44-501

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44-501. Compensation; disallowances; substance abuse testing; exceptions, pre-existing conditions; public service benefits protection act, coronary disease or cerebrovascular injury benefits for firefighters and law enforcement officers; liability limited for construction design professional; benefits reduced for certain retirement benefits. (a) (1) Compensation for an injury shall be disallowed if such injury to the employee results from:

(A) The employee's deliberate intention to cause such injury;

(B) the employee's willful failure to use a guard or protection against accident or injury which is required pursuant to any statute and provided for the employee;

(C) the employee's willful failure to use a reasonable and proper guard and protection voluntarily furnished the employee by the employer;

(D) the employee's reckless violation of their employer's workplace safety rules or regulations; or

(E) the employee's voluntary participation in fighting or horseplay with a co-employee for any reason, work related or otherwise.

(2) Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall not apply when it was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances to not use such equipment, or if the employer approved the work engaged in at the time of an accident or injury to be performed without such equipment.

(b) (1) (A) The employer shall not be liable under the workers compensation act where the injury, disability or death was contributed to by the employee's use or consumption of alcohol or any drugs, chemicals or any other compounds or substances, including, but not limited to, any drugs or medications which are available to the public without a prescription from a health care provider, prescription drugs or medications, any form or type of narcotic drugs, marijuana, stimulants, depressants or hallucinogens.

(B) In the case of drugs or medications which are available to the public without a prescription from a health care provider and prescription drugs or medications, compensation shall not be denied if the employee can show that such drugs or medications were being taken or used in therapeutic doses and there have been no prior incidences of the employee's impairment on the job as the result of the use of such drugs or medications within the previous 24 months.

(C) It shall be conclusively presumed that the employee was impaired due to alcohol or drugs if it is shown that, at the time of the injury, the employee had an alcohol concentration of .04 or more, or a GCMS confirmatory test by quantitative analysis showing a concentration at or above the levels shown on the following chart for the drugs of abuse listed:

	Confirmatory test cutoff levels (ng/ml)
Marijuana metabolite 1	15
Cocaine metabolite 2	150
Opiates: Morphine Codeine	2000 2000
6-Acetylmorphine 4	10 ng/ml
Phencyclidine	25
Amphetamines: Amphetamine Methamphetamine 3	500 500
1 Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol-9-carboxylic acid.
2 Benzoylecgonine.
3 Specimen must also contain amphetamine at a concentration greater than or equal to 200 ng/ml.
4 Test for 6-AM when morphine concentration exceeds 2,000 ng/ml.

(D) If it is shown that the employee was impaired pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(C) at the time of the injury, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the accident, injury, disability or death was contributed to by such impairment. The employee may overcome the presumption of contribution by clear and convincing evidence.

(E) An employee's refusal to submit to a chemical test at the request of the employer shall result in the forfeiture of benefits under the workers compensation act if the employer had sufficient cause to suspect the use of alcohol or drugs by the claimant or if the employer's policy clearly authorizes post-injury testing.

(2) The results of a chemical test shall be admissible evidence to prove impairment if the employer establishes that the testing was done under any of the following circumstances:

(A) As a result of an employer mandated drug testing policy, in place in writing prior to the date of accident or injury, requiring any worker to submit to testing for drugs or alcohol;

(B) during an autopsy or in the normal course of medical treatment for reasons related to the health and welfare of the injured worker and not at the direction of the employer;

(C) the worker, prior to the date and time of the accident or injury, gave written consent to the employer that the worker would voluntarily submit to a chemical test for drugs or alcohol following any accident or injury;

(D) the worker voluntarily agrees to submit to a chemical test for drugs or alcohol following any accident or injury; or

(E) as a result of federal or state law or a federal or state rule or regulation having the force and effect of law requiring a post-injury testing program and such required program was properly implemented at the time of testing.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2), the results of a chemical test performed on a sample collected by an employer shall not be admissible evidence to prove impairment unless the following conditions are met:

(A) The test sample was collected within a reasonable time following the accident or injury;

(B) the collecting and labeling of the test sample was performed by or under the supervision of a licensed health care professional;

(C) the test was performed by a laboratory approved by the United States department of health and human services or licensed by the department of health and environment, except that a blood sample may be tested for alcohol content by a laboratory commonly used for that purpose by state law enforcement agencies;

(D) the test was confirmed by gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy or other comparably reliable analytical method, except that no such confirmation is required for a blood alcohol sample;

(E) the foundation evidence must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the test results were from the sample taken from the employee; and

(F) a split sample sufficient for testing shall be retained and made available to the employee within 48 hours of a positive test.

(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), compensation shall not be paid in case of coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability was more than the employee's usual work in the course of the employee's regular employment.

(2) For events occurring on or after July 1, 2014, in the case of a firefighter as defined by K.S.A. 40-1709(b)(1), and amendments thereto, or a law enforcement officer as defined by K.S.A. 74-5602, and amendments thereto, coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury shall be compensable if:

(A) The injury can be identified as caused by a specific event occurring in the course and scope of employment;

(B) the coronary or cerebrovascular injury occurred within 24 hours of the specific event; and

(C) the specific event was the prevailing factor in causing the coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury.

(d) Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project or any employee of a construction design professional who is assisting or representing the construction design professional in the performance of professional services on the site of the construction project, shall be liable for any injury resulting from the employer's failure to comply with safety standards on the construction project for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act, unless responsibility for safety practices is specifically assumed by contract. The immunity provided by this subsection to any construction design professional shall not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans or specifications.

(e) An award of compensation for permanent partial impairment, work disability, or permanent total disability shall be reduced by the amount of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. Any such reduction shall not apply to temporary total disability, nor shall it apply to compensation for medical treatment.

(1) Where workers compensation benefits have previously been awarded through settlement or judicial or administrative determination in Kansas, the percentage basis of the prior settlement or award shall conclusively establish the amount of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. Where workers compensation benefits have not previously been awarded through settlement or judicial or administrative determination in Kansas, the amount of preexisting functional impairment shall be established by competent evidence.

(2) In all cases, the applicable reduction shall be calculated as follows:

(A) If the preexisting impairment is the result of injury sustained while working for the employer against whom workers compensation benefits are currently being sought, any award of compensation shall be reduced by the current dollar value attributable under the workers compensation act to the percentage of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. The "current dollar value" shall be calculated by multiplying the percentage of preexisting impairment by the compensation rate in effect on the date of the accident or injury against which the reduction will be applied.

(B) In all other cases, the employer against whom benefits are currently being sought shall be entitled to a credit for the percentage of preexisting impairment.

(f) If the employee receives, whether periodically or by lump sum, retirement benefits under the federal social security act or retirement benefits from any other retirement system, program, policy or plan which is provided by the employer against which the claim is being made, any compensation benefit payments which the employee is eligible to receive under the workers compensation act for such claim shall be reduced by the weekly equivalent amount of the total amount of all such retirement benefits, less any portion of any such retirement benefit, other than retirement benefits under the federal social security act, that is attributable to payments or contributions made by the employee, but in no event shall the workers compensation benefit be less than the workers compensation benefit payable for the employee's percentage of functional impairment. Where the employee elects to take retirement benefits in a lump sum, the lump sum payment shall be amortized at the rate of 4% per year over the employee's life expectancy to determine the weekly equivalent value of the benefits.

History: L. 1927, ch. 232, § 1; L. 1967, ch. 280, § 1; L. 1974, ch. 203, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 258, § 1; L. 1979, ch. 156, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 175, § 1; L. 1987, ch. 187, § 1; L. 1990, ch. 182, § 1; L. 1993, ch. 286, § 24; L. 1996, ch. 79, § 1; L. 2000, ch. 160, § 5; L. 2005, ch. 54, § 1; L. 2011, ch. 55, § 3; L. 2014, ch. 25, § 1; July 1.

Source or prior law:

L. 1911, ch. 218, § 1; L. 1917, ch. 226, § 27; R.S. 1923, 44-501.

Law Review and Bar Journal References:

Mental illness under act, 11 K.L.R. 259, 261 (1962).

Case of Taylor v. Centrix Construction Co., 191 K. 130, 379 P.2d 217[analyzed below under Case Annotation 376] discussed in comment, 2 W.L.J. 309 (1963).

Survey of law of municipal corporations, Albert B. Martin, 10 K.L.R. 260 (1961).

Recovery for traumatic cancer, Jerry G. Elliott, 13 K.L.R. 79, 93 (1964).

"Changes in Workmen's Compensation," William F.Morrissey, 36 J.B.A.K. 173, 175 (1967).

The unusual-exertion requirement now in the statute is an obvious manifestation of legislative discontent with previous decisional law, William A. Kelly, 16 K.L.R. 411, 416 (1968).

"Assaults by Fellow Employees—The Kansas Experience," William A. Kelly, 39 J.B.A.K. 361, 405 (1970).

"Workmen's Compensation—Accelerated Payment—Need for Statutory Change," Sheila R. Miller, 18 K.L.R. 940, 941 (1970).

"Torts—Fellow Servant Rule," Richard S. Hyter, 9 W.L.J. 488 (1970).

Child dependency under the workmen's compensation act, 11 W.L.J. 471, 474 (1972).

"No-Fault Automobile Insurance," Barry W. McCormick and Lynn Franklin Taylor II, 23 K.L.R. 141, 168 (1974).

"Potential Federalization of State Workmen's Compensation Law—The Kansas Response," James C. Wright and James P. Rankin, 15 W.L.J. 244, 263 (1976).

Survey of workmen's compensation, Ann Hoover, 15 W.L.J. 409 (1976).

Recovery under workmen's compensation, 25 K.L.R. 158, 161, 165 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—An Introduction to Changes in the Kansas Statute," Bryce B. Moore, 24 K.L.R. 603, 604 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—Major Changes in Employments Covered, Benefits, Defenses, Offsets, and Other Changes," Alvin D. Herrington, 24 K.L.R. 611, 620 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—Permanent Partial Disability Benefits—The Dilemma," George E. McCullough, 24 K.L.R. 627, 629, 632 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—The Workmen's Compensation Fund," Charles J. Woodin, 24 K.L.R. 641 (1976).

Recovery for mental injury caused by mental impact, 16 W.L.J. 552, 556 (1977).

This and following sections discussed in note, "Employer Liability to Third Parties under the Workmen's Compensation and Comparative Negligence Statutes," Ruth C. Nelson, 26 K.L.R. 485, 486, 487 (1978).

"Brown and Miles: At Last, An End to Ambiguity in the Kansas Law of Comparative Negligence," Hal D. Meltzer, 27 K.L.R. 111, 131 (1978).

"Survey of Kansas Law: Workers' Compensation," William A. Kelly, 27 K.L.R. 377, 390 (1979).

"The Kansas Tort Claims Act and School Districts," Susan C. Jacobson, 28 K.L.R. 619, 627 (1980).

"New Standard for 'Usual Work' Under Heart Amendment," Gary L. Jordan, 1 J.K.T.L.A. No. 3, 10, 11 (1977).

"Major Legislative Changes in Workers' Compensation Law," Gary L. Jordan, 3 J.K.T.L.A. No. 1, 14, 15 (1979).

"Architects' Liability for Construction Site Accidents," Wyatt A. Hoch, 30 K.L.R. 429, 440 (1982).

"Workers' Compensation: The Dual Capacity Doctrine—California's Exception to the Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation Coverage," Pamela S. Yeary, 22 W.L.J. 168, 171 (1982).

"Workers' Compensation: Reconsidering the 'Right to Control' as the Exclusive Test for Employment Status," Catherine M. Foster, 23 W.L.J. 379, 380 (1984).

"Workers' Compensation: The Exclusive Remedy Rule Is Alive and Well in Kansas [Hormann v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 236 Kan. 190, 689 P.2d 837 (1984)]," Janet K. Kerr, 25 W.L.J. 192, 193, 195, 196 (1985).

"Analysis of Bill Drafted by Interim Committee on 1984 Labor and Industry," Gary L. Jordan, Vol. VIII, No. 3, J.K.T.L.A. 11 (1984).

"Workers' Compensation—A Salute to the Trial Lawyers of Kansas," Gary L. Jordan, 10 J.K.T.L.A. No. 6, 9 (1987).

"Workers' Compensation: A New Era," Tom Hammond, 11 J.K.T.L.A., No. 2, 6, (1987).

"Should You Take A Chiropractor To Court?" Steven M. Dickson, J.K.T.L.A., Vol. XIII, No. 3, pp. 19-20 (1990).

"Concurrent Jurisdiction: Should Your Compensation Claim Be Filed In Kansas, Missouri, Or Both," William W. Hutton, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIV, No. 6, 15, 16 (1991).

"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XV, No. 1, Review p. 4 (1991).

"Corporate Criminal Liability for Injuries and Death," Patrick Hamilton, 40 K.L.R. 1091, 1115 (1992).

"Workers Compensation Review", Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVI, No. 2, Special section, 3 (1992).

"An Overview of the 1993 Amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act," David J. Rebein, 62 J.K.B.A. No. 5, 30, 31, 34 (1993).

"Preventing Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens: The Final OSHA Standard," Jeffrey A. Chanay, 62 J.K.B.A. No. 8, 26, 32 (1993).

"Enforcement Remedies of Workers' Compensation Awards," Beth Regier Foerster, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVI, No. 3, 6, 11 (1993).

"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 2 (1994).

"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 2, 3 (1995).

"Worker's Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 6, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1 (1995).

"Tort Action Or Workers' Compensation Claim? Private Animosity Defeats The Exclusive Remedy Rule," Frank D. Taff, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 6, 27 (1995).

"Will Debtors Win the Battle as Creditors Win the War?: Retroactive Recovery of Attorney Fees in Consumer Credit Contracts in Kansas," Tamara Putnam and Jonathan Lautt, 34 W.L.J. 556, 567, 568 (1995).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 2, Review Section, 1, 7, 10, 11 (1995).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 4, Review Section, 12 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 5, Review Section, 1, 8 (1996).

"New Work Comp Laws Now In Effect," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 5, 4 (1996).

"Bosses Beware—It's a Jungle Out There: Supervisor Liability in Employment Litigation," Celia Garrett and Scott Nehrbass, 65 J.K.B.A. No. 10, 20 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 1, Review Section, 3 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 2, Review Section, 28, 32 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 3, Review Section, 30, 34, 36 (1997).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 4, Review Section, 27, 29 (1997).

"Combatting the Preexisting Impairment Defense," Kendra L. Walker, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 6, 16 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 6, Review Section, 29, 33 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 1, Review Section, 24, 27, 28, 29 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 2, Review Section, 30 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Law: Constitutionality of the 1993 Kansas Workers Compensation Act," Nicole M. Zomberg, 37 W.L.J. 829 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 3, Review Section, 24, 28 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 4, Review Section, 27 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 5, Review Section, 18, 19 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Law Update: The Multiple Employer Rule and Liberal Construction," Beth Regier Foerster, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 6, 13 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 6, Review Section, 20, 26, 28 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 1, 21 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 2, 25 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 4, 26 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 5, 24 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 6, 25, 27, 28, 32 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 6, 21 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 20 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 25 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXIII, No. 4, 21 (2000).

"New K.S.A. 44-503(g): Has the Immunity Windfall for Statutory Employers Been Curtailed?" Donald W. Vasos and Michael R. Wallace, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 23, No. 6, 14 (2000).

"Workers Compensation Review," Patrick R. Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 23, No. 6, 20 (2000).

"Heart Attacks and Strokes Under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act," Timothy A. Short, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 1, 8 (2000).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 4, 21 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 5, 23 (2001).

"Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I," William E. Westerbeke and Stephen R. McAllister, 49 K.L.R. 1037 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 3, 17, 18 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 6, 20 (2002).

"The Clash Between Workers' Compensation Benefits and Underinsured Motorists Benefits Under Kansas Law," Brooke A. Bennett, 51 K.L.R. 155 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 1, 21 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 2, 19 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 4, 26 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 5, 18 (2003).

"Cold-Hearted Application of the Heart Amendment Leaves Kansas Workers' Compensation Claimants Gasping [Mudd v. Neosho Memorial Regional Medical, 62 P.3d 236 (Kan. 2003)]," Shannon L. Bell, 43 W.L.J. 171 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 6, 23 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 2, 21 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 3, 25 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 4, 18 (2004).

"The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Claims Act: The First Twenty-Five Years," William E. Westerbeke, 52 K.L.R. 939 (2004).

"Litigating a Defense of Alcohol or Drug Impairment Under the Workers Compensation Act," Hon. Bruce E. Moore, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 6, 6, 10 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 6, 19 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 1, 19 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 4, 24 (2005).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 5, 18 (2005).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 3, 23 (2006).

"Making the Most Out of the Cap: Maximizing Non-Economic Damages," Bradley J. Prochaska, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 6, 8 (2006).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 2, 18 (2006).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 5, 15 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 6, 25 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 31, No. 1, 23 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 31, No. 5, 18 (2008).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 33, No. 6, 31 (2010).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 34, No. 4, 19 (2011).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 34, No. 3, 23 (2011).

"The 2011 Kansas Workers Compensation Act: Too Sharp a Right Turn?" Tim Alvarez, 81 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 25 (2012).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Kathleen J. Cossairt, Jan Fisher, Jon W. Stapleton, Jr., Stephanie J. Wilson, and David H. Ferris, 36 J.K.A.J. No. 6 (2013).

Attorney General's Opinions:

County extension council; extension agent and other employees status under tort claims and workers compensation acts. 84-56.

Kansas civil air patrol; tort claims act; workers compensation. 91-124.

Requirement for medical examinations; differences between Americans with Disabilities Act and Kansas Workers Compensation Act. 1999-35.

Authority of legislature to transfer money from special revenue funds into state general fund. 2002-45.

"Paid Loss Reporting Forms" is public record available for public inspection. 2004-1.

CASE ANNOTATIONS

Explanation, see Revisor's Note under article title, chapter 44, article 5.

Cases through 1973

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

—Constitutionality (1-8)

1. Act of 1911, as amended by 1913 Act, is constitutional under state and federal constitutions. Shade v. Cement Co., 92 Kan. 146, 139 P. 1193 (1914); rehearing 93 Kan. 257, 261, 144 P. 249 (1914).

2. Act of 1911, as amended in 1913, constitutional and valid. Hovis v. Refining Co., 95 Kan. 505, 511, 148 P. 626 (1915).

3. Act does not violate due process or equal protection clauses of federal constitution; does not deprive of right to trial by jury. Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 259, 260, 144 P. 249 (1914).

4. Title does not violate article 2 of section 16 of the constitution. Swader v. Flour Mills Co., 103 Kan. 378, 380, 176 P. 143 (1918); rehearing 103 Kan. 703, 176 P. 143 (1918); Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 261, 144 P. 249 (1914).

5. Statute is optional and does not infringe constitutional due process provisions. Baker v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 145 Kan. 273, 280, 65 P.2d 284 (1937).

6. Those in nonhazardous class not required to post notice they are under act; constitutional. Schmeling v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 137 Kan. 573, 574, 576, 577, 578, 21 P.2d 337 (1933); rehearing denied, 138 Kan. 281, 282, 26 P.2d 265 (1933).

7. Employer electing to accept act cannot question constitutionality. Slick v. Hamaker, 28 F.2d 103 (1928).

8. No violation of state or federal constitution in K.S.A. 44-504 on basis of unreasonable classification or equal protection of laws. Elam v. Bruenger, 165 Kan. 31, 193 P.2d 225 (1948).

—Act complete (9-12)

9. The workmen's compensation act establishes its own procedure and furnishes a remedy which is substantial, complete and exclusive from the inception of the claim to final judgment thereon. Taylor v. Taylor, 156 Kan. 763, 765, 766, and Syl. 1, 137 P.2d 147 (1943).

10. Act is complete and exclusive and code provisions do not apply. Cruse v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 138 Kan. 117, 23 P.2d 471 (1933).

11. Act establishes own procedure and provides substantial, complete and exclusive remedy. Wilson v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 185 Kan. 725, 347 P.2d 235 (1959).

12. Act establishes a procedure of its own which provides a remedy that is substantial, complete and exclusive in compensation cases. Peschka v. Wilkinson Drilling Co., 192 Kan. 126, 131, 386 P.2d 509 (1963).

—Exclusive remedy (15-27)

15. Remedies under compensation act exclusive where both parties under act. Shade v. Cement Co., 92 Kan. 146, 147, 139 P. 1193 (1914); McRoberts v. Zinc Co., 93 Kan. 364, 367, 144 P. 247 (1914).

16. Remedies provided by act are exclusive as to all injuries within its purview. Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 80, 85, 89, 174 P.2d 78 (1946).

17. Traveling entertainer found to be under compensation act; sole remedy under act. Neugen v. Associated Chautauqua Co., 70 F.2d 605 (1934).

18. Where workman and employer under act remedies thereunder are exclusive. Kelly v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665, 668 (1954).

19. Inhaling poison gas from day to day was cause of death; not injury by accident within compensation statute; common law action proper. Echord v. Rush, 124 Kan. 521, 261 P. 820 (1927).

20. Compensation allowed; no bar to suit against physician for malpractice. Cooke v. Bunten, 135 Kan. 558, 11 P.2d 1016 (1932).

21. Exclusive remedy is under compensation act when employer is operating thereunder. Spade v. VanSickle, 175 Kan. 557, 563, 265 P.2d 860 (1954).

22. Mentioned in holding employer not liable in common law action for damages. Whitaker v. Douglas, 179 Kan. 64, 65, 70, 292 P.2d 688 (1956).

23. Employer and employee compulsorily under act; employee's remedy against employer exclusive thereunder. Wilburn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 188 Kan. 722, 729, 366 P.2d 246 (1961).

24. Employer and workman both under act; compensation case found no personal injury by accident; dependents may bring wrongful death action and compensation act is not a bar. Contrary was held in first opinion and reversed on rehearing. Echord v. Rush, 122 Kan. 260, 251 P. 1112 (1927); reversed 124 Kan. 521, 261 P. 820 (1927).

25. Remedy under act is not exclusive if injury complained of is not within its provisions. Echord v. Rush, 124 Kan. 521, 523, 261 P. 820 (1927).

26. Plaintiff statutory employee of defendant; remedy exclusive. Coe v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 348 F.2d 1, 2 (1965).

27. Employee had no common law remedy in negligence after accidental injury. Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Company, 458 F.2d 210 (1972).

—Legislative intent (28-37)

28. Background and theory of compensation act discussed. Truman v. Railroad Co., 98 Kan. 761, 767, 161 P. 587 (1916).

29. Purpose of act; liberal construction in favor of workman. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

30. English cases fixed the meaning of terms in this section before their adoption by Kansas legislature. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 777, 180 P. 793 (1919).

31. The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" is borrowed from the English act; legislative intent and purpose discussed. Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F.2d 398, 399 (1925).

32. Act founded upon considerations of public policy; purpose; liberal construction. Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 232, 109 P.2d 119 (1941).

33. Act liberally construed to effectuate legislative intent. Thuillez v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 Kan. 618, 619, 621, 622, 358 P.2d 676 (1961).

34. The purpose of the compensation law is not to pay the workman for the injury, but to compensate him in a way for his loss of earning power. Blythe v. State Highway Comm., 148 Kan. 598, 601, 83 P.2d 678 (1938).

35. Purpose of act considered in holding dispute between two insurance carriers to be settled in separate action. Kuhn v. Grant County, 201 Kan. 163, 439 P.2d 155 (1968).

36. Considered and quoted in part in construing provisions of K.S.A. 44-512a. Shinkle v. State Highway Commission, 202 Kan. 311, 315, 448 P.2d 12 (1968).

37. Enactment of last sentence of statute by legislature intended as curb on recent court decisions in heart attack cases (dissent). Brannum v. Spring Lakes Country Club, Inc., 203 Kan. 658, 669, 455 P.2d 546 (1969).

—Liability arises on contract (38-39)

38. Rights and duties under compensation act are contractual in nature. Neville, Administratrix, v. Wichita Eagle, 179 Kan. 197, 199, 201, 294 P.2d 248 (1956).

39. Liability of employer for injury to employee arises on contract. Johnson, Guardian, v. Milling Co., 116 Kan. 731, 229 P. 359 (1924).

—Liberal interpretation (40-43)

40. Statute will be liberally construed to make effective legislative intent. Clifford v. Eacrett, 163 Kan. 471, 475, 183 P.2d 861 (1947).

41. Liberal construction of act in order to award compensation to workman where it is reasonably possible to do so. Bright v. Bragg, 175 Kan. 404, Syl. 6, 264 P.2d 494 (1953).

42. If the trial court fails in its application of the rule of liberal construction, appellate court has the duty to correct such failure. Bender v. Salina Roofing Co., 179 Kan. 415, 422, 295 P.2d 662 (1956).

43. Workmen's compensation act to be liberally interpreted and flexibly applied. Palmer v. Fincke, 122 Kan. 825, 826, 253 P. 583 (1927).

—Miscellaneous (45-50)

45. Cited in case holding that where findings of fact entered by a district court in a workmen's compensation proceeding are supported by substantial competent evidence they will not be set aside on appellate review. Calvert v. Darby Corporation, 207 Kan. 198, 200, 483 P.2d 491 (1971).

46. There are three parties interested in act; the employer, the employee and the public. Miles v. Wyatt, 138 Kan. 863, 864, 28 P.2d 748 (1934).

47. Disability awarded hereunder does not control disability benefits under federal Social Security Act. Sampson v. Flemming, 189 F. Supp. 725, 726, 728 (1960).

48. Liability barred in three years under statute of limitations. Taylor v. Swift & Co., 114 Kan. 431, 219 P. 516 (1923).

49. Compensation claim cannot be barred by 3-year statute of limitations. Cruse v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 138 Kan. 117, 23 P.2d 471 (1933).

50. Death as a result of injury must occur within three years after the date of the accident or no death benefits may be allowed. Forcade v. List & Clark Construction Co., 172 Kan. 119, 123, 238 P.2d 549 (1951).

—Obligation (51-55)

51. Mentioned in setting forth the "obligation" to workman by his employer under workmen's compensation act. Johnson v. Warren, 192 Kan. 310, 313, 387 P.2d 213 (1963).

52. Nature of obligation considered. Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, 512, 407 P.2d 471 (1965).

53. Section cited; action against negligent coemployee. Tully v. Estate of Gardner, 196 Kan. 137, 140, 409 P.2d 782 (1966).

54. "Obligation" of act considered; no provision for restitution or "recover back" of payments made pending appeal. Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 196 Kan. 244, 247, 249, 252, 409 P.2d 1001 (1966).

55. Obligation under act does not affect rights of employee against person other than employer. Houk v. Arrow Drilling Co., 201 Kan. 81, 82, 84, 91, 439 P.2d 146 (1968).

—Historical jury trial (60-67)

60. Verdict entirely inconsistent with evidence and findings set aside. Penn v. Swift & Co., 108 Kan. 336, 195 P. 620 (1921).

61. Decision of arbitrator final upon issues properly before him. Palmer v. Fincke, 122 Kan. 825, 826, 253 P. 583 (1927).

62. Employer entitled to trial on question of fact and law not submitted. Williams v. Wilson, 124 Kan. 331, 259 P. 702 (1927).

63. Special findings of jury under act; time of filing motions. Mickens v. Hill, 126 Kan. 794, 271 P. 279 (1928).

64. Special finding as to cause of death not inconsistent with general verdict. Riggs v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 131 Kan. 244, 289 P. 410 (1930).

65. Defense of contributory negligence raised; recovery not barred thereby; comment on comparative negligence. Ballou v. Railway Co., 95 Kan. 761, 763, 765, 152 P. 284 (1915).

66. Allegations negativing conditions of this section, barring recovery, held unnecessary. Oliver v. Christopher, 98 Kan. 660, 662, 159 P. 397 (1916).

67. Plaintiff need not allege matters of defense. Oliver v. Christopher, 98 Kan. 660, 662, 159 P. 397 (1916).

ACCIDENT, IN GENERAL

—Definition "accident" (70-78)

70. An accident is simply an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character and often accompanied by a manifestation of force. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 773, 180 P. 793 (1919).

71. Accident defined; a certain time, place or circumstance when accident happened, took place or occurred required as one element. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

72. "Arising out of" and "in course of employment" defined; death resulting from physical structure giving way from exertion constitutes accident. Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, 677, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

73. "Injury by accident" defined; "accident" liberally construed. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

74. Meaning of term "by accident" discussed. Bender v. Salina Roofing Co., 179 Kan. 415, 295 P.2d 662 (1956).

75. Physical structure of the man gave out under the stress of his usual labor. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 777, 180 P. 793 (1919).

76. "Injury by accident" means simply accidental injury or accident in the popular sense. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 774, 180 P. 793 (1919).

77. Deafness of traumatic origin; a series of accidents, being a series of pistol shots; accidental injury within act. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

78. Terms "personal injury" and "accident," defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

—Miscellaneous (80-87)

80. When injury may be deemed to be "by accident" considered. Monson v. Battelle, 102 Kan. 208, 211, 170 P. 801 (1918).

81. "By accident" construed; coronary thrombosis caused by lifting merchandise held accident. Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 Kan. 271, 272, 273, 274, 146 P.2d 657 (1944).

82. Coronary occlusion, coronary thrombosis, cerebral hemorrhage, thrombosis or hemorrhage, or heart failure-acute may be personal injury by accident. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 300, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

83. A cough or cold is not an accident within meaning of act. Shoemaker v. Hardwick, 189 Kan. 72, 73, 366 P.2d 1008 (1961).

84. Injury resulting from wanton conduct of employer within act; remedy exclusive. Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 80, 85, 89, 174 P.2d 78 (1946).

85. Workman breathed cement dust resulting in weakness; heart attack while climbing a ladder in employment; accident arising out of employment. Riggs v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 Kan. 91, 272 P. 153 (1928).

86. Lifting flour sacks by 40-year-old man unaccustomed to heavy work resulted in his dropping dead; physical structure of the man gave way under stress of his usual labor; compensable. Harmon v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 134 Kan. 143, 4 P.2d 406 (1931).

87. Claimant has the burden of establishing, among other things, that the injury to the workman occurred as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 Kan. 385, Syl. 1, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

—Occupational disease (90-92)

90. Occupational diseases not accidental injuries within meaning of compensation act. Chop v. Swift & Co., 118 Kan. 35, 233 P. 800 (1925); Watson v. International Milling Co., 190 Kan. 98, 372 P.2d 287 (1962).

91. "Personal injury by accident" ordinarily does not include occupational disease. El Dorado Refining Co. v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 157 Kan. 198, 202, 139 P.2d 369 (1943).

92. Finding lead poisoning was occupational disease not accidental injury upheld. Vocke v. Eagle-Picher Co., 168 Kan. 708, 215 P.2d 185 (1950).

—Personal injury (96-100)

96. Term "personal injury" defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

97. Finding of personal injury by accident does not require finding of disability. Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449, 452, 381 P.2d 365 (1963).

98. Act liberally construed to effectuate legislative intent; "accident" and "personal injury" defined. Thuillez v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 Kan. 618, 619, 621, 622, 358 P.2d 676 (1961).

99. Aggravation of pre-existing heart condition constitutes "personal injury by accident." McIver v. State Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 678, 681, 684, 426 P.2d 118 (1967).

100. Existence of accidental, compensable personal injury is question of fact; trial court's finding supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed. Ippolito v. Katz Drug Co., 199 Kan. 309, 310, 429 P.2d 101 (1967).

PARTICULAR ACCIDENTS

—Assault (102-110)

102. Injury resulting from assault by fellow workman not within act; exception. Johnson v. Guggenheim Packing Co., 168 Kan. 702, 704, 215 P.2d 178 (1950).

103. Altercation between workmen; injury did not arise out of employment. Romerex v. Swift & Co., 106 Kan. 844, 189 P. 923 (1920).

104. Injury in fight with another employee; not compensable, when. Addington v. Hall, 160 Kan. 268, 160 P.2d 649 (1945).

105. Injury intentionally inflicted upon workman by foreman; not within act because wrongful conduct was not habitual. Peavy v. Contracting Co., 112 Kan. 637, 211 P. 1113 (1923).

106. Ticket agent, while on duty, was fatally assaulted by unknown person; employment invited assault; accident and death arose out of employment. Phillips v. Kansas City, L. & W. Rly. Co., 126 Kan. 133, 134, 267 P. 4 (1928).

107. Traveling man intentionally assaulted by person outside employment; not within act. Covert v. John Morrell & Co., 138 Kan. 592, 27 P.2d 553 (1933).

108. Assault on the job by a fellow workman, known by employer to have fighting propensities, is compensable. Hallett v. McDowell & Sons, 186 Kan. 813, 817, 352 P.2d 946 (1960).

109. Mentioned in finding injury resulted from assault of fellow employee. Carter v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 197 Kan. 374, 375, 417 P.2d 137 (1966).

110. Recovery granted to employee injured by assault of fellow employee. Brannum v. Spring Lakes Country Club, Inc., 203 Kan. 658, 660, 455 P.2d 546 (1969).

—Automobiles (113)

113. Auto accident while on job did not aggravate a pre-existing coronary condition which caused death a month later. Embry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 451 F.2d 472 (1971).

—Falls (115-117)

115. Sixty-two-year-old man fell on concrete when chair slipped out from under him; suffered cerebral hemorrhage; arose out of employment. Burk v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 160 Kan. 519, 163 P.2d 402 (1945).

116. Eighty-year-old man fell from chair, developed pneumonia and died; was doing nothing within employment; compensation denied. Gamble v. Board of Public Utilities, 137 Kan. 227, 19 P.2d 729 (1933).

117. Foreman sent workman on an errand; in performing errand workman fell into a vat of hot water; accident and death arose in the course of employment. McDonnell v. Swift & Co., 124 Kan. 327, 328, 329, 259 P. 695 (1927).

—Gas and poison (120-123)

120. Death resulting from carbon monoxide gas in mine; accidental injury within act. Scott v. Devine, 132 Kan. 834, 835, 297 P. 669 (1931).

121. Suicide which results from carbon monoxide poisoning constitutes an accident; insufficient evidence thereof. Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 Kan. 190, 193, 80 P.2d 1066 (1938).

122. Finding lead poisoning was occupational disease not accidental injury upheld. Vocke v. Eagle-Picher Co., 168 Kan. 708, 215 P.2d 185 (1950).

123. Truck driver killed by carbon monoxide fumes in the cab of his truck parked by highway found to be compensable. McGhay v. Eaton, 146 Kan. 686, 687, 688, 689, 692, 73 P.2d 15 (1937).

—Miscellaneous (125-133)

125. Injury from electrical shock, death occurring later, held within act. Casebeer v. Coal Co., 110 Kan. 728, 731, 205 P. 626 (1922).

126. Injury by firearms held not to arise out of employment. Finck v. Galloway, 139 Kan. 173, 29 P.2d 1091 (1934).

127. Claimant flying airplane for personal reasons; failure to sustain burden of proof of causal connection to employment. Whitely v. King Radio Corporation, Inc., 190 Kan. 439, 375 P.2d 593 (1962).

128. Salesman contacted high voltage wire and was killed on the highway; causal connection between employment and injury. Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 Kan. 191, 285 P. 536 (1930).

129. Jerking, jarring and jolting of maney caused driver's back injury; accidental injury within compensation act. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

130. Gun carried for deceased's own protection accidentally discharged; accident did not arise out of employment. Hudson v. Salina Country Club, 148 Kan. 697, 701, 84 P.2d 854 (1938).

131. Deafness caused by series of pistol explosions held injury by accident. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

132. Incapacity resulting from unskillful medical treatment does not arise out of employment. Cooke v. Bunten, 135 Kan. 558, 11 P.2d 1016 (1932).

133. Workman abandoned his employment to go into a dangerous part of electrical plant and was injured by electrical current there; accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Haas v. Light & Power Co., 109 Kan. 197, 205, 198 P. 174 (1921).

—Overexertion (140-150)

140. Pull on wrench resulting in heart attack is accident and arose out of employment. Hill v. Etchen Motor Co., 143 Kan. 655, 56 P.2d 103 (1936).

141. Exertion aggravated existing heart condition; personal injury arising out of and in course of employment. Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 Kan. 795, 798, 366 P.2d 28 (1961).

142. Work requiring extreme exertion by golf course superintendent found to have resulted in cardiac failure; compensable. Price v. McSpaden, 188 Kan. 578, 579, 580, 363 P.2d 533 (1961).

143. Lifting flour sacks by 40-year-old man unaccustomed to heavy work resulted in his dropping dead; physical structure of the man gave way under stress of his usual labor; compensable. Harmon v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 134 Kan. 143, 4 P.2d 406 (1931).

144. Workman breathed cement dust resulting in weakness; heart attack while climbing a ladder in employment; accident arising out of employment. Riggs v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 Kan. 91, 272 P. 153 (1928).

145. Necessary for workman to break off rock by blows of a 16-pound sledge; suffered pulmonary hemorrhage; essential attributes of an accident present. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 773, 180 P. 793 (1919).

146. Evidence held sufficient to connect exertion and hemorrhage in eye. Shapland v. Ferguson Furniture Co., 139 Kan. 768, 33 P.2d 145 (1934).

147. Valvular heart lesion suffered while lifting and jerking lever; compensable. Earhart v. Wible Ice & Cold Storage Co., 150 Kan. 695, 95 P.2d 366 (1939).

148. Increase in blood pressure from exertion of sawing boards contributed to cerebral hemorrhage; compensation allowed. Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, 676, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

149. Workman, while stacking merchandise, strained himself and suffered coronary thrombosis; personal injury by accident. Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 Kan. 271, Syl. 1, 146 P.2d 657 (1944).

150. Cold weather and exertion precipitated coronary attack. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 299, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

—Weather (155-166)

155. Death from lightning while passing from quarry to quarry within act. Mathis v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 Kan. 93, 272 P. 183 (1928).

156. Injury from storm held not to be within act. Rush v. Empire Oil & Refining Co., 140 Kan. 198, 200, 34 P.2d 542 (1934).

157. Storm blew down high voltage wires and salesman's car contacted them killing the salesman; accidental injury within act. Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 Kan. 191, 285 P. 536 (1930).

158. Causal connection between employment and injury by tornado; compensable. Faulkner v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 Kan. 667, 668, 359 P.2d 833 (1961).

159. Employee slipping on ice on entering plant; within act. Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434, 312 P.2d 220 (1957).

160. Claimant's fingers frozen while digging ditch; injury within act; accident. Murphy v. I. C. U. Const. Co., 158 Kan. 541, 148 P.2d 771 (1944).

161. Overheated workman drinking ice water; death held within compensation act. Gilliland v. Zinc Co., 112 Kan. 39, 209 P. 658 (1922).

162. Heatstroke held accidental injury within act. Tabor v. Tole Landscape Co., 181 Kan. 616, 619, 313 P.2d 290 (1957).

163. Exposure to cold at farm auction resulting in death held compensable. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

164. Wound infected by walking through flood waters at place of employment; accidental injury within act. Monson v. Battelle, 102 Kan. 208, 211, 170 P. 801 (1918).

165. Workman's toes froze on 28-degree day; Buerger's disease (circulatory); no accidental injury within compensation act. Wright v. Keith, 136 Kan. 393, 395, 15 P.2d 429 (1932).

166. Injury from excessive heat followed by pneumonia, not within act. Hoag v. Laundry Co., 113 Kan. 513, 215 P. 295 (1923).

IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

—Burden of proof (175-176)

175. Claimant has the burden of establishing, among other things, that the injury to the workman occurred as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 Kan. 385, Syl. 1, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

176. Death held not compensable; burden of proof as to causal connection. Rorabaugh v. General Mills, 187 Kan. 363, 367, 356 P.2d 796 (1960).

—Definition "in course of" (178-183)

178. Phrase "in the course of his employment" defined. Schooley v. Swanson, 147 Kan. 758, 760, 762, 78 P.2d 858 (1938).

179. Terms "out of" and "in the course of" defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

180. An accident happens "in the course of the employment" when it occurs while the workman is doing the duty he was employed to perform. Hudson v. Salina Country Club, 148 Kan. 697, 701, 84 P.2d 854 (1938).

181. The phrase "in the course of employment" relates to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred, and means that the accident happened while the workman was at work in his employer's service. Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, Syl. 3, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

182. Purpose of act; liberal construction in favor of workman; "out of" and ''in course of" construed. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

183. Distinction made between injury arising "out of" and "in the course of" employment; both conditions must exist before compensation allowable. Siebert v. Hoch, 199 Kan. 299, 303, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).

—Place of injury (186-198)

186. Workman going from one mine to another not within act. Bevard v. Coal Co., 101 Kan. 207, 208, 165 P. 657 (1917).

187. Injury on runway between factories held within provisions of act. Gadberry v. Egg Case Filler Co., 104 Kan. 72, 177 P. 834 (1919).

188. Miner injured while leaving mine; injury in course of employment. Chance v. Coal & Mining Co., 108 Kan. 121, 193 P. 889 (1920).

189. Accidental fall and injury in dressing room held incident of employment. Corpora v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 129 Kan. 690, 284 P. 818 (1930).

190. Traveling man injured on highway within territory is within act. Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 Kan. 191, 285 P. 536 (1930).

191. Night watchman fell through roof to death; circumstantial evidence carried burden of proof; acting within scope of employment; within act. Supica v. Armour & Co., 131 Kan. 756, 293 P. 483 (1930).

192. Workman injured just before arrival at working place, injury not within act. Harrison v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 158 Kan. 129, 131, 145 P.2d 147 (1944).

193. Mechanic killed in automobile collision while returning from another city; injury incident to employment and compensable. Blair v. Shaw, 171 Kan. 524, 233 P.2d 731 (1951).

194. Employee slipping on ice on entering plant; within act. Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434, 312 P.2d 220 (1957).

195. Injury in adjoining alley held not compensable under K.S.A. 44-508 (k). Murray v. Ludowici-Celadon Co., 181 Kan. 556, 558, 313 P.2d 728 (1957).

196. Workman requested foreman's permission to move foreman's car and foreman yielded to the request; workman killed moving car; accident did not arise out of employment. Sellers v. Reice Construction Co., 124 Kan. 550, 551, 555, 262 P. 19 (1927).

197. Trip to doctor's office for treatment of injury suffered in employment is an activity in the course of employment. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).

198. Workman killed while trespassing on other grounds not within act. Mazeffe v. Railway Co., 106 Kan. 796, 798, 189 P. 917 (1920).

—Time of injury (201-203)

201. Miner injured while ascending to top of mine at day's end; compensable. Sedlock v. Mining Co., 98 Kan. 680, 681, 159 P. 9 (1916).

202. Employee injured during noon intermission; liability of employer considered. Thomas v. Manufacturing Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919).

203. Workman injured just before arrival at working place; injury not within act. Harrison v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 158 Kan. 129, 131, 145 P.2d 147 (1944).

ARISES OUT OF EMPLOYMENT

—Aggravation (204-227)

204. Claim that diabetes was caused or accelerated by accident; no evidence to support claim; compensation disallowed. Whitaker v. Panhandle Eastern P. L. Co., 142 Kan. 314, 315, 46 P.2d 862 (1935).

205. Evidence that pre-existing diabetes made a double hernia inoperable is not evidence of aggravation of diabetes, barring subsequent complications. Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 Kan. 693, 702, 149 P.2d 632 (1944).

206. Aggravation of pre-existing hernia is compensable. Kronig v. Nolan Motor Co., 186 Kan. 534, 535, 536, 351 P.2d 1 (1960).

207. Injury contributed to and aggravated pre-existing multiple sclerosis (a disease); compensable. Blackburn v. Brick & Tile Co., 107 Kan. 722, 193 P. 351 (1920).

208. Running drill in employment intensified affliction. Lee v. Lone Star Cement Co., 142 Kan. 349, 46 P.2d 864 (1935).

209. Injury aggravating existing Hodgkins disease resulting in death is compensable. Hall v. Kornfeld-Harper Well Servicing Co., 159 Kan. 70, 151 P.2d 688 (1944).

210. Injury resulting in disability within act though employee afflicted with disease. Warlop v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 24 F.2d 926 (1928).

211. Workman's lungs weakened by flu; had a pulmonary hemorrhage while sawing lumber in his employment; injury arose out of employment. Stringer v. Mining Co., 114 Kan. 716, 717, 718, 720, 220 P. 168 (1923).

212. Arthritis of back aggravated by jarring, jolting and jerking of workman; accidental injury arising out of employment. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

213. Pipe slipped and crushed workman resulting in hemorrhage from stomach; pre-existing gastric ulcers; injury contributed to death; compensable. Baxter v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 139 Kan. 443, 32 P.2d 451 (1934).

214. Accident intensified or aggravated affliction or contributed to death; compensable. Lee v. Lone Star Cement Co., 142 Kan. 349, 351, 46 P.2d 864 (1935).

215. Shock of accident constituted a new factor which operated on the existing condition and contributed to death; compensable. Vera v. Swift & Co., 143 Kan. 593, 601, 604, 56 P.2d 96 (1936).

216. Furnace door fell on claimant; it "aggravated, activated and set in motion" an existing condition which resulted in cancer. Waltrip v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 147 Kan. 781, 783, 78 P.2d 898 (1938).

217. Scraping and bruising a protrusion on leg aggravated it; malignant tumor found in treating resulting abscess; compensable. Johnson v. Skelly Oil Co., 180 Kan. 275, 276, 277, 280, 303 P.2d 172 (1956); affirmed, 181 Kan. 655, 312 P.2d 1076 (1957).

218. Increase in blood pressure from exertion of sawing boards contributed to cerebral hemorrhage; pre-existing arterio-sclerosis; compensation allowed. Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, 678, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

219. Traumatic neurosis totally incapacitated injured workman; mental affliction caused or accelerated by injury; subject reviewed. Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 791, 792, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

220. Accidental injury aggravating or intensifying or precipitating pre-existing mental disease is compensable. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 365, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

221. Mental affliction brought about or caused to recur as a result of fall and injury to spine; compensable. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

222. Accidental injury to potential psychoneurotic was exciting cause which precipitated traumatic neurosis, being a chronic anxiety state. Hayes v. Garvey Drilling Co., 188 Kan. 179, 181, 183, 360 P.2d 889 (1961).

223. Traumatic neurosis (conversion hysteria or psychoneurosis) is compensable, even if trauma merely aggravated a pre-existing condition. Barr v. Builders, Inc., 179 Kan. 617, 622, 627, 296 P.2d 1106 (1956).

224. Accidental injuries are compensable where the accident only serves to aggravate or accelerate an existing disease, or intensifies an affliction. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 Kan. 325, Syl. 4, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).

225. Exertion aggravated existing heart condition; personal injury arising out of and in course of employment. Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 Kan. 795, 798, 366 P.2d 28 (1961).

226. Workman injured in course of employment entitled to compensation notwithstanding pre-existing disease. Warlop v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 24 F.2d 926 (1928).

227. Work on assembly line; claimant suffered cerebral vascular accident; compensable. Kirksey v. General Motors Corporation, 190 Kan. 806, 378 P.2d 91 (1963).

—Burden of proof (228-233)

228. It must appear that injury arose out of and in course of employment. Sedlock v. Mining Co., 98 Kan. 680, 681, 159 P. 9 (1916).

229. Burden on claimant to prove injury arose out of employment; failed to do so. Gamble v. Board of Public Utilities, 137 Kan. 227, 19 P.2d 729 (1933).

230. Claimant made "proof of more than possibility the infection resulted from the wound." Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 145 Kan. 36, 40, 64 P.2d 582 (1937).

231. Claimant has the burden of establishing, among other things, that the injury to the workman occurred as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 Kan. 385, Syl. 1, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

232. Claimant flying airplane for personal reasons; failure to sustain burden of proof of causal connection to employment. Whitely v. King Radio Corporation, Inc., 190 Kan. 439, 375 P.2d 593 (1962).

233. Evidence failed to establish causal connection between work being done and workman's death by coronary occlusion. Transmeier v. Blaw-Knox Construction Co., 191 Kan. 321, 380 P.2d 332 (1963).

—Causal connection (235-254)

235. Injury arises out of employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions required by the work and the resulting injury. Cox v. Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 323, 195 P. 863 (1921).

236. Accident had its origin in a risk connected with employment and flowed from that source as a rational consequence. Whetlaufer v. Howse, 146 Kan. 500, 505, 71 P.2d 879 (1937).

237. Personal acts, disassociated from employment, did not arise out of employment. Burns from using coal oil to start dwelling stove not within act. Holloway v. Consolidated Gas, Oil & Mfg. Co., 152 Kan. 129, 133, 102 P.2d 987 (1940).

238. Superintendent of drilling took indirect route between wells; was suffering from loss of sleep to perform job; accident en route arose out of employment. Mitchell v. Mitchell Drilling Co., 154 Kan. 117, 114 P.2d 841 (1941).

239. Fact that employee happened to be doing something incidental to or in connection with his work does not mean accident arose out of employment. Repstine v. Hudson Oil Co., 155 Kan. 486, 489, 126 P.2d 225 (1942).

240. Injury to left leg and bone graft taken from right hip by surgery; disability in right hip was occasioned by accidental injury arising out of and in course of employment; causal connection was traceable. Duncan v. Davidson Construction Co., 170 Kan. 520, 525, 227 P.2d 95 (1951).

241. Probability that exertion caused heart attack. Workman v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 164 Kan. 478, 479, 190 P.2d 863 (1948).

242. Finding cerebral hemorrhage did not arise out of employment upheld. Neff v. Henry Wagner Transport Co., 177 Kan. 738, 743, 281 P.2d 1109 (1955).

243. Causal connection between employment and injury by tornado; compensable. Faulkner v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 Kan. 667, 668, 359 P.2d 833 (1961).

244. Ticket agent, while on duty, was fatally assaulted by unknown person; employment invited assault; accident and death arose out of employment. Phillips v. Kansas City, L. & W. Rly. Co., 126 Kan. 133, 134, 267 P. 4 (1928).

245. "Arising out of" requires causal connection between incident of employment and the accident. Pearson v. Electric Service Co., 166 Kan. 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 201 P.2d 643 (1949).

246. Workman required to go back and forth between stone quarries of employer was killed en route; causal connection between injury and condition under which deceased required to work; within act. Mathis v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 Kan. 93, 272 P. 183 (1928).

247. Brush salesman returned home feeling bad and died five days later of angina pectoris or myocarditis; death was not result of accidental injury arising out of employment. Zelinkoff v. Mountain States Brush Mfg. Corp., 135 Kan. 247, 9 P.2d 649 (1932).

248. Automobile accident while moving own household goods at request of employer; accident had its origin in a risk connected with employment. Stapleton v. State Highway Comm., 147 Kan. 419, 423, 76 P.2d 843 (1938).

249. Suicide which results from carbon monoxide poisoning constitutes an accident; insufficient evidence thereof. Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 Kan. 190, 193, 80 P.2d 1066 (1938).

250. Injuries happening through curiosity or pranks of immature boy coworkers arise out of employment. Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F.2d 398, Syl. 2 (1925).

251. Court may consider lay testimony in determining connection between work and coronary occlusion; corollary to Mein v. Meade County, 197 Kan. 810. Hanna v. Edward Gray Corporation, 197 Kan. 793, 421 P.2d 205 (1966).

252. Evidence sufficient to support causal relationship between employment and heart attack. Mein v. Meade County, 197 Kan. 810, 421 P.2d 177 (1966).

253. Causal connection between work and coronary; evidence supported finding. Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768, 773, 443 P.2d 314 (1968).

254. Question of causal relation of exertion to cerebrovascular injury is one of fact. Dolan v. Steele, 207 Kan. 640, 642, 643, 644, 485 P.2d 1318 (1971).

—Definition "arises out of" (255-260)

255. The words "out of" employment point to origin of the injury and require a showing of some causal connection between the injury and employment. Evans v. Western Terra Cotta Co., 145 Kan. 924, 925, 67 P.2d 426 (1937).

256. The phrase "out of" employment, points to the cause or origin of the accident and requires some causal connection between the accidental injury and employment. Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, Syl. 4, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

257. "Out of" and "in course of" construed. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

258. Terms "out of" and "in the course of" defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

259. Compensable injury must both arise "out of" and "in the course of" employment; dissent as to appellate jurisdiction. Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 194 Kan. 278, 281, 398 P.2d 578 (1965).

260. Clause "injuries arising out of and in the course of employment for wage or profit" appearing in group insurance policy held to have same meaning as in this act. Bienz, Administratrix v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 195 Kan. 422, 425, 426, 407 P.2d 222 (1965).

—Incompetent medical care (261-266)

261. Incapacity resulting from unskilled medical treatment not within compensation act. Ruth v. Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98 Kan. 179, 181, 157 P. 403 (1916); second appeal 100 Kan. 608, 164 P. 1064 (1917).

262. Incompetent surgical treatment furnished by employer; compensation not increased; such incapacity does not arise out of and in course of employment. Ruth v. Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98 Kan. 179, 181, 157 P. 403 (1916).

263. No neglect of physicians who treated claimant found; respondent not excused from liability. Weaver v. Shanklin Walnut Co., 131 Kan. 771, 774, 293 P. 950 (1930).

264. Disability from bone grafts for surgical repair of accidental injury do not as a matter of law constitute an independent, intervening cause; natural result traceable to the injury; compensable. Duncan v. Davidson Construction Co., 170 Kan. 520, 527, 227 P.2d 95 (1951).

265. Death resulting from an operation necessitated by an injury is compensable when death resulted from injury. Evans v. Western Terra Cotta Co., 145 Kan. 924, 927, 67 P.2d 426 (1937).

266. Workman bruised chest; sarcoma of sternum developed; death followed operation; compensable. Parker v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Kan. 832, 73 P.2d 1032 (1937).

—Refusal of medical care (268-270)

268. Award may be modified or canceled, for refusal to submit to reasonable medical treatment; burden of proof on employer.

(a) Evans v. Cook & Galloway Drilling Co., 191 Kan. 439, 381 P.2d 341 (1963);

(b) McCullough v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 155 Kan. 629, 632, 127 P.2d 467 (1942);

(d) Strong v. Iron & Metal Co., 109 Kan. 117, 198 P. 182 (1921).

269. Refusal to submit to surgical operation; compensation held properly refused. Strong v. Iron & Metal Co., 109 Kan. 117, 198 P. 182 (1921).

270. Refusal to submit to reasonable medical treatment is grounds for cancellation of award; forfeiture provision; burden of proof upon employer. Evans v. Cook & Galloway Drilling Co., 191 Kan. 439, 444, 445, 381 P.2d 341 (1963).

—No standard of health (272-273)

272. No standard of health necessary to bring workman under act. Workman v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 164 Kan. 478, 479, 190 P.2d 863 (1948).

273. The statute establishes no standard of health for workman.

(a) Kirksey v. General Motors Corporation, 190 Kan. 806, 808, 378 P.2d 91 (1963);

(b) Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 Kan. 795, Syl. 1, 366 P.2d 28 (1961);

(d) Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 Kan. 325, Syl. 3, 225 P.2d 129 (1950);

(e) Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 778, 180 P. 793 (1919);

(f) Geurian v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 589, 594, 389 P.2d 782 (1964).

PARTICULAR INJURIES, DISEASES AND CONDITIONS

—Back (280-283)

280. Miner fell while pushing car of coal; traumatic sciatica resulted; condition within act. Ertman v. Clemens Coal Co., 132 Kan. 803, 297 P. 431 (1931).

281. Issue of fact whether lifting or infection caused back disability. Voiles v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 141 Kan. 451, 41 P.2d 723 (1935).

282. Claimant had congenital back defect; injured back while loading ore; exactitude unnecessary whether he suffered from one or the other; compensable. Baker v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 145 Kan. 273, 281, 65 P.2d 284 (1937).

283. Minor back injury still compensable. Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 Kan. 699, 702, 352 P.2d 48 (1960).

—Cancer (285-287)

285. Workman bruised chest; sarcoma of sternum developed; death followed operation; compensable. Parker v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Kan. 832, 73 P.2d 1032 (1937).

286. Furnace door fell on claimant; it "aggravated, activated and set in motion" an existing condition which resulted in cancer. Waltrip v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 147 Kan. 781, 783, 78 P.2d 898 (1938).

287. Workman suffering from pre-existing cancer ruptured intestinal wall, which aggravated, worsened and intensified his affliction; compensable. Strasser v. Jones, 186 Kan. 507, Syl. 3, 350 P.2d 779 (1960).

—Diseases (290-301)

290. Workman afflicted with muscular atrophy (a disease); fell from scaffold and injured back; question of fact whether disability was caused by the injury. Brown v. Kansas Buff Brick Co., 120 Kan. 335, 243 P. 304 (1926).

291. Employee's disability occurring entirely by reason of disease not within act. Warlop v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 24 F.2d 926 (1928).

292. Epileptic workman had fit and fell, injuring himself; fit was not provoked, induced or rendered more likely to happen because of his work; accident did not arise out of employment. Cox v. Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 324, 325, 195 P. 863 (1921).

293. Insanity is a disease; injury was cause or forerunner or the circumstance which brought about recurrence of mental affliction; compensable. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 365, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

294. Arthritis of back aggravated by jarring, jolting and jerking of workman; accidental injury arising out of employment. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

295. Workman's toes froze on 28-degree day; Buerger's disease (circulatory); no accidental injury within compensation act. Wright v. Keith, 136 Kan. 393, 395, 15 P.2d 429 (1932).

296. Claim that diabetes was caused or accelerated by accident; no evidence to support claim; compensation disallowed. Whitaker v. Panhandle Eastern P. L. Co., 142 Kan. 314, 315, 46 P.2d 862 (1935).

297. Diabetic workman stepped on nail; developed gangrene necessitating amputation of leg five inches below knee; scheduled injury compensation allowed. McKinney v. Rodney Milling Co., 177 Kan. 401, 403, 279 P.2d 221 (1955).

298. Evidence that pre-existing diabetes made a double hernia inoperable is not evidence of aggravation of diabetes, barring subsequent complications. Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 Kan. 693, 702, 149 P.2d 632 (1944).

299. Injury aggravating existing Hodgkin's disease resulting in death is compensable; evidence. Hall v. Kornfeld-Harper Well Servicing Co., 159 Kan. 70, 151 P.2d 688 (1944).

300. Workman suffering from syphilis and hypertrophic arthritis struck knee from which he suffered for a time; temporary total until time of trial allowed. Kelsey v. Armour & Co., 119 Kan. 837, 241 P. 453 (1925).

301. Whether disability was caused by trauma or by chancroid infection is a question of fact; found to be the latter. Gregg v. American Walnut Lbr. Co., 137 Kan. 201, 19 P.2d 463 (1933).

—Heart (305-324)

305. Workman breathed cement dust resulting in weakness; heart attack while climbing a ladder in employment; accident arising out of employment. Riggs v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 Kan. 91, 272 P. 153 (1928).

306. Cement plant worker's lungs and heart weakened by dust and gases; heart attack upon exertion in employment was within act. Riggs v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 131 Kan. 244, 289 P. 410 (1930).

307. Brush salesman returned home feeling bad and died five days later of angina pectoris or myocarditis; death was not result of accidental injury arising out of employment. Zelinkoff v. Mountain States Brush Mfg. Corp., 135 Kan. 247, 9 P.2d 649 (1932).

308. Heart pain resulting from exertion did not arise out of employment. Meredith v. Seymour Packing Co., 141 Kan. 244, 40 P.2d 325 (1935).

309. Pull on wrench resulting in heart attack is accident and arose out of employment. Hill v. Etchen Motor Co., 143 Kan. 655, 56 P.2d 103 (1936).

310. Valvular heart lesion suffered while lifting and jerking lever; compensable. Earhart v. Wible Ice & Cold Storage Co., 150 Kan. 695, 95 P.2d 366 (1939).

311. Pneumonia followed by heart attack; did not arise out of employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 Kan. 385, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

312. Workman, while stacking merchandise, strained himself and suffered coronary thrombosis; personal injury by accident. Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 Kan. 271, Syl. 1, 146 P.2d 657 (1944).

313. "Accident" defined; death from heart attack held by accident. Workman v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 164 Kan. 478, 479, 190 P.2d 863 (1948).

314. Cold weather and exertion precipitated coronary attack. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 299, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

315. Coronary occlusion suffered by car salesman held accidental injury. Ford v. Morrison, 182 Kan. 787, 324 P.2d 140 (1958).

316. Coronary artery disease caused death; not within act. Grow v. Musgrove Petroleum Corp., 184 Kan. 800, 339 P.2d 75 (1959).

317. Coronary occlusion; injury within act; judgment supported by evidence. Wilson v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 185 Kan. 725, 347 P.2d 235 (1959).

318. Coronary occlusion; death held not compensable; burden of proof; causal connection. Rorabaugh v. General Mills, 187 Kan. 363, 367, 356 P.2d 796 (1960).

319. Coronary occlusion held accidental injury "arising out of and in course of employment." Thuillez v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 Kan. 618, 619, 621, 622, 358 P.2d 676 (1961).

320. Work requiring extreme exertion by golf course superintendent found to have resulted in cardiac failure; compensable. Price v. McSpaden, 188 Kan. 578, 579, 580, 363 P.2d 533 (1961).

321. Exertion aggravated existing heart condition; personal injury arising out of and in course of employment. Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 Kan. 795, 798, 366 P.2d 28 (1961).

322. Evidence failed to establish causal connection between work being done and workman's death by coronary occlusion. Transmeier v. Blaw-Knox Construction Co., 191 Kan. 321, 380 P.2d 322 (1963).

323. Coronary thrombosis found to be an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Karle v. Board of County Commissioners, 188 Kan. 800, 366 P.2d 241 (1961).

324. Death resulting from acute coronary occlusion was accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Alpers v. George-Nielsen Motor Co., 182 Kan. 790, 794, 324 P.2d 177 (1958).

—Hemorrhage (325-338)

325. Provisions of 1967 amendment found inapplicable in appeal concerning death from coronary occlusion. Pratt v. Seis-Tech Exploration Co., 199 Kan. 732, 735, 433 P.2d 555 (1967).

326. 1967 amendment concerning coronary applies only prospectively to injuries subsequent to effective date. Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768, 773, 443 P.2d 314 (1968).

327. Vascular accident resulting in coronary occlusion did not arise out of and in course of employment. Meyers v. Consolidated Printing & Stationery Co., 201 Kan. 806, 808, 443 P.2d 319 (1968).

328. Death of workman from coronary insufficiency; accidental injury arising out of and in course of employment. Osman v. City of Wichita, 203 Kan. 313, 314, 454 P.2d 427 (1969).

329. Death from pulmonary hemorrhage; injury arising out of employment; "accident." Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 773, 180 P. 793 (1919).

330. Death from hemorrhage of lungs within act. Stringer v. Mining Co., 114 Kan. 716, 220 P. 168 (1923).

331. Workman's head injured by falling from scaffold; testimony death resulted from cerebrospinal meningitis (a disease); presents issue as to which caused death. Doty v. Crystal Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Kan. 323, 324, 235 P. 96 (1925); second case 122 Kan. 653, Syl. 2, 122 P. 611 (1927).

332. Pipe slipped and crushed workman resulting in hemorrhage from stomach; pre-existing gastric ulcers; injury contributed to death; compensable. Baxter v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 139 Kan. 443, 32 P.2d 451 (1934).

333. Evidence held sufficient to connect exertion and hemorrhage in eye. Shapland v. Ferguson Furniture Co., 139 Kan. 768, 33 P.2d 145 (1934).

334. Rupture of aneurysm result of aggravation of existing condition. McMillin v. City of Salina, 163 Kan. 575, 587, 184 P.2d 201 (1947).

335. Work on assembly line; claimant suffered cerebral vascular accident; compensable. Kirksey v. General Motors Corporation, 190 Kan. 806, 378 P.2d 91 (1963).

336. Increase in blood pressure from exertion of sawing boards contributed to cerebral hemorrhage; pre-existing arteriosclerosis; compensation allowed. Carney v. Hellar, 155 Kan. 674, 676, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

337. Sixty-two-year-old man fell on concrete when chair slipped out from under him; suffered cerebral hemorrhage; arose out of employment. Burk v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 160 Kan. 519, 163 P.2d 402 (1945).

338. Finding cerebral hemorrhage did not arise out of employment upheld. Neff v. Henry Wagner Transport Co., 177 Kan. 738, 743, 281 P.2d 1109 (1955).

—Hernia (339-340)

339. Strangulated hernia arose out of and in course of employment. Evans v. Western Terra Cotta Co., 145 Kan. 924, 67 P.2d 426 (1937).

340. Hernia sustained while preparing for work on employers' premises within act. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 Kan. 325, 329, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).

—Infections and pneumonia (341-349)

341. Infection of existing wound; accident arising out of employment. Monson v. Battelle, 102 Kan. 208, 211, 170 P. 801 (1918).

342. Pneumonia following injury held not an accident. Hoag v. Laundry Co., 113 Kan. 513, 517, 215 P. 295 (1923).

343. Mashed toe infected by tetanus causing death; within act. Bradshaw v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 121 Kan. 525, 247 P. 644 (1926).

344. Finding of ringworm on leg resulting from cut arm sustained. Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 145 Kan. 36, 64 P.2d 582 (1937).

345. Evidence sustained finding systematic infection resulted from cut finger and within act. Parks v. Swift & Co., 146 Kan. 510, 72 P.2d 82 (1937).

346. Issue of fact whether lifting or infection caused back disability. Voiles v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 141 Kan. 451, 41 P.2d 723 (1935).

347. A cough or a cold is not an accident within meaning of act. Shoemaker v. Hardwick, 189 Kan. 72, 73, 366 P.2d 1008 (1961).

348. Eighty-year-old man fell from chair, developed pneumonia and died; was doing nothing within employment; compensation denied. Gamble v. Board of Public Utilities, 137 Kan. 227, 19 P.2d 729 (1933).

349. Pneumonia followed by heart attack; did not arise out of employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 Kan. 385, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

—Intoxication (350)

350. Respondent has burden of establishing death of workman resulted solely from intoxication. Schmidt v. Jensen Motors, Inc., 208 Kan. 182, 183, 490 P.2d 383 (1971).

—Mental illness (351)

351. Mental illness resulting from solely mental stimuli considered; finding claimant did not sustain injury by accident arising out of employment supported by evidence. Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966).

—Miscellaneous (352-359)

352. Workman fell and hurt side; muscle spasm produced disability; compensable. Hardwell v. St. Louis S. & R. Co., 146 Kan. 870, 73 P.2d 1120 (1937).

353. Developing sore arm not injury arising out of and in course of employment. Burton v. Western Iron and Foundry Co., 173 Kan. 506, 249 P.2d 688 (1952).

354. Compensation recoverable where inability to labor results from pain. Trowbridge v. Wilson & Co., 102 Kan. 521, 170 P. 816 (1918).

355. Pain which does not result in incapacity is not compensable. Dobson v. Apex Coal Co., 150 Kan. 80, 85, 91 P.2d 5 (1939).

356. Shock of accident constituted a new factor which operated on the existing condition and contributed to death; compensable. Vera v. Swift & Co., 143 Kan. 593, 601, 604, 56 P.2d 96 (1936).

357. Traumatic neurosis totally incapacitated injured workman; mental affliction caused or accelerated by injury; subject reviewed. Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 791, 792, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

358. Deafness caused by series of pistol explosions held injury by accident. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

359. Heatstroke held accidental injury within act. Taber v. Tole Landscape Co., 181 Kan. 616, 619, 313 P.2d 290 (1957).

DEFENSES RELATING TO PROVISO

—Clause (a), earning full wages (361-369)

361. Injured employee not barred from recovering compensation by remaining in service of employer. Gailey v. Manufacturing Co., 98 Kan. 53, 157 P. 431 (1916).

362. Workman not barred by finding other employment at higher wages. Dennis v. Cafferty, 99 Kan. 810, 813, 163 P. 461 (1917).

363. Judgment relieving defendant from payments while workman employed considered. Lombard v. Planing Mill Co., 102 Kan. 780, 172 P. 32 (1918).

364. Injured workman not barred because earnings same as before accident. Raffaghelle v. Russell, 103 Kan. 849, 850, 176 P. 640 (1918).

365. Workman's thumb injured; still able to work and receive same pay; not barred from recovery. Quillen v. Wichita Gas Co., 128 Kan. 9, 275 P. 1075 (1929).

366. Workman entitled to compensation although returned to work, at request of employer, at same remuneration. Harvey v. Eldridge & Majors Packing Co., 128 Kan. 403, 278 P. 16 (1929).

367. Right to compensation not lost by continuing in employment. Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 Kan. 699, 702, 352 P.2d 48 (1960).

368. Partially incapacitated employee does not lose right to compensation by remaining at former wage. Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449, 452, 381 P.2d 365 (1963).

369. Claimant returned to similar work on other jobs at no decrease in pay; still entitled to compensation. Peschka v. Wilkinson Drilling Co., 192 Kan. 126, 133, 386 P.2d 509 (1963).

—Clause (a), minimum time (370-375)

370. Clause concerning two weeks total disability considered. Dennis v. Cafferty, 99 Kan. 810, 812, 163 P. 461 (1917).

371. Partial disability; total disability for two weeks not required. Raffaghelle v. Russell, 103 Kan. 849, 850, 176 P. 640 (1918).

372. Workman must be disabled for at least a week. Whitby v. Armour & Co., 114 Kan. 445, 447, 219 P. 253 (1923).

373. Workman losing no time from full pay, not within act. Chappell v. Morris & Co., 118 Kan. 210, 212, 235 P. 117 (1925).

374. Clause (a) of proviso construed and its intent and purpose stated. Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 714, 715, 716, 717, 207 P.2d 1179 (1949).

375. Permanent partial disability; total disability for two weeks not required. Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 714, 715, 716, 717, 207 P.2d 1179 (1949).

—Clause (b), use of guard (378-382)

378. Removal of guards to clean machines; defendant not barred. Messick v. McEntire, 97 Kan. 813, 815, 156 P. 740 (1916).

379. Whether guard sufficient and proper question of fact. Binger v. Read, 101 Kan. 303, 306, 165 P. 821 (1917).

380. Use of guard; negligence can be shown only by evidence. Binger v. Read, 101 Kan. 303, 306, 165 P. 821 (1917).

381. Guards removed for cleaning the machinery; not replaced; not "willful" negligence. Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 Kan. 800, 803, 189 P. 934 (1920).

382. Intractableness necessary to show willful failure to use guard. Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 Kan. 800, 803, 189 P. 934 (1920).

—Clause (b), intoxication (383-384)

383. Intoxication is a defense under statute; evidence thereof. Sayers v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 134 Kan. 872, 874, 8 P.2d 383 (1932).

384. Salesman abandoned employment; became intoxicated while pursuing his own pleasure; then had automobile accident; not within act. Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 Kan. 413, 417, 418, 103 P.2d 837 (1940).

—Clause (b), willful injury (385-388)

385. Defense of intentional and deliberate injury to self raised; unsupported by facts. Messick v. McEntire, 97 Kan. 813, 815, 156 P. 740 (1916).

386. Workman not guilty of willful negligence; failure to stop machinery. Thorn v. Zinc Co., 106 Kan. 73, 186 P. 972 (1920).

387. Voluntary and intentional omission to use guards not necessarily "willful." Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 Kan. 800, 803, 189 P. 934 (1920).

388. Suicide which results from carbon monoxide poisoning constitutes an accident; insufficient evidence thereof. Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 Kan. 190, 193, 80 P.2d 1066 (1938).

DEVIATIONS FROM EMPLOYMENT

—Abandonment (389-392)

389. Workman abandoned his employment to go into a dangerous part of electrical plant and was injured by electrical current there; accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Haas v. Light & Power Co., 109 Kan. 197, 205, 198 P. 174 (1921).

390. City employee does not abandon employment when he performs duty outside of city. Brenn v. City of St. John, 149 Kan. 416, 420, 87 P.2d 546 (1939).

391. Salesman abandoned employment; became intoxicated while pursuing his own pleasure; then had automobile accident; not within act. Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 Kan. 413, 417, 418, 103 P.2d 837 (1940).

392. Use of freight elevator was incidental, naturally and normally, to the work for which claimant employed; had not "departed" from employment. Bailey v. Mosby Hotel Co., 160 Kan. 258, 267, 160 P.2d 701 (1945).

—Errand outside scope of employment (393-394)

393. Injury suffered while lending aid to stranger held in course of employment. Floro v. Ticehurst, 147 Kan. 426, 430, 431, 76 P.2d 773 (1938).

394. Foreman sent workman on an errand; in performing errand workman fell into a vat of hot water; accident and death arose in the course of employment. McDonnell v. Swift & Co., 124 Kan. 327, 328, 329, 259 P. 695 (1927).

—Personal activities (395-401)

395. Automobile accident while moving own household goods at request of employer; accident had its origin in a risk connected with employment. Stapleton v. State Highway Comm., 147 Kan. 419, 423, 76 P.2d 843 (1938).

396. Injury sustained while chopping wood for own use not within act. Schooley v. Swanson, 147 Kan. 758, 760, 78 P.2d 858 (1938).

397. Workman injured while working on own automobile; injury arose out of employment. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

398. Personal acts, disassociated from employment, did not arise out of employment; burns from using coal oil to start dwelling stove not within act. Holloway v. Consolidated Gas, Oil & Mfg. Co., 152 Kan. 129, 133, 102 P.2d 987 (1940).

399. Mechanic killed in automobile collision while returning from another city; injury incident to employment and compensable. Blair v. Shaw, 171 Kan. 524, 233 P.2d 731 (1951).

400. Claimant flying airplane for personal reasons; failure to sustain burden of proof of causal connection to employment. Whitely v. King Radio Corporation, Inc., 190 Kan. 439, 375 P.2d 593 (1962).

401. Trip to doctor's office for treatment of injury suffered in employment is an activity in the course of employment. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).

—"Sporting" (402-407)

402. Mortar playfully thrown into eye by fellow workman; question for jury. Stuart v. Kansas City, 102 Kan. 307, 171 P. 913 (1918); judgment clarified, 102 Kan. 563, 171 P. 913 (1918).

403. Injuries from sportive acts of coemployees; liability of employer considered. Stuart v. Kansas City, 102 Kan. 307, 310, 171 P. 913 (1918); White v. Stockyards Co., 104 Kan. 90, 177 P. 522 (1919).

404. Injury while engaged in amusement during noon hour within act. Thomas v. Manufacturing Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919).

405. Injury resulting from voluntary sport and horseplay not within act. Neal v. Boeing Airplane Co., 161 Kan. 322, 323, 167 P.2d 643 (1946).

406. Injuries happening through curiosity or pranks of immature boy coworkers arise out of employment. Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F.2d 398 (1925).

407. Active participant in "horseplay" is not entitled to compensation. Finck v. Galloway, 139 Kan. 173, 29 P.2d 1091 (1934).

—Volunteer activities (408-411)

408. Workman requested foreman's permission to move foreman's car and foreman yielded to the request; workman killed moving car; accident did not arise out of employment. Sellers v. Reice Construction Co., 124 Kan. 550, 551, 555, 262 P. 19 (1927).

409. Claimant assisted (without request) in felling a tree which struck and killed him; activity within employment; injury compensable. Fairchild v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 138 Kan. 651, 27 P.2d 209 (1933).

410. Employee going to bank for employer; helped move stalled car; injured returning to his car; injury within act. Roth v. Hudson Oil Co., 185 Kan. 576, 345 P.2d 627 (1959).

411. Workman injured when returning from ration board office; injury not covered. Brandon v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 506, 509, 163 P.2d 384 (1945).

—Travel deviations, en route to or from work (415-416)

415. Workman ordered back to work at night; injured en route; injury not within act. Abbott v. Southwest Grain Co., 162 Kan. 315, 319, 176 P.2d 839 (1947).

416. Hernia sustained while preparing for work on employer's premises within act. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 Kan. 325, 329, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).

—Travel deviations, indirect route (417-419)

417. Traveling salesman took indirect route and was killed in automobile accident; compensation allowed. Woods v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 141 Kan. 363, 41 P.2d 748 (1935); modified 141 Kan. 748, 43 P.2d 786 (1935).

418. Trip to doctor's office for treatment of injury suffered in employment is an activity in the course of employment. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).

419. Superintendent of drilling took indirect route between wells; was suffering from loss of sleep to perform job; accident en route arose out of employment. Mitchell v. Mitchell Drilling Co., 154 Kan. 117, 114 P.2d 841 (1941).

OLD CASES (largely outdated) (420)

420. Other early compensation cases primarily under arbitration and jury trial provisions are as follows:

(a) Welden v. Edgar Zinc Co., 127 Kan. 870, 275 P. 151 (1929); rehearing 129 Kan. 422, 283 P. 618 (1930);

(b) Williams v. Wilson, 129 Kan. 215, 282 P. 574 (1929);

(d) Fuller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co., 124 Kan. 66, 257 P. 971 (1927);

(e) Nealey v. Wyandotte Elevator Co., 123 Kan. 189, 254 P. 377 (1927);

(f) Bonini v. Crowe Coal Co., 122 Kan. 731, 253 P. 570 (1927);

(g) Robertson v. Labette County Comm'rs, 122 Kan. 486, 252 P. 196 (1927); second case 124 Kan. 705, 261 P. 831 (1927);

(h) Powell v. Kansas-Mo. Rly. & T. Co., 121 Kan. 622, 249 P. 675 (1926);

(i) Wood v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 121 Kan. 128, 245 P. 1015 (1926);

(j) Albertsen v. Swift & Co., 117 Kan. 337, 230 P. 1057 (1924);

(k) Bowman v. Foundry Co., 117 Kan. 66, 230 P. 320 (1924);

(l) Francis v. Refining Corporation, 116 Kan. 723, 229 P. 357 (1924);

(m) Rogers v. Railway Co., 115 Kan. 815, 225 P. 108 (1924);

(n) Milling Co. v. Ellis, 115 Kan. 431, 223 P. 274 (1924);

(o) Kinzer v. Gas Co., 110 Kan. 574, 204 P. 999 (1922); second case 114 Kan. 440, 219 P. 278 (1923);

(p) Walls v. Zinc Co., 113 Kan. 700, 216 P. 308 (1923);

(q) Dolen v. Sand Co., 110 Kan. 142, 202 P. 846 (1921);

(r) Flanigan v. Railway Co., 108 Kan. 133, 193 P. 1077 (1920);

(s) Mayeur v. Mining Co., 106 Kan. 123, 186 P. 1035 (1920);

(t) Villalobos v. Packing Co., 105 Kan. 106, 181 P. 599 (1919);

(u) Matassarin v. Street Railway Co., 100 Kan. 119, 163 P. 796 (1917);

(v) Roberts v. Packing Co., 95 Kan. 723, 149 P. 413 (1915); second appeal 98 Kan. 750, 160 P. 221 (1916);

(w) Girten v. Zinc Co., 98 Kan. 405, 158 P. 33 (1916).

Cases after 1973

421. "Heart amendment" construed; whether exertion was more than usual work presents question of fact for trial court. Nichols v. State Highway Commission, 211 Kan. 919, 920, 921, 922, 508 P.2d 856.

422. Injuries arise "out of" employment when, considering all circumstances, there is apparent a causal connection between working conditions and resulting injuries. Craig v. Electrolux Corporation, 212 Kan. 75, 77, 510 P.2d 138.

423. Recovery for heart attack denied; unloading sheetrock was claimant's usual work in course of his regular employment. Simpson v. Logan-Moore Lumber Co., 213 Kan. 404, 405, 510 P.2d 1234.

424. "Heart amendment" considered; environmental heat shown to be cause of injury; compensation awarded even though immediate result of heat was cerebral hemorrhage. Dial v. C. V. Dome Co., 213 Kan. 262, 264, 265, 515 P.2d 1046.

425. Action hereunder; traumatic neurosis following physical injury and directly traceable to the injury is compensable. Rund v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 213 Kan. 812, 813, 518 P.2d 518.

426. Cited; workmen's compensation act provides exclusive remedy for accidental injuries arising out of and in course of employment. Lindsay, Administrator v. Hankamer Asphalt Co., Inc., 213 Kan. 855, 856, 518 P.2d 934.

427. Appeal from decision disallowing unauthorized medical expenses; traumatic neurosis; record examined; no error. Buck v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 215 Kan. 157, 158, 523 P.2d 697.

428. Exclusive remedy provision barred wife's recovery in common law action for loss of consortium. Fritzson v. City of Manhattan, 215 Kan. 810, 811, 812, 813, 528 P.2d 1193.

429. Act provides exclusive remedy; employer's election sufficient; common-law action barred; dismissal proper. Stonecipher v. Winn-Rau Corporation, 218 Kan. 617, 618, 620, 545 P.2d 317.

430. Evidence supported denial of claim for disability from myocardial infarction; intent of 1967 Heart amendment. Suhm v. Volks Homes, Inc., 219 Kan. 800, 801, 802, 804, 805, 549 P.2d 944.

431. Applied; granting summary judgment in wrongful death action error; factual issues unresolved. Woods v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 220 Kan. 479, 482, 553 P.2d 900.

432. Finding that exertion not more than usual work supported by substantial, competent evidence. Woods v. Peerless Plastics, Inc., 220 Kan. 786, 787, 556 P.2d 455.

433. Workman entitled to recover award for functional disability irrespective of its relationship to work disability. Anderson v. Kinsley Sand & Gravel, Inc., 221 Kan. 191, 194, 201, 558 P.2d 146.

434. Recovery under workman's compensation act is an exclusive remedy; common-law action for damages barred. Baker v. List and Clark Construction Co., 222 Kan. 127, 133, 136, 563 P.2d 431.

435. Action involving heart attack; what is "usual exertion" discussed. Lentz v. City of Marion, 222 Kan. 169, 170, 171, 563 P.2d 456.

436. Action by employee against negligent third party after compensation paid; reduction of liability when both employer and employee negligent; K.S.A. 60-258a applied. Beach v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 428 F. Supp 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 963.

437. Third party action for indemnity against employer of injured worker held not maintainable. McCleskey v. Noble Corp., 2 Kan. App. 2d 240, 577 P.2d 830.

438. Applied; common-law action barred if recovery available under workmen's compensation act. Fugit, Administratrix v. United Beechcraft, Inc., 222 Kan. 312, 314, 564 P.2d 521.

439. Workman suffering injury may maintain claim even though returns to work within one week. Gillig v. Cities Service Gas Co., 222 Kan. 369, 371, 564 P.2d 548.

440. Claim not precluded under this section; claimant's heart attack product of some external force. Makalous v. Kansas State Highway Commission, 222 Kan. 477, 479, 481, 565 P.2d 254.

441. Standard for determination of "unusual exertion"; work history of individual involved. Chapman v. Wilkenson Co., 222 Kan. 722, 724, 725, 567 P.2d 888.

442. Referred to in construing K.S.A. 44-510b; surviving legal spouse entitled to benefits without proof of dependency. Brinkmeyer v. City of Wichita, 223 Kan. 393, 394, 573 P.2d 1044.

443. Claim that employer failed to provide reasonable working conditions not exclusively within province of Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act. Cordon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1064, 1066.

444. Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act was held to be exclusive remedy for injured employee. Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1182, 1183.

445. Contrasted with Kansas acts against discrimination. Van Scoyk v. St. Mary's Assumption Parochial School, 224 Kan. 304, 306, 580 P.2d 1315.

446. Section is not unconstitutional because coverage is compulsory. Boyd v. Barton Transfer and Storage, 2 Kan. App. 2d 425, 426, 429, 430, 580 P.2d 1366.

447. Comparative negligence action; party immune from suit; considered for comparison only. Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 491, 499, 582 P.2d 300.

448. Fatal cardiovascular accident; finding of substantial external force which proximately caused death upheld. Hall v. City of Hugoton, 2 Kan. App. 2d 728, 729, 587 P.2d 927.

449. Workman's death "arose out of" his employment when he was on a rooftop and hit by early shots of a nearby sniper. Hensley v. Carl Graham Glass, 226 Kan. 256, 257, 258, 597 P.2d 641.

450. Employee limited to relief under K.S.A. 44-528 for settlement and award obtained through fraud of employer. Yocum v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 228 Kan. 216, 218, 219, 224, 612 P.2d 699.

451. In recovery by injured workmen from third-party tort-feasor, employer subrogated to extent of compensation and medical aid provided; no reduction in amount of subrogation allowed regardless of concurrent negligence of employer. Negley v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 229 Kan. 465, 470, 625 P.2d 472.

452. Where employee hurt back getting out of truck, injury did not "arise out of" employment. Martin v. U.S.D. No. 233, 5 Kan. App. 2d 298, 299, 615 P.2d 168.

453. Personal injury by accident arising out of and in course of employment which may have been occasioned by employer's wantonness does not give employee common-law action for damages. Lawrence v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 272, 273, 627 P.2d 1168.

454. Where employee-at-will terminated for filing claim hereunder may maintain action for retaliatory discharge. Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 489, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).

455. Workmen's Compensation Act raised as defense to common-law negligence action. Orr v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 335 (1981).

456. Employee entitled to exclusive remedy under act and precluded suit against United States under Federal Tort Claims Act. Griffin v. United States, 644 F.2d 846, 848 (1981).

457. To avoid one year statute of limitations, employee must plead cause of action for himself, his employer and workmen's compensation insuror; plaintiff allowed to amend complaint. Baird v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 535 F. Supp. 1371, 1374, 1376 (1981).

458. Mentioned in applying K.S.A. 44-503(a); employee of an independent contractor performing work which is part of principal's trade or business included as statutory employee. Robinson v. Flynn's Ferry Service, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 709, 711, 633 P.2d 1166 (1981).

459. Considered; liability of workmen's compensation fund derives from that of employer; settlement between claimant and employer precludes action against fund by claimant. Arduser v. Daniel International Corp., 7 Kan. App. 2d 225, 231, 640 P.2d 329 (1982).

460. Defendant was not a statutory employer; plaintiff's remedy was not solely under workers' compensation act; reversed. Zehring v. Wickham, 8 Kan. App. 2d 65, 66, 649 P.2d 1246 (1982).

461. Injured employee of subcontractor considered statutory employee of principal; common-law negligence action barred. Zehring v. Wickham, 232 Kan. 704, 705, 706, 658 P.2d 1004 (1983).

462. Act does not require injured worker to repay employer or insurance carrier when award judicially reduced. Johnston v. Tony's Pizza Service, 232 Kan. 848, 851, 658 P.2d 1047 (1983).

463. Mere coemployee status is not sufficient for immunity against suit. Wells v. Anderson, 8 Kan. App. 2d 431, 432, 435, 659 P.2d 833 (1983).

464. Act held constitutional; civil damage action cannot be maintained by person against fellow employee for compensation for injury covered by this act. Rajala v. Doresky, 233 Kan. 440, 441, 442, 443, 661 P.2d 1251 (1983).

465. Recovery for loss of earning power, not compensatory damages for physical injury; purpose of act. Fogle v. Sedgwick County, 9 Kan. App. 2d 129, 673 P.2d 465 (1984).

466. Act cited as exclusive remedy against employer for dependents of employee killed by trench cave-in. Balagna v. Shawnee County, 233 Kan. 1068, 1085, 668 P.2d 157 (1983).

467. Employer asked to be excused from trial attendance because liability limited hereunder; properly excused if no objection made. Powers v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 234 Kan. 89, 96, 671 P.2d 491 (1983).

468. Act does not violate plaintiff's due process or equal protection rights. Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166, 1172 (1983).

469. City employee injured by prison escapees not barred from suing state and county for failing to warn of escape. Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 573, 675 P.2d 57 (1984).

470. Absent physical injury, mental disorders not compensable personal injuries. Followill v. Emerson Electric Co., 234 Kan. 791, 792, 796, 674 P.2d 1050 (1984).

471. Summary judgment appropriate where coemployee/defendant immune from civil liability under act. Blank v. Chawla, 234 Kan. 975, 980, 678 P.2d 162 (1984).

472. Where injuries are intentional acts of insurers in terminating payments, acts arose outside of employment. Hormann v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 236 Kan. 190, 197, 689 P.2d 837 (1984).

473. Emphysema and chronic bronchitis distinguished; burden of proof for bronchitis is preponderance of evidence. Box v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 236 Kan. 237, 240, 242, 689 P.2d 871 (1984).

474. Where employer brings money suit, worker cannot claim offsets alleged due under act when provisions not utilized. Bethany Medical Center v. Knox, 10 Kan. App. 2d 192, 194, 196, 694 P.2d 1331 (1985).

475. Dual-capacity doctrine applied where employer had assumed assets and liabilities of third-party tortfeasor. Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 10 Kan. App. 2d 165, 166, 170, 694 P.2d 907 (1985).

476. Exclusive remedy provision provides no employer, or employee thereof, is liable for injury where compensation paid under act; employee injured by third-party tortfeasor. Anderson v. National Carriers, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 203, 205, 207, 695 P.2d 1293 (1985).

477. Where injury by assault arose out of and in course of employment whether claimant was aggressor irrelevant. Springston v. IML Freight, Inc., 10 KA.2d 501, 506, 704 P.2d 394 (1985).

478. Cited; traumatic neuroses (or conversion hysteria) and knowledge of handicap discussed in detail. Ruse v. State, 10 Kan. App. 2d 508, 509, 708 P.2d 216 (1985).

479. Cited; claimant has burden of proof with respect to traumatic neurosis claim. Wade v. Union Nat'l Bank, 10 Kan. App. 2d 645, 649, 707 P.2d 1087 (1985).

480. Cited; election under K.S.A. 44-505d must be held before August 1 for coverage to start with next budget year. City of Wichita v. Wichita Firemen's Relief Ass'n, 238 Kan. 122, 127, 708 P.2d 201 (1985).

481. Restitution doctrine not in act; no recovery back of monies paid during appeal after appeal determines nonliability. Clouston v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 11 Kan. App. 2d 112, 113, 715 P.2d 29 (1986).

482. Cited; self-employed persons and individual employers not intended to be covered by act as employees. Allen v. Mills, 11 Kan. App. 2d 415, 417, 418, 724 P.2d 143 (1986).

483. Cited; tort of retaliatory discharge not extended to employees covered by collective bargaining agreement. Cox v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 95, 99, 727 P.2d 456 (1986).

484. Cited; exclusivity of remedy stated in examining contracting out statute (K.S.A. 44-503(a)). Hollingsworth v. Fehrs Equip. Co., 240 Kan. 398, 401, 729 P.2d 1214 (1986).

485. Cited; in retaliatory discharge suit state tort claim preempted by federal law where claim arose from collective bargaining agreement. Edwards v. Western Mfg. Div. of Mont. Elev., 641 F. Supp. 616, 617 (1986).

486. Cited; where subcontractor's employee held as employee of principal (K.S.A. 44-503), provisions of act apply. Murphy v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 643 F. Supp. 269, 270 (1986).

487. Cited; duty to warn employee of danger working with familiar machinery purchased from former employer examined. Olson v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1511, 1513 (1986).

488. Violation of employer's instructions not "willful" as matter of law; element of intractableness must be included. Carter v. Koch Engineering, 12 Kan. App. 2d 74, 75, 76, 84, 85, 735 P.2d 247 (1987).

489. Cited; proof required of employer to be relieved of liability for hiring or retaining handicapped employee (K.S.A. 44-1567) examined. Denton v. Sunflower Electric Co-op, 12 Kan. App. 2d 262, 269, 740 P.2d 98 (1987).

490. Cited; denial of tort action for retaliatory discharge to worker protected by collective bargaining agreement does not violate U.S. Constitution. Armstrong v. Goldblatt Tool Co., 242 Kan. 164, 167, 172, 747 P.2d 119 (1987).

491. Claims of estate representative of victim killed by parolee against state correction officials barred by exclusivity provisions of act where victim and officials state coemployees. Beck v. Kansas University Psychiatry Foundation. 671 F. Supp. 1563, 1575, 1576 (1987).

492. Blood alcohol concentration relevant as to cause of accident, but does not give rise to presumption of intoxication. Poole v. Earp Meat Co., 242 Kan. 638, 639, 646, 750 P.2d 1000 (1988).

493. Immunity of insurer in dual capacity as general liability insurer and workers' compensation carrier for alleged negligence in boiler inspection examined. Leroy v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspec. and Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (D. Kan. 1988).

494. Absence of distinction between phrases "accidental means" and "accidental results" determined. Whitaker v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 13 Kan. App. 2d 279, 282, 768 P.2d 320 (1989).

495. Proof required to establish claim for traumatic neurosis examined. Love v. McDonald's Restaurant, 13 Kan. App. 2d 397, 771 P.2d 557 (1989).

496. Group health insurance clause excluding injuries "arising out of and in the course of any employment for wage or profit" applicable where claimant denied coverage hereunder. Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co., 13 Kan. App. 2d 452, 458, 773 P.2d 678 (1989).

497. Civil service board ruling as not res judicata against tort action brought under act against discrimination (K.S.A. 44-1001 et seq.) examined. Parker v. Kansas Neurological Institute, 13 Kan. App. 2d 685, 690, 778 P.2d 390 (1989).

498. Scope of review in workers compensation cases (K.S.A. 44-556) as unaltered by act for judicial review (K.S.A. 77-601 et seq.) determined. Reeves v. Equipment Service Industries, Inc., 245 Kan. 165, 168, 176, 777 P.2d 765 (1989).

499. Ambiguity of exclusionary clause in health and accident policy relative to application of workers compensation act examined. Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 245 Kan. 724, 733, 783 P.2d 900 (1989).

500. United States in same position as "statutory employer" under act with regards to claim by employee of contractor managing ammunition dump. Nofsinger v. U.S., 727 F. Supp. 586 (1989).

501. Director's action on claim for penalties and additional benefits, after trial court's affirmance of award, subject to review. Sawyer v. Oldham's Farm Sausage Co., 246 Kan. 327, 333, 787 P.2d 697 (1990).

502. Aggravation or additional injury from medical malpractice in treating compensable injury also compensable. Roberts v. Krupka, 246 Kan. 433, 442, 790 P.2d 422 (1990).

503. Provisions regarding attorney fees in K.S.A. 44-504 to be liberally construed. Lemery v. Buffalo Airways, Inc., 14 Kan. App. 2d 301, 305, 789 P.2d 1176 (1990).

504. Cited by dissent where majority found loss of services subject to subrogation in third-party action under act. McGranahan v. McGough, Sausage Co., 246 Kan. 327, 333, 787 P.2d 697 (1990).

505. Claimant's burden to establish right to compensation award and to prove conditions of such right stated. Hughes v. Inland Container Corp., 247 Kan. 407, 410, 789 P.2d 1011 (1990).

506. Government entitled to exert exclusive remedy provision in act as defense to contractor employee's action under federal tort claims act. Matthews v. U.S., 756 F. Supp. 511, 513 (1991).

507. Interplay of K.S.A. 44-503 and 44-532a examined and applied concerning fund liability for certain employers. Workers Compensation Fund v. Silicone Distributing, Inc., 248 Kan. 551, 556, 809 P.2d 1199 (1991).

508. Computation of diminution of employer's subrogation interest for fault (K.S.A. 44-504(d)) where worker obtains judgment against third party discussed and determined. Brabander v. Western Cooperative Electric, 248 Kan. 914, 915, 811 P.2d 1216 (1991).

509. Worker's action against third party for loss of services is for damages not recoverable under act; subrogation disallowed. McGranahan v. McGough, 249 Kan. 328, 338, 820 P.2d 403 (1991).

510. Worker's death must have been substantially caused by drug use or have deviated sufficiently from employment to have been off the job to deny compensation. Angleton v. Starkan, Inc., 250 Kan. 711, 717, 828 P.2d 933 (1992).

511. Act construed to include subcontractor's injured employee. Rodriquez v. John Russell Constr., 16 Kan. App. 2d 269, 271, 275, 826 P.2d 515 (1992).

512. Claimant has burden of proof to establish the right to compensation. Perez v. IBP, Inc., 16 Kan. App. 2d 277, 279, 826 P.2d 520 (1992).

513. Injury following epileptic seizure while driving company vehicle arose out of employment because condition of employment increased risk of injury. Bennett v. Wichita Fence Co., 16 Kan. App. 2d 458, 459, 824 P.2d 1001 (1992).

514. Exclusive remedy defense applied in ruling Kansas workers compensation law applicable to injuries sustained by employees of federal contractors. Mahaffey v. U.S. 785 F. Supp. 148, 150 (1992).

515. Insolvent employer's obligation under Kansas workers compensation act was nontax in nature; not entitled to tax priority in bankruptcy. In Re Payne, 27 B.R. 809, 810, 812 (1983).

516. Personal injury negligence action arising in workers compensation setting; independent contractor status, dual-status employee, liability between employees, employer's vicarious liability examined. Bright v. Cargill, Inc., 251 Kan. 387, 389, 837 P.2d 348 (1992).

517. Benefit disqualification for suicide not automatic, chain-of-causation rule adopted, claimant failed burden of proof. Rodriguez v. Henkle Drilling & Supply Co., 16 Kan. App. 2d 728, 730, 733, 734, 828 P.2d 1335 (1992).

518. Cited where term "wholly dependent child" (K.S.A. 44-508(c), 44-510b) construed as including child whose parentage undetermined at time of worker's death. Killingsworth v. City of Wichita, 16 Kan. App. 2d 801, 830 P.2d 70 (1992).

519. Impartial interpretation of act as result of 1987 amendment noted; claimant not automatically entitled to most advantageous calculation under K.S.A. 44-510a. Miner v. M. Bruenger & Co., Inc., 17 Kan. App. 2d 185, 193, 836 P.2d 19 (1992).

520. Where plaintiff barred from tort claim as a matter of law, any settlement of tort suit is patently unreasonable. Murphy v. Silver Creek Oil & Gas, Inc., 17 Kan. App. 2d 213, 215, 217, 837 P.2d 1198 (1992).

521. More than one employer in contractor-subcontractor-employer pyramid may qualify as injured worker's statutory employer. Selle v. The Boeing Co., 17 Kan. App. 2d 543, 545, 840 P.2d 542 (1992).

522. Workers compensation judge may determine parentage for purposes of workers compensation benefits only. R.L.J. v. Western Sprinklers, Inc., 17 Kan. App. 2d 749, 753, 844 P.2d 37 (1992).

523. Exclusive remedy defense applies to coemployees, bars common law actions against coemployees or employer. Thilla v. E.L. Farmer and Company, Inc., 958 F.2d 328, 329 (1992).

524. Presumption of validity of second marriage over prior common-law marriage examined. Chandler v. Central Oil Corp., 253 Kan. 50, 53, 853 P.2d 649 (1993).

525. Cited where disparate treatment between employees with nonresident alien dependents and others (K.S.A. 44-510b(i)) declared unconstitutional. Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 253 Kan. 116, 126, 853 P.2d 669 (1993).

526. Limitation on remedies examined when employee has no spouse, children or dependents. Karhoff v. National Mills, Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 302, 305, 851 P.2d 1021 (1993).

527. Employer's nonliability noted where permanency of claimant's condition does not result from work-related injury. West-Mills v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 561, 563, 859 P.2d 392 (1993).

528. Personal injury negligence claim in workers compensation setting, effect of remand and settlement agreements examined. Bright v. LSI Corp., 254 Kan. 853, 854, 869 P.2d 686 (1994).

529. Whether employee was on the way to or from work for workers compensation coverage purposes examined. Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 19 Kan. App. 2d 367, 368, 869 P.2d 761 (1994).

530. Whether employee covered by workers compensation injured by coemployee's negligent driving may sue coemployee separately examined. Bay v. Funk, 19 Kan. App. 2d 440, 442, 871 P.2d 268 (1994).

531. On question certified, standard of proof required in retaliatory discharge action for filing workers compensation claim examined. Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 514, 518, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994).

532. Whether inherently dangerous exception to nonliability of landowner applies to independent contractor's employees covered by workers compensation examined. Dillard v. Strecker, 255 Kan. 704, 708, 877 P.2d 371 (1994).

533. Whether employee's injury in parking garage occurred on employer's premises examined; going and coming rule applied. Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 256 Kan. 36, 38, 883 P.2d 768 (1994).

534. Whether employer discharged employee in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim examined. Malek v. Martin Marrietta Corp., 859 F. Supp. 458, 465 (1994).

535. Whether KWCA (K.S.A. 44-501 et seq.) is exclusive remedy for plaintiff's assault and battery claims examined. Bernard v. Doskocil Companies, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (1994).

536. Whether employee established connection between pursuit of workers compensation benefits and termination in retaliatory discharge claim examined. Rosas v. IBP, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 912, 915 (1994).

537. Whether special hazard exception to coming and going rule applies to worker injured crossing street to work examined. Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 20 Kan. App. 2d 962, 963, 894 P.2d 901 (1995).

538. Whether issues regarding whether plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim precluded summary judgment examined. Hill v. IBP, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 521, 522 (1995).

539. Employer failed to prove that employee's intoxication was a substantial cause of fatal injury. Kindel v. Ferco Rental, Inc., 258 Kan. 272, 285, 899 P.2d 1058 (1995).

540. Special hazard exception to going and coming rule applied to worker injured while crossing street on way to work. Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 Kan. 653, 655, 662, 664, 907 P.2d 828 (1995).

541. Injury sustained by employee assaulted by fellow worker does not arise out of employment unless foreseeable by employer. Harris v. Bethany Medical Center, 21 Kan. App. 2d 804, 805, 909 P.2d 657 (1995).

542. Former employee terminated for filing claim under workers compensation act. Huffman v. Ace Elec. Co., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 1469, 1470 (1995).

543. Under facts, plaintiff's claim of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress not barred by KWCA. U.S. v. Moffet, 885 F. Supp. 237 (1995).

544. Personal injury claims should be brought under tort or workers compensation, not Americans with disabilities act (42 USCA § 12101 et seq.). Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1463, 1469 (1995).

545. Issue concerning whether contractor's employee had implied contract with subcontractor precluded summary judgment on employee's negligence claim. Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. LaFever, 905 F. Supp. 904, 929 (1995).

546. Issue regarding whether employee was discharged in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims precluded summary judgment. Lyden v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 343, 345 (1995).

547. Issue regarding whether employer discharged employee for exercising rights under KWCA precluded summary judgment. Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (1995).

548. Where injury does not disable employee for at least one week workers compensation benefits are limited to medical expenses. Boucher v. Peerless Products, Inc., 21 Kan. App. 2d 977, 979, 911 P.2d 198 (1996).

549. Enforcement of indemnity contract not barred by exclusive remedy provision of workers compensation act (K.S.A. 44-501 et seq.). Estate of Bryant v. All Temperature Insulation, Inc., 22 Kan. App. 2d 387, 389, 394, 916 P.2d 1294 (1996).

550. Tort liability for employer's negligent treatment of employees nonwork-related injury barred by dual capacity doctrine. Scott v. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp., 23 Kan. App. 2d 156, 158, 928 P.2d 109 (1996).

551. Evidence that employer offered prizes for injury free work sections admissable in relalictory discharge action. Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (1996).

552. Remedy for increase in emotional distress raised by employee lies in tort or under workers compensation act. Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 102 F.3d 1075, 1076 (1996).

553. Self-employed person is not covered by workers compensation act unless valid election is in effect. Aetna Life and Cas. v. Americas Truckway Systems, Inc., 23 Kan. App. 2d 315, 317, 929 P.2d 803 (1997).

554. Rights under subsection (c) cannot be destroyed by retroactive legislation imposing liability not previously existing. Osborn v. Electric Corp. of Kansas City, 23 Kan. App. 2d 868, 936 P.2d 297 (1997).

555. Undisputed testimony that primary injury worsened by aging and time sufficient to award benefits for increased injury under K.S.A. 44-528. Nance v. Harvey County, 23 Kan. App. 2d 899, 902, 931 P.2d 1245 (1997).

556. Workers compensation board's offset of claimant's retirement insurance paid by employer from workers compensation benefits upheld. Bohanan v. U.S.D. No. 260, 24 Kan. App. 2d 362, 372, 947 P.2d 440 (1997).

557. Exclusive remedy provision of worker's compensation act barred injured employee's negligence claim. Kiser v. Building Erection Services, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (1997).

558. Fact issue concerning type of work done by plaintiff awarded workers compensation precluded negligence summary judgment. Ascanio v. Allied Signal, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (1998).

559. Benefit calculation for employee whose permanent partial disability benefits change from work disability to functional impairment examined. Wheeler v. Boeing Co., 25 Kan. App. 2d 632, 636, 967 P.2d 1085 (1998).

560. Evidence sufficient to support finding employee suffered work related injury for workers compensation claim purposes. Newell v. K-Mart Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1313 (1999).

561. Workers compensation act exclusive recovery provision is not applicable to intentional assaults by employer. Stapp v. Overnite Transp. Co., 995 F. Supp. 1207, 1216 (1998).

562. Employee may not recover wages in retaliatory discharge action while receiving temporary total disability compensation. Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291 (1998).

563. ALJ's award misaddressed; not received before expiration of review application filing date; notice insufficient to satisfy due process. Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 266 Kan. 580, 582, 972 P.2d 747 (1999).

564. Offset provision of section does not violate equal protection guarantees. Gadberry v. R.L. Polk & Co., 25 Kan. App. 2d 800, P.2d (1998).

565. Settlement of claim with employee does not preclude Ch. 60 action to determine proportionate liability between two employers. U.S.D. No. 501 v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 25 Kan. App. 2d 820, 971 P.2d 1210 (1999).

566. Offset provisions of K.S.A. 44-501(h) do not apply to social security retiree working part time who was injured in the course of employment. Dickens v. Pizza Co., 266 Kan. 1066, 1071, 974 P.2d 601 (1999).

567. Employer entitled to offset workers compensation award by retirement benefits received; plan was totally funded by employer. Treaster v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 267 Kan. 610, 626, 987 P.2d 325 (1999).

568. Act to be liberally construed; stewardess who had spent some unspecified time flying over Kansas and was entitled to compensation (carpal tunnel syndrome). Graff v. Trans World Airlines, 267 Kan. 851, 857, 860, 983 P.2d 258 (1999).

569. Employer exempted from workers compensation act who purchases workers compensation insurance is not deemed to have elected to be subject to act. Rivera v. Cimarron Dairy, 267 Kan. 875, 880, 988 P.2d 235 (1999).

570. Injured employee receiving workers compensation benefits as well as social security disability benefits is subject to social security setoff at age 65; social security benefits at age 65 are based on age not disability. Wishon v. Cossman, 268 Kan. 99, 108, 991 P.2d 415 (1999).

571. Former firefighters work-related disability benefits not subject to setoff in determining workers compensation benefits. Green v. City of Wichita, 26 Kan. App. 2d 53, 54, 977 P.2d 283 (1999).

572. Under statute then in effect, claimant not entitled to workers compensation benefits if not disabled for at least one week from earning full wages. Matney v. Matney Chiropractic Clinic, 26 Kan. App. 2d 69, 71, 977 P.2d 962 (1999).

573. Employer liable to compensate employee for injury where claimant was totally unable to return to work for one week. Overstreet v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., Inc., 26 Kan. App. 2d 586, 587, 985 P.2d 142 (1999).

574. Workers compensation board dismissal of insurer appeal on policy coverage issue upheld; term "certain defenses" construed. Carpenter v. National Filter Service, 26 Kan. App. 2d 672, 675, 994 P.2d 641 (1999).

575. Five nonconsecutive days off work satisfied condition that employee be disabled for one week for a compensable injury. Farrel v. U.S.D. No. 229, 26 Kan. App. 2d 797, 798, 995 P.2d 881 (1999).

576. Under facts, claimant was disabled for a sufficient amount of time to qualify for permanent partial disability compensation. Curran v. Lawrence Paper Co., 26 Kan. App. 2d 949, 950, 996 P.2d 358 (2000).

577. Employer had legitimate reason for terminating employee which was not in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim. Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (1999).

578. Issue concerning whether employee was terminated in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim precluded summary judgment. McClurg v. GTech Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1162 (1999).

579. Employer's reason for terminating employee was legitimate and not in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim. Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1235 (1999).

580. Corporate employer allowed to designate treatment provider for injured employee who is also a stockholder. Matney v. Matney Chiropractic Clinic, 268 Kan. 336, 338, 995 P.2d 871 (2000).

581. Employee of subcontractor who provided workers compensation benefits to employee may not sue principal contractor in tort for injuries sustained at job site. Robinett v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 12 P.3d 411 (2000).

582. Where work related injury causes aggravation of preexisting condition, compensation is allowed for entire disability less any amount of preexisting impairment established by employer (0 in this case). Hanson v. Logan U.S.D. 326, 28 Kan. App. 2d 92, 11 P.3d 1184 (2000).

583. Trial court finding that employee was terminated in retaliation for asserting workers compensation claim upheld. Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1209 (2000).

584. Employee failed to prove employer based termination on filing of workers compensation claim. Dougherty v. Venator Group Retail, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (2000).

585. Employee failed to prove employer's reasons for termination were pretext for retaliation. Foster v. Allied Signal, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (2000).

586. Supervisor's comment on claimant's loss of hearing caused claimant to go to audiologist; attempt to make a cast of ear caused permanent hearing loss: held, injury not arising out of and in course of claimant's employment. Wilson v. Mercy Health Center, 28 Kan. App. 2d 410, 15 P.3d 853 (2000).

587. Missouri resident working in Kansas for about six months rents room in hotel close to jobsite, held: accident occurring while going from hotel to jobsite is not an injury arising out of and in course of employment. Butera v. Fluor Daniel Const. Corp., 28 Kan. App. 2d 542, 18 P.3d 278 (2001).

588. Defendant contractor is immune from negligence action brought by employee of temporary employment agency; defendant became a special employer for purposes of workers compensation act. Scott v. Altmar, Inc., 272 Kan. 1280, 38 P.3d 673 (2002).

589. Injury which occurred when employee returned to employer's premises to pick up paycheck is injury in course of employment. Palmer v. Lindberg Heat Treatment, 31 Kan. App. 2d 1, 59 P.3d 352 (2002).

590. Employee with chronic lower back pain has compensable claim from injury sustained while getting into motor vehicle. Anderson v. Scarlett Auto Interiors, 31 Kan. App. 2d 5, 61 P.3d 81 (2002).

591. Provision of estoppel as an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pled and cannot be raised by court, is extended to workers compensation cases. Coffman v. State, 31 Kan. App. 2d 61, 59 P.3d 1050 (2002).

592. Unless employer shows probable cause that employee used or was impaired by alcohol while working, results of blood alcohol tests are inadmissible and no conclusive presumption of alcohol impairment arises. Evans v. Frakes Trucking, 31 Kan. App. 2d 212, 64 P.3d 440 (2002).

593. Material fact issue concerning whether plaintiff was fired for exercise of workers compensation rights precluded summary judgment. Foster v. Allied Signal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1187, 1189 (2002).

594. Workers compensation benefits denied; under facts of case stress cannot be considered as an external factor; unusual stress is not supported by evidence. Mudd v. Neosho Memorial Regional Med. Center, 275 Kan. 187, 62 P.3d 236 (2003).

595. In repetitive micro-trauma case, last day worked prior to hearing is date of injury. Kimbrough v. University of Kansas Med. Center, 276 Kan. 853, 79 P.3d 1289 (2003).

596. Blood alcohol level of claimant erroneously excluded by workers compensation board; claimant not entitled to benefits. Foos v. Terminix, 31 Kan. App. 2d 522, 67 P.3d 173 (2003).

597. In retaliatory discharge action, employee's absences from work caused by work related injury are considered protected activity in considering existence of causal connection between injury and termination. White v. Tomasic, 31 Kan. App. 2d 597, 69 P.3d 208 (2003).

598. Fact issue concerning employer's vicarious liability to accident victim precluded summary judgment. O'Shea v. Welch, 350 F.3d 1101, 1103 (2003).

599. Kansas recognizes tort for retaliatory discharge for employee's exercise of rights under Federal Employers Liability Act. Hysten v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Kan. 551, 85 P.3d 1183 (2004).

600. Private injury action not allowed; defendant had clocked out from job at Walmart but was still on premises assisting in apprehension of check forger. Servantez v. Shelton, 32 Kan. App. 2d 305, 81 P.3d 1263 (2004).

601. Benefits denied under intoxication exception; section requires probable cause arise, exist or occur contemporaneously with collection of blood sample. Foos v. Terminix, 277 Kan. 687, 89 P.3d 546 (2004).

602. Claim of death as result of heart attack not successful; workers compensation benefits awarded. Titterington v. Brooke Insurance, 277 Kan. 888, 89 P.3d 643 (2004).

603. Cause of action for retaliatory discharge exists against employer other than employer against whom workers compensation claim made. Gonzalez-Centeno v. North Central Kansas Regional Juvenile Detention Facility, 278 Kan. 427, 101 P.3d 1170 (2004).

604. Federal social security benefits offset workers compensation benefits for injury sustained prior to date of retirement. McIntosh v. Sedgwick County, 32 Kan. App. 2d 889, 91 P.3d 545 (2004).

605. Injuries resulting from fight between two workers at job site are compensable without regard to who was aggressor; employer had reason to anticipate incident; act to be liberally construed. Jordan v. Pyle, Inc., 33 Kan. App. 2d 258, 101 P.3d 239 (2004).

606. Fatal injuries "did not arise out of and in course of employment"; incident occurred on employer's premises but 1 1 / 2 hours after termination of employment for day. Smith v. Winfield Livestock Auction, Inc., 33 Kan. App. 2d 615, 106 P.3d 94 (2005).

607. Varicose vein condition was an injury which arose out of and was directly caused by his employment but appellant failed to make timely written claim of hearing loss. Poff v. IBP, Inc., 33 Kan. App. 2d 700, 106 P.3d 1152 (2005).

608. No permanent partial disability award for employee developing allergic reaction to produce while working in grocery store. Casey v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 34 Kan. App. 2d 66, 114 P.3d 182 (2005).

609. Retirement benefits received reduce weekly rate under K.S.A. 44-501 but do not limit weeks payable for permanent total disability compensation under K.S.A. 44-510. McIntosh v. Sedgwick County, 34 Kan. App. 2d 684, 123 P.3d 740 (2005).

610. Employee permitted to keep employer's vehicle at his residence and use it to drive to and from work; this is an exception to going and coming rule that such injuries are not compensable. Sumner v. Meier's Ready Mix, Inc., 34 Kan. App. 2d 850, 126 P.3d 1127 (2006).

611. Nonwork related injury to shoulder in 2004 deemed natural consequence of 1993 work injury. Logsdon v. Boeing Co., 35 Kan. App. 2d 79, 128 P.3d 430 (2006).

612. Employee tortfeasor has fellow servant immunity for acts as long as acting within scope and course of employment. Scott v. Hughes, 281 Kan. 642, 652, 132 P.3d 889 (2006).

613. Where employee's drug and alcohol use not resolved in workers compensation proceeding, summary judgment against employee premature. Scott v. Hughes, 281 Kan. 642, 653, 132 P.3d 889 (2006).

614. Mentioned regarding employer and co-worker liability under workers compensation act. PMA Group v. Trotter, 281 Kan. 1344, 1346, 135 P.3d 1244 (2006).

615. Injured worker can recover from employer's insurance company for underinsurance coverage even if already received workers compensation benefits from employer. Stemple v. Maryland Casuality Co., 282 Kan. 405, 414, 144 P.3d 1273 (2006).

616. The two phases "out of" and "in the course of" employment have separate and distinct meanings; they are conjunctive, and each condition must exist before compensation is allowable. Rinke v. Bank of America, 282 Kan. 746, 752, 148 P.3d 553 (2006).

617. Plain meaning analysis; injuries do not arise out of employment if strain or physical exertion is normal activity of day-to-day living. Johnson v. Johnson County, 36 Kan. App. 2d 786, 790, 147 P.3d 1091 (2006).

618. Tort of retaliatory discharge extended to encompass firing of injured employee likely to file claim in near future. Pendergraft v. Layne Christensen Canada, LTD., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1217 (2006).

619. Employer did not meet its burden to offset employee's retirement benefits under subsection (h). Rash v. Heartland Cement Co., 37 Kan. App. 2d 175, 187, 154 P.3d 15 (2006).

620. Construction design professional immunity provided by K.S.A. 44-501(f) discussed. Edwards v. Anderson Engineering, Inc., 284 Kan. 892, 166 P.3d 1047 (2007).

621. Offset provisions discussed; lump sum payment of retirement benefits apportioned over remaining life expectancy. Lleras v. Via Christi Regional Med. Center, 37 Kan. App. 2d 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 154 P.3d 1130 (2007).

622. Mentioned, if decedents were employees rather than independent contractors then workers compensation applicable. Dye v. WMC, Inc., 38 Kan. App. 2d 655, 666, 172 P.3d 49 (2007).

623. Workers compensation retaliation claim denied; employee's burden of proof in summary judgment motion discussed. Coleman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1229, 1230 (2007).

624. Cited; when two parallel scheduled injuries occur and presumption of permanent total disability rebutted award is calculated under K.S.A. 44-510d. Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 778, 780, 189 P.3d 508 (2008).

625. Subsection (h) of K.S.A. 44-501 contemplates the retirement benefit offset must be calculated using the total of all such benefits. Robinson v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 39 Kan. App. 2d 342 to 351, 180 P.3d 597 (2008).

626. Subsection (c) permits award to the extent the work-related injury causes increased disability, reduced by preexisting functional impairment. Payne v. Boeing Co., 39 Kan. App. 2d 353, 355 to 363, 180 P.3d 590 (2008).

627. Workers compensation case appealed; recreational and social events exception of K.S.A. 44-508(f) construed and applied. Hizey v. MCI, 39 Kan. App. 2d 609, 612, 181 P.3d 583 (2008).

628. Cited in workers compensation opinion discussing the "going and coming rule" and exceptions thereto. Halford v. Nowak Construction Co., 39 Kan. App. 2d 935, 938, 186 P.3d 206 (2008).

629. Heart attack claimant failed to show negligent medical treatment by employer in rendering emergency care. Adee v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 39 Kan. App. 2d 1017, 1024 to 1027, 186 P.3d 840 (2008).

630. Cited; under K.S.A. 44-510e a worker's post-injury wage is to be based on actual hours worked. Nistler v. Footlocker Retail, Inc., 40 Kan. App. 2d 831, 832, 836, 196 P.3d 395 (2008).

631. Choice of law case where injury in Kansas but Nebraska subcontractor paid workers compensation; claim against Kansas general contractor barred. Anderson v. Commerce Const. Services, Inc., 531 F.3d 1190, 1193 (2008).

632. Terms "out of" and "in the course of" employment construed; premise exception applied. McCready v. Payless Shoesource, 41 Kan. App. 2d 79, 200 P.3d 479 (2009).

633. K.S.A. 44-508(f) construed and applied involving recreational or social events; claimant felt pressured to attend. Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 42 Kan. App. 2d 441, 213 P.3d 764 (2009).

634. Employer is not liable for benefits when an employee's injuries were contributed to by the employee's drug use. Wiehe v. Kissick Construction Co., 43 Kan. App. 2d 732, 232 P.3d 866 (2010).

635. Claimant failed to demonstrate the compensability of medical compensation and her post-award medical benefits were incurred outside the relation back period; awards reversed. Roles v. Boeing Co., 43 Kan. App. 2d 619, 230 P.3d 771 (2010).

636. City retirement board's interpretation of city code requiring that any amounts received from workers' compensation be deducted from disability retirement benefit not arbitrary or capricious. Robinson v. City of Wichita Retirement Bd. of Trustees, 291 Kan. 247, 243 P.3d 326 (2010).

637. Amendments to the workers compensation act do not apply retroactively. Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc., 292 Kan. 585, 257 P.3d 255 (2011).

638. Evidence insufficient to support finding by Workers Compensation Board that claimant suffered permanent and total disability from exposure to chemicals and fumes at work. Chriestenson v. Russell Stover Candies, 46 Kan. App. 2d 453, 263 P.3d 821 (2011).

639. Plaintiff's civil lawsuits are barred; defendant is entitled to fellow servant immunity. Scott v. Hughes, 294 Kan. 403, 275 P.3d 890 (2012).

640. The workers compensation board's findings in denying compensation held not supported by substantive evidence. Lake v. Jessee Trucking, 49 Kan. App. 2d 820, 316 P.3d 796 (2013).

641. Provision in employment agreement shortening a 2-year statute of limitations for retaliatory discharge claim deemed void as against public policy. Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation, 297 Kan. 547, 304 P.3d 1226 (2013).

642. Employer's reason for discharging employee on grounds of dishonesty was not pretext for retaliation against him for filing a workers compensation claim. Macan v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 743 F.3d 708 (10 th Cir. 2014).

643. Workers compensation award is not subject to setoff where an employee's benefits accrue regardless of whether any other income existed. Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 49 Kan. App. 2d 1011, 321 P.3d 18 (2014).

644. With no evidence of contemporaneous impairment, the affirmative defense does not apply to the claimant under the facts of the case. Young v. Great Bend Cooperative Assn., 50 Kan. App. 2d 158, 324 P.3d 306 (2014).

645. An award for workers compensation benefits, for work-related injury that causes increased disability by aggravating a preexisting condition, must be reduced by the amount of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. Ward v. Allen County Hospital, 50 Kan. App. 2d 280, 324 P.3d 1122 (2014).

646. A person retired and receiving old-age social security benefits will have a workers compensation award offset subject to the social security offset provisions. Farley v. Above Par Transportation, 50 Kan. App. 2d 866, 871, 334 P.3d 883 (2014).

647. Statute must be followed as written requiring that all workers compensation payments are subject to offset. Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 Kan. 358, 367, 361 P.3d 504 (2015).

648. An injured worker's award for both a total disability and permanent partial disability must be calculated before any preexisting functional impairment reductions can be made. Ballard v. Dondlinger & Sons Constr. Co., 51 Kan. App. 2d 855, 865, 355 P.3d 707 (2015).

649. An insufficient urine sample, without evidence of an intent to thwart the purpose of a drug test, is not a refusal to submit to drug testing as used in the workers compensation act. Byers v. Acme Foundry, 53 Kan. App. 2d 485, 388 P.3d 621 (2017), rev. denied (July 25, 2017).

650. Positive drug test results performed on sample collected by hospital were admissible, but clear and convincing evidence showed the presumed impairment did not contribute to accident. Woessner v. Labor Max Staffing, 312 Kan. 36, 471 P.3d 1 (2020).

651. Whether a worker's injury or disability was caused by unusual exertion or by external forces raises two separate theories of recovery. Larson v. Excel Indus., Inc., 59 Kan. App. 2d 583, 483 P.3d 1067 (2021).

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