Printable Format8-284. Public policy of state. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Kansas:
(a) To provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of the state;
(b) To deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on such highways to persons who by their conduct, attitude and record have demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of this state, the orders of its courts and the statutorily required acts of its administrative agencies; and
(c) To discourage repetition of criminal acts by individuals against the peace and dignity of this state and its political subdivisions and to impose increased and added deprivation of the privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual violators who have been convicted repeatedly of violations of traffic laws.
History: L. 1972, ch. 32, ยง 1; July 1.
Attorney General's Opinions:
Habitual violators; effect of prior conviction based on nolo contendere plea. 82-82.
Municipal court diversion; ineligibility based on prior alcohol related conviction. 94-62.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Applied in construing K.S.A. 8-286; word "forthwith" directory, not mandatory; finding defendant habitual violator affirmed. State v. Garton, 2 Kan. App. 2d 709, 710, 586 P.2d 1386.
2. Affirmative showing in complaint of counsel representation not required where actual imprisonment not the result; reversed and remanded. State v. Skeen, 3 Kan. App. 2d 231, 592 P.2d 150.
3. Violation of city ordinance counts toward habitual violator conviction only when specifically provided by K.S.A. 8-285. State v. Wood, 231 Kan. 699, 647 P.2d 1327 (1982).
4. Action filed to have defendant declared habitual violator is civil not criminal proceeding. State v. Boos, 232 Kan. 864, 865, 870, 872, 659 P.2d 224 (1983).
5. Habitual violator proceeding cannot be based on an uncertified record of conviction. State v. Topping, 8 Kan. App. 2d 467, 470, 660 P.2d 578 (1983).
6. K.S.A. 8-1567 "self-contained habitual criminal act"; prior conviction cannot be used where right to counsel violated. State v. Oehm, 9 Kan. App. 2d 399, 402, 680 P.2d 309 (1984).
7. Driving under influence statute (K.S.A. 8-1567) not vague nor denial of equal protection or ex post facto. State v. Campbell, 9 Kan. App. 2d 474, 476, 681 P.2d 679 (1984).
8. Cited in holding habitual violator under K.S.A. 8-285 requires three separate convictions, each based on separate incident. State v. Underwood, 10 Kan. App. 2d 116, 121, 123, 693 P.2d 1205 (1985).
9. Neither general civil nor general criminal statutes of limitations applies to habitual violator proceedings. State v. Graham, 12 Kan. App. 2d 803, 809, 758 P.2d 247 (1988).
10. Habitual violator finding (K.S.A. 8-286) not invalid because adjudication based in part on uncounseled misdemeanor violation. State v. Weber, 13 Kan. App. 2d 571, 573, 574, 775 P.2d 679 (1989).
11. Purpose of act stated; criminal constitutional considerations as inapplicable examined. State v. Hines, 14 Kan. App. 2d 100, 102, 783 P.2d 350 (1989).
12. Habitual violator act civil in nature; actual conviction dates noted as controlling five-year period (K.S.A. 8-285). State v. Walden, 15 Kan. App. 2d 139, 143, 803 P.2d 1054 (1991).
13. Used to support a habitual violator conviction. State v. Day, 17 Kan. App. 2d 737, 739, 843 P.2d 294 (1992).
14. Court restoration of driving privileges examined. State v. Browning, 17 Kan. App. 2d 768, 769, 844 P.2d 739 (1993).