kan. App. 2d 520, 528, 775 P.2d 183 (1989).

41. Practical distinction between arson (K.S.A. 21-3718) and criminal damage to property (K.S.A. 21-3720) examined. Zapata v. State, 14 Kan. App. 2d 94, 98, 782 P.2d 1251 (1989).

42. Cited where instruction of attempted second-degree murder as lesser included offense of attempted first-degree murder appropriate examined. State v. Dixon, 252 Kan. 39, 42, 843 P.2d 172 (1992).

43. Refusal of court to instruct on vehicular homicide as lesser included offense of second-degree murder examined. State v. Stone, 253 Kan. 105, 113, 853 P.2d 662 (1993).

44. Cited in holding willful violation of penal statute exclusion in insurance policy controls on duty to defend issue. MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 253 Kan. 198, 203, 855 P.2d 77 (1993).

45. Whether criminal defamation statute is constitutionally overbroad examined. Phelps v. Hamilton, 828 F. Supp. 831, 847 (1993).

46. Whether court failed to correctly instruct jury regarding criminal intent examined. State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 17, 891 P.2d 324 (1995).

47. Whether K.S.A. 65-2803 requires proof of criminal intent to show violation examined on question reserved by prosecution. State v. Mountjoy, 257 Kan. 163, 169, 176, 891 P.2d 376 (1995).

48. Whether defendant who uses firearm in commission of crime is eligible for retroactive application of sentencing guidelines examined. State v. George, 20 Kan. App. 2d 648, 652, 891 P.2d 1118 (1995).

49. Whether lesser severity levels of aggravated battery are included offenses or lesser included offenses of level 4 aggravated battery examined. State v. Ochoa, 20 Kan. App. 2d 1014, 1020, 895 P.2d 198 (1995).

50. Cited; proof of criminal intent necessary to convict for escape from custody discussed. State v. Kelly, 21 Kan. App. 2d 114, 120, 896 P.2d 1101 (1995).

51. Criminal use of weapons statute (K.S.A. 21-4201) is not unconstitutionally vague for lack of criminal intent. State v. Neighbors, 21 Kan. App. 2d 824, 827, 908 P.2d 649 (1995).

52. Evidence did not warrant jury instruction on unintentional second-degree murder and reckless involuntary manslaughter. State v. Hickles, 261 Kan. 74, 84, 929 P.2d 141 (1996).

53. Specific intent distinguished from general intent; voluntary intoxication may be defense to specific but not general intent crimes. State v. Esher, 22 Kan. App. 2d 779, 782, 922 P.2d 1123 (1996).

54. Defendant was not entitled to reckless second-degree murder instruction in first-degree murder case. State v. Baacke, 261 Kan. 422, 435, 932 P.2d 396 (1997).

55. Rape is a general criminal intent crime; specific intent instruction not required. State v. Plunkett, 261 Kan. 1024, 1030, 934 P.2d 113 (1997).

56. Insufficient evidence that killing unintentional or reckless; involuntary manslaughter instruction not required. State v. Jackson, 262 Kan. 119, 124, 936 P.2d 761 (1997).

57. Failure to instruct on general criminal intent in aggravated indecent liberties (K.S.A. 21-3504) case not clearly erroneous. State v. Isley, 262 Kan. 281, 290, 936 P.2d 275 (1997).

58. General intent instruction not clearly erroneous where jury also instructed on specific intent necessary for conviction. State v. Mitchell, 262 Kan. 434, 442, 939 P.2d 879 (1997).

59. Licensee's knowledge of habitual violator status required to sustain her conviction for violating K.S.A. 8-287. State v. Lewis, 263 Kan. 843, 852, 856, 953 P.2d 1016 (1998), rev'g., 23 Kan. App. 2d 758, 767, 768, 935 P.2d 1072 (1997).

60. Evidence of driving under the influence of alcohol insufficient to bind defendant over on reckless aggravated battery. State v. Huser, 265 Kan. 228, 236, 959 P.2d 908 (1998).

61. Abuse of child statute (K.S.A. 21-3609) not unconstitutionally vague; required mental state is that shaking be intentional. State v. Carr, 265 Kan. 608, 614, 616, 963 P.2d 421 (1998).

62. Felony prosecution under K.S.A. 8-262(a)(1) requires accused had knowledge driver's license was suspended as an essential element. State v. Thomas, 266 Kan. 265, 267, 970 P.2d 986 (1998).

63. Trial court failure to instruct jury on lesser included offense of premeditated murder affirmed. State v. Harris, 266 Kan. 270, 276, 970 P.2d 519 (1998).

64. Evidence sufficient to establish criminal intent in habitual violator action; compulsion defense unavailable. State v. Bateson, 25 Kan. App. 2d 90, 98, 958 P.2d 44 (1998).

65. Aggravated assault of law enforcement officer only requires proof that defendant intentionally placed another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm; specific intent not required; not reversible error for failing to give general intent instruction. State v. Eichman, 26 Kan. App. 2d 527, 530, 989 P.2d 795 (1999).

66. Defendant bartender guilty of selling cereal malt beverage to person underage although patron's ID was checked but misread by a third party; general criminal intent crime. State v. Pendleton, 26 Kan. App. 2d 565, 567, 990 P.2d 1241 (1999).

67. Proof of criminal intent not required for crimes of involuntary manslaughter under the influence (K.S.A. 21-3442) and injury to a pregnant woman (K.S.A. 21-3441). State v. Creamer, 26 Kan. App. 2d 914, 916, 996 P.2d 339 (2000).

68. Cited in case involving conviction for a lesser included offense. State v. McCarley 38 Kan. App. 2d 165, 177, 166 P.3d 418 (2007).

69. Cited; no error in premeditated first degree murder case in denying jury instructions on lesser included offenses. State v. Henson, 287 Kan. 574, 587, 197 P.3d 456 (2008).

70. Refusal to give instruction on voluntary intoxication defense to rape found erroneous but no reversal required under facts of case. State v. Smith, 39 Kan. App. 2d 204, 211, 178 P.3d 672 (2008).

71. Cited; so long as juvenile's actions were not accidental or involuntary, juvenile possessed the required culpable intent. In re D.A., 40 Kan. App. 2d 878, 892, 197 P.3d 849 (2008).

72. Validity of charging instrument to be tested by reading the document in its entirety. State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 200 P.3d 1275 (2009).

73. Crime involving intent to expose individuals to a life-threatening communicable disease is a specific intent crime. State v. Richardson, 289 Kan. 118, 209 P.3d 696 (2009).

74. Discussion of crimes designated as strict liability, general intent and specific intent crimes. In re C.P.W., 289 Kan. 448, 213 P.3d 413 (2009).

75. Jury instruction on inferable intent given at trial for attempted first-degree murder did not impermissibly change statutory definition of intentional conduct. State v. Hernandez, 44 Kan. App. 2d 524, 239 P.3d 103 (2010).

76. A defendant can act "recklessly" for purposes of criminal intent without foreseeing the particular harm that ultimately occurs. State v. Bolze-Sann, 302 Kan. 198, 204, 352 P.3d 511 (2015).

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